LAND AND WATER 
Soptombor 1:?, 1914 
Tlic form in Aviiicli this prublcm prc-iouts itself 
Las boon so tleavly put in the yoiioiv.l Tress, that the 
ivpetitiou of it hero may seem tedious to the reader. 
I will, novei-thele?-s, repeat its main elements, because, 
simple as they are, they must be fully grasped if the 
future of this campaign is to bo imderstood. 
At the end of last week it seemed as though a)i 
investmeut of, or at least an attack upon, the Northern 
and Eastci-u sections of the fortifications of Paris was 
intt>ndi>d by the Oerman eommandei-s. They had 
suc-eessfully advanced with amazing ra]iidity from the 
Belgian frontier to the gates of the French caj)ital. 
Tliei-o v.-as not anyone following and commenting 
npo:i the military history of the campaign Avho did 
not hope (if his heart was with the Allies) that this 
task would be undert;iken by the invaders or who 
did not dread it if his syn^xithies were with the 
Germans. 
It is almost self-e\ idcnt that to iindeiiake a task 
of such magnitude as the attack upon the Northern 
and Eastern forts alone in a perimeter of over 100 
miles, and that in the presence of an unbeaten army, 
would be to imperil the whole future of the (.{ennan 
forces of invasion. But it Avas suggested in these 
comments^ 
(1) That the overwhelming advance upon Paris 
would never have been made unless Paris had been its 
ti-ue objective. 
(i) That the moral importance of entering Paris, 
both positive in its effect upon the (Icrman nation 
and negative in its effect upon the Allies, would 
hardly permit the (lerman commanders to give up the 
prey, even temporarih'. 
As a nnitter of fact, the right v.ing -that is the 
extreme western extremity — of the (icrman invading 
line was, upon Saturday and Sunday last, deliljeratcly 
hi-ltcd. The forces opposed to it at the moment (in 
the neighbourhood of Creil) were certainly not suffi- 
cient to have com]>ellcdthis halt, or to have imposed it 
upon a reluctant enemy. The change of plan, though 
c. itiinly made at the last moment, wa.s deliberately 
chos:n and as delibei-ately acted upon by those who 
were resj)onsiblc for the (Jermau mo\'ements as a 
whole. And the change of plan was this. Of the 
forces which had niai'ched, one overlapping the other, 
until the German army of invasion was stretched over 
the whole of northern France from the neighbourhood 
of Paris at Creil in the west to Verdun in the east, 
the extreme western ones turned suddenly at right 
angles to their previous course and began nnirching 
south and east in the directions indicated in the sketch 
below by the arrows. 
,.,tstk-«» 
f > lO 15 JOIJ 
die J'-'/.r 
EKF.TCB fcHOWIXO THE WKt'KL Oi' THE <!KKJIAN ET.3I1T WINT., 
cr. 1st akmy, between seitiubeb 3rd axd SKritKEEn 5th.' 
Paris was left neglected uj)on the light; i,r,d 
■while the remainder of the German lincAvas advaucino- 
southward (each body directly towards the front of 
the position it occupied) these Avestcrn units alone 
(conventionally known here as the First German 
Army) turned partly away from, but in the main per- 
pendicular to, the original direction which they had 
hithci'to strictly and rajndl}- followed from Mons and 
Charleroi towards the Frer.ch ca])ital. 
AVhy did they do this ? AVhat had happened? 
'fhe answer to such questions can only be found 
in one of two allernatives. 
Either {a) the v.hole German advance upon li'aris 
was not intended as a fundamental part of the campaign, 
but was in the nature of a feint ; or, {fi) the Gcnnan 
advance had on its western extreme come up against 
a snrpri.se ; had met forces nnexpcctcdly strong, liad 
come up against an unsuspected reserve maintained 
by the French deliberately during all the reti'cat, 
and maintained at the cost of weakening the defensive 
line Avhich retired so precipitately (])ut remained 
unbroken) during that retreat. 
There is indeed a third jiossiljility, which has only 
to be named to be reiected. As it has been suggested 
in some quarters 1 A\ill not leave it unnoticed. 
This third conjecture is that the cessation of the 
Gernnui ad\ancc upon Paris was due to an exhaustion 
of that adva)ice in numbers and in energy. There are 
many reasons \\hy this conjecture may be safely 
rejected. 
It is c\ident that the advance was ])lanned in 
great detail, and Avith a full organisation of its daily 
effort and its reser\-es of strength. 
It is equally evident that the check, had it been 
due to this cause, would have taken the form of an 
increasing exhaustion long before Paris was reached, 
and of that exhaustion there has been no sign. 
Further, the extreme German right wing, which 
was thus suddenl}' turned perjiendicular to its original 
direction, has been so turning in these last few days, 
Avitli full enei-gy ; it is still defending itself vigorously 
against what are obviously superior numbers. It has, 
as I write, taken a strong counter offensive upon the 
Ourcq. AVhile the deliberate choice of a new and, at 
first sight, puzzling direction towards the east and 
south (while Paris lay to the Avest) is still furtlier 
evidence of a change of \Aixa. \ci-y different in character 
from mere beAvilderment, or from any confusion due 
to some miscalcidation by the German commanders of 
their remaining energy. 
Nothing can explain this unexpected Avbcel but 
the necessity of a new ])l;in, and that necessity arising 
from the discover^', behind and in the neighbourhood 
of Paris, of a large French }-eservc force of Avhose 
existence, or, at any rate, of anIiosc numljcrs, the 
enemy were hitherto ignorant. 
AMuit is that new jdan which has thus been 
suddenly adopted by the Germans, Avhen they dis- 
covered this unexpected weight of men on their right, 
and what are its chances of success ? 
While the German advance on Paris was taking 
]>lace, the various bodies of the ( rerman Line between 
the j\[eusc and Paris were occupied in attempting to 
outflank the Allied line Avhich was retreating before 
them. In any one day of the advance, after the line 
of the Sambre was abandoned, the positiim was always 
somcAvhat after the fash ion of t!i is diagram . The Allied 
line being held by bodies A B C i^ of the enemy, 
opjwsed to its OAvn bodies F G II K, fresh bodies, 
drawn from the superior numbers of the Germans, 
kept coming round, as at E, to euA-elop the Allied lino 
if possible. This attempt to envelop Avas oidy 
avoided day after day by the continued ra])id, but 
luckily orderly, retreat of the Allies upon positions to 
G» 
