LAND AXD WATER 
September U, 1914 
tTioiu'li pivssod in upon tlitir riglit at ^I will luvve 
acliitn-o<l their immediate ol^joct. 
For : - 
(//) They Avill have compelled the Frencli 
bodies at Jj. L. either to retreat precipitately 
through the gap of Xaney betv/een Toiil aud 
I'pinal, or to bo caught in reverse and 
annihilated : 
(//) Tliey will have permitted their own 
army in Lorraine [K K K) to pass through 
the gap of Xancy and to join up in a direct 
i'orward march with what Inid hitheiio been 
tlieir northern armies cut off tVom them by the 
])rojecting fortress of Verd\in. 
(r) More important still, they will have 
wiped out the strategical' factor of the fortified 
frontier line Verdun — Toul, and Epinal— 
Eclfort. For once the Germans are behind 
that line, tliat line might as well not exist ; 
and the garrisons within the fortresses can be 
picked up at their leisure. 
{f/) Finnlhi, and most im/jorlant nf all, lie 
Germans {if theij achiece i/iis pusliing back or 
hreahnt/ of 1/ie French line in ilie neighbour- 
hood of /'.) \cill pick up communicaltons 
{;?), (2), (2) far preferaUe 1o the onli/ onea 
iheij now have ahnr/ (1), (1). The former 
(2), (:?), (i), are Avhat they have always wished 
to lii.ve, but have 1)een debarred from by the 
barrier of the foi-tiiied frontier. They are lines 
li'ading directly and shortly to their great 
depots on the u]iper Khine and in Lorraine, 
well served Avith roiling stock, numerous, and 
parallel. Quite another matter from the long, 
crowded and insuiiicient lines (1), (1), through 
the intensely hostile territory of Belgium. 
Hero along (t), (.•2), is a mass of railways — no 
less than six main lines, coming straight 
across the Eliine— to feed the iuAading army ; 
and the threat to their existing lines at 
(1), (1), even, if the French pressure around 
the (rerman right at ]\[ continues and develops 
to tlie X'orth, will have become negligible, 
because the German line vrill have new and far 
better seiTice of supply from Ahacc-Lonaine. 
This should make it clear that everything 
depends in the next few days upon whether the 
(lernians can (I) break throngh, or even (2) seriously 
push back the eastern part of the Allied line, that is 
the French troops stretched from half-way between 
Paris and Verdun to Verdun itself. 
In the first ease, supposing the Germans break 
through in the iieighbo .irhood of Vitry, all that is 
caught to the east of the ])oint, including the French 
troo])s in Lorraine at (L), (L), (L), would bo doomed. 
In the second case, supposing they do not break 
the French line but merely cause it to retire, though no 
decision would have been arrived at (always supposing 
that the troops in Lorraine had time to retreat rapidly 
through the gap and join their fellows beyond) and 
though the German forces Avuuld still find an intaet 
aud unbroken ariny in front (jf them, yet the invaders 
v.ould have manage.i to estal)!ish themselves in a 
stronger position than before. The difficult and few 
Ik-lgiau lines of communication (1), (1), would have 
lost their importance. Xo turning movement against 
their north v.-ould then threaten their supplies, for 
their snjiplies would then come directly from the east, 
and they would have estaljlished ncAv, much more 
ninnerous, much stronger, and much shorter lines of 
su]iply coming straight from dbectly over the Ehine 
beliind them. 
One may illustrate the three possible results 
Avhich the situation appears to present in the three 
following diagrams. 
Li the first, Avl.erc it is supposed that the 
^\^ X lik 
j^ Verduis 
<^ 
^ end 
VITFY* LE 
SKKTCH SHOWING EESCLT 
IF THE ALLIED LIXK IS 
KEITHEB rHKSPKD BACK 
KOa I'lEECED. 
FRANCOIS 
fpiNAL 
litLFORT 
German forces in the north betvicen Verdun and 
l\iris have failed to pierce the Allied line, they will 
have no choice but to retire along their existing line* 
of communication (1) — (1), in the direction marke<l 
by the aiTOAvs. They Avill be in danger of being cut 
off from their fellows, K K, in Lon-aiue ; they Avill 
be in danger of seeing their oidy communications 
through Belgium aud the north (1) (1) cut by the 
advance of the sujierior Allied forces along A B. 
In the second supposition, having broken the 
PARI S 
a 

a 
<^ 
^ 
SKr.TCH 6K0WIXO KrEl'LT 
IF ALLIED LINE IS riEECED. 
BELFORT 
Allied line at V, they would have cut off the French. 
army in Lorraine, L L L, and could confidently 
expect its tjestruction. At the same time, they would 
feel no more anxiety about their old abandoned com- 
nninications along (1) — (1), for they Avould depend,. 
Avhcn the French army in Lorraine had gone, upon 
the neAv and better commnnications along (2) — (2). 
From that moment onwards the German forces icould be, 
fur the first time, in a definite position, of superiority 
over the Allies in the irtstern field of the tear. 
The third possibility is that of the Allied line^ 
% 0^ ^ 
PARIS ^ 
^c|» 
TOrjL 
SKETCH SHOWING EESILT 
IF THE ALLIED LIKE IS 
rUSHED BACK. 
■^- 
2 
' epi;-jal 
-«ELFORT 
pushed back into such a position as Vv W W, joined 
by the troops from Lorraine and not broken, nor 
8* 
