ecpt.-ml)cr U, 1911 
LAND AND WATER 
been wc cannot toll until further details come in ; 
but it is evident that the first Austrian Army was 
in a position to suffer defeat, and almost equally 
evident that it woidd not have escaped from its 
jiosition without at least some veiy heavy loss. 
Things may even be worse for the remaining 
Austrian Army ; wc do not yet kno^v. Ihit at the 
moment of writing it is not yet cut off. 
The question now arises, what u.se the liussians 
can make of this victory, if it is complete : that 
is, if the first Austrian Army is broken up as the 
.second was, and if the advance through Galicia into 
Silesia remains imcheckcd. 
The first thing that strikes one is the great way 
that the Armies liave to travel. It is nearly a month's 
marching from the district of Jjemberg to the German 
frontier ; but against this delay in time there are two 
things to be said : I'irst, it is evident from the map 
that once Galicia was clear of opposition, forces in 
Itussian Poland gathered at A^'arsaw or between that 
centre and the Gennan frontier coidd, if they were in 
sufficient nvmibers, come down upon Silesia, before the 
main Russian Army, now in the ueighbourliood of 
Lemberg, could come uj). It is an imiwobable because 
u diiugerous policy. 'The Russians thus advancing 
as a detached body iu front of their main body 
might have to meet forces sujx^rior to their own 
and suffer just what their companions have sufl'ered 
in Eas-t Prussia. It is more probable that the 
pressure upon Silesia (if the Russian victory is 
indeed complete, and if, as seems probable, the line 
of advance undertaken will be westward through 
Galicia) will not begin imtil at least a month has 
passed. 
Tlie second consideration, however, is more pract- 
ical. It is this. The wealthy industrial district for 
which the word "Silesia" stands is not confined to the 
German province whose capital is J5reslau. It extends 
into Austrian and even into Rus.sian ti/rritory ; and the 
disturbance caused to the society of the enemy b\' his 
presence in territories which can bo held to ransom, 
and the social Ufc of which is important to the whole 
Germanic alliance, will begin before the German 
frontier is crossed. 
But before we leave this first division of this 
week's comments, the eastern theatre of the war, some- 
thing must be said of the effect j)roduced by the 
German victories in East Prussia. 
The extent of the check there received by the 
Russian Armies has not, perhaps, been fully appre- 
ciated by the public of this country. 
The German official report first claimed 30,000 
prisoners — later, more than double that number. 
Accurate as these official reports usually are, one is 
disinclined to accept the very large second estimate ; 
or, at least, one is inclined to suggest that its j)ro- 
duction immediately after the Lemberg disaster was 
too much of a coincidence. 
It is only a conjecture made for what it is worth, 
but the conjecture may be risked that of some five 
Rxtssian Army Gorps present in East Prussia, two 
got pushed further ahead than was safe and \\erv' 
caught. That they Avere completely surrounded and 
destroyed there is no evidence. That their fighting 
value for the immediate future was destroyed is 
probable. But a conjecture it remains, and more 
than a conjecture it will not be until we have some 
full account of the reverse here suffered by our 
Allies. 
It Avould be possible for the main Russian Anny 
in Galicia to march on into Silesia before this check 
was set right by the occupation of East Prussia in 
force. But it would not be possible to begin a 
general advance upon Berlin, or upon the centre of 
Gennany, while large and victorious German forces 
still stood upon the lower Tistula. And all this lino 
of argument reinforces one's conclusion that it is 
unwise to expect the effect of the Russian pressiu-e 
iu the East to be felt in the west until several weeks 
have passed. 
THE WESTERN FIELD. 
3CAL! Of MiCtS 
COMPIECNE 
o 
RHEIMS 
Wi 
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V ^^5" 
VILLES TOURBftS 
la o z?"« < 
»VALMY ar^^ 
In the western field of the war, that is in operations. We can only say that the problem 
Northern France, we arc approaching very rapidly presents it.self in a certain form ; we cannot yet say 
the most critical moment in tlio first pliase of the how that problem will be solved. 
