Soijten.1x-i- 1:2, I'Jl-i 
LAND AXD WATER 
Its (.liaracti'i- as tlic on pita! still of a province and liut 
I'cociit'y of a kingdom, its inmionse wealtii, its 
i('inarka1)lo triiiinjjlis of arcliitectui'O, and its ooiu- 
nionial character all lend tlionisolvesto this conclusion, 
ami nialce it a ilt subject for the experiment. Ou the 
other ])and no such bonibaixlment Avoiild have any 
effect npon the disposition of the armies in the field, 
und the position of Nancy will bo held or abandoned 
ill the present temper of the French exactly as thou'rh 
it were a few lields of barren ground. For the whole 
mind of tlie nation is bent upon a strategic task, and 
not c\en nn entry into Paris would have disturbed 
tliiit mind from its immediate object, which, is not the 
siiving (jf bcuiity or Avcalth, but a iinal victory. 
THE EFFECT OF THE SIEGE GUNS. 
The mention of such a boiiibardment, whi^'h 
may oven now bo taking place, leads me to return 
to a inatter of which J have spoken already in these 
comments (la.st week, 1 think, and the v>eek before) — 
the power of resLstance opposable by the French 
f<n-tresscs to the German claim that modern forti- 
fication Avill alwaj's bi-eak dov.n, and speedily, under 
the effect of modem siege ai-tillerv. 
Xamur was an exceptional case, for we see more 
and more, as the details come in, that Xamur was not 
in a postui'c for defence. Had it held out but a 
few days, the French counter-offensive through the 
Ardennes would, probably, have succeeded; the line 
of the Sambre could certainly have been held. 
X'amur fell Avith an unexpected rapidity, and one 
which will presumably not be i-ejieated ; but it is none 
the less apparent that the German claim is largely 
Kuccessful in practice, and that the new siege artillery 
dominates the old .system of fortification. 
If that is the case, as it Avould appear to be : if the 
modern ring fortress, thinigh it may have resisting 
jiov.vr for weeks, has not resisting power for nnjnths 
— and, perhaps, has only resisting power for days — 
the strateg}' of the Allies will have io considei* how 
far, in a)iy future development, the resistance of any 
inodeni fortification can be relied upoii. 
-\t the present moment, for instance, the whole 
of this gn.-at line of the Allies is reposing idtimately 
UjMjn Verdun and upon Paris. It is true that against 
J'aris no attempt has boon made, nor does it aj)pear as 
yet that hea^■y siege guns have Ijcen brought up 
against A'^ordun. IJut it may well be that in some 
future dcAelopment of the campaign— and perhaps no 
distant development— the value of fortified positions 
as a pivot, still more as a refuge to armies in being, 
Avill disapjicar. AVe must expect to hear of their 
, fall under any determined effort directed against 
them, and it is unfortunately true that as yet a siege 
artillery <jf convsponding foi'cc to be brought against 
the enemy's jwsitions, Avhen these in their turn arc 
attacked, may be lacking. 
There is nothing impossible, or even secret, in 
the construction of such large pieces as the Germans 
have brought forwanl; but it takes time. Their supply 
to tlie Allies is a task to which, Avithout any doubt, 
the attention of at least two of the three Allied 
Powers has already been turned. It is one Avhich they 
Avdl not be able to solve bef<n'e a date distant by many 
months from the present. One niight put it so bluntly 
as to say that it looks as though the Germanic Powers 
Avould be able to rely upon the permanent fortiiications 
they have established more than the Allied Powers 
can rely npon theirs, because the Allies eannot have 
for many )nontlis such howitzers to use against pre- 
])ured fortresses as Prussia already commands to th'' 
uuml^er of perliaps half a hundred. 
Aleaiiwhile, it remains true that the idtimate fate 
of this, as of all campin'gns, dejiends, not upon arti- 
ficial Avorks, Avhich introduce no more than the element 
of dehiA', but upon the success or failure of armies in 
the field. 
THE NATURE OF THE NEWS 
RECEIVED. 
Now that Ave shall probably receive fuUer news 
from the seat of Avar than has been either advisable 
(jr jiossible during the past month, it may be v.orth 
Avhile to consider certain points about that ucavs and 
the wa}- in Avhich Ave should judge it. 
The first thing to be grasped is that the reports 
reaching us are bound to be for some time to come, as 
they have been in the immediate past, apparently self- 
ci^ntrauictory. 
There are ftnir sources from Avhicli Ave receive 
information, an.d the motives and the methods of 
their authors are A'ery different. 
There is first of all the report of the journalist 
sent out by his projn'ictor in search of the jiicturesque 
and the vivid : sometimes such a source of information 
is acquainted Avith the elements of military affairs, 
more often he is not. At aiiy rate the descriptions he 
sends cannot be of value to the comprehension of the 
cam])aign as a v.hole nor are they intended to be. 
(K'Casionallv in such descriptions you get a phrase 
which supplies you with some truth to what has really 
happened in a particular place on a particular day, but 
as a rule they tell you nothing of the general moA'e- 
incnt, the fortunes of Avhich alone concern the fate of 
the countiy. 
Xext there are the stories fi-om individuals, par- 
ticularly from i)rlvate soldiei's, Avhich present the very 
high local interest, but must bepiitin the same category 
as the last, so far as general comprehension is concerned. 
Thirdl}-, there arc the despatches proceeding from 
officers in the field and occasionally commmiicated to 
the public by their Goveruinents. This source of 
information is of course of the highest value, but it is 
always somewhat belated. It Avill be of capital interest 
Avhen the history of the war comes to be Avritten, but 
for following the campaign Avhile it is in progi-ess this 
•soui'cc of information comes as a rule too late. 
Finally, there are the official digests or short 
communiques issued by the A'arious GoA'enaments, our 
OAvn, our Allies, and our enemies. 
This last sources is the only secure foundation ou 
Avhich one can build a knowledge of the campaign as 
it goes on, and it is imp<^)rtant to appreciate Avhat the 
(jualities of these communiques are. In the first place 
tiuy are accurate .so far as they go, and this is just as 
true of the enemies' communiques as of om-s. The 
public is apt to be confused upon this point, because 
every nunour, falsehood or exaggeration proceeding 
from enemy sources is lumped together Avith or 
Avithout that distinction of origin. 
I can recall no official CJerman communique 
A\hich, so far as it Avent, Avas not accurate. On the 
other hand, the newspaper connnent in Gennany and 
the stories sent by the German financial press are 
often ludicrous and impossible. 
Jhit the second jwi'it about these ofl^icial com- 
municpus, Avhether from enemies or from friends, is 
that they invariably suppress news Avhich is unfavour- 
able to their <jwn side. For instance, the German 
communiques said nothing about that decisive action 
in front of Jjcmberg Avhich must necessarily influence 
the Avhole of the v.ar, and in the same way we have 
li'ai'ned from the enemy of more than one rcA'crse Avhich 
neither our Allies' despatches nor our own told us of. 
11* 
