Septemljcr 1.^, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
TOWARDS the cud of l:\st week the Press Bureau 
reported that a number of damaged German 
destroyers v.erc at Kiel, and that others Lad sunk 
outsid'a tha Caual. Speculations as to some 
further action wera rife. Some surmised an 
affray with the Russians in the North Sea, but 
it is far more probably a belated German sequel to tbc Heligo- 
land affair. 
Wiiheliii&havcn — as the. map indicates — is far nearer to 
Heligoland than Kiel. On tlie other hand, Kiel is no great 
dis-ti.ncc away, and, as Wiihelmshaven is an active base for 
tlestroycr divisions, it is probable that the authorities con- 
sidered it inadvisabk> to allow fresh and vutried forces to 
contemplate what had happcnid to the division to which 
V 187 belonged. The boats which escaped must have been 
terribly mauled. 
In this connection we have to remember that the bulk 
of the German crews are. relative to our own men, compara- 
tively raw, and also necessarily unfortified by those traditions 
of past warfare which are so valuable an asset to tha British 
Navy. 
We have further to remember how sedulously the men of 
the German Navy have been taught to despise- the British and 
British gunnery. Psychology, therefore, becomes a matter of 
o:;lreriie importance. 
Auotlur instance of the iiinueuco of psychology on the 
German scheme of things is t^j be found in last Frida.y's night 
raid on the British trawlers in tiie North Sea- -a perfectly 
uselcs: operation from tli<» niilit;iry point of view, unless, of 
fonrsc, it was influenced by the idea that the fifteen trawlers 
<apture<l can be used for further indiscriminate mine laying, 
their crews being terrorised into concealing the presence of 
German combatants on board them. 
This is a point of view worthy of consideration. If there 
is one thing more certain than another, it is that German v/a»-- 
ships did not risk the danger of going out for the mere 
" glory " of capturing soma inoffensive British fishermen. So 
the above is one cxplanati'iu of that • German naval victory " 
over which our Press has since made so merry. 
Another, and I am inclined to think a truer, explanation 
13 that the nx>ve was a. purely psychological one. As students 
of hi.story (even if not from pcr- 
PSYCHOLOGY sonal experience) the German 
AND ACTION. < authorities cannot be unaware of 
the deadly effects of inaction on a 
fleet bottled up iu harbour. Just as later on it was deemed 
^f ^-'^^ 
place, to ask ourselves how we would act if compelled to do 
our best with an inferior force, untried, without traditions, 
deliberately educated on false ideals as to superiority, and 
with the pusillanimity of the capture of the O'oeben to live 
down. " Prove something at all costs " is the only possible 
move. 
And so we arc very ill-adviiod to make merry about 
German victories (probably on the Dogger Bank) over British 
fishermen. Rather we should remember that the capture of 
a bathing machine from an East Coast watering place might 
well be a most valuable moral asset to the German Fleet. To 
the inferior naval power the most trival gain has a real value. 
GLKMAM 
AMPIIIO:' SPKW PA.-Tuiit*xn 
WAi- TO ILI.UtfTR.iTK THK DOCKT.tSDS AND I-nlVCIP.VL PRFV-VTB 
I'IBUS AT WHOSK YAUDS D-VMAOKD OICUMAX WARSHIPS CAN B> 
EXPAIRilD. 
advisable not to allow the outposts to see the effects of Briti.sh 
gunnery on the Heligoland destroyoi"», so it liad been dc-sirable 
to demonstrate, by producing the spoils of victory, that 
Germany " rules the waves " in the North Sea. In attempting 
to assess any operation we hav*> to put ourselves iu the enemy's 
BRITISH 
DiAOP-AM TO ILH;STE.ITK TlIK USSPECTIVK LOSSES IX THa 
KOBTK SKA IN TEB31S Of Al-PBOXIMATB FIQHTISO TALUK TO 
SEPTKMBKE 7tU (oXB MOSTU's WABFABE). 
One is bound to confess that t^e German Commander-in-Chief 
of the High Sea Fleet has made no errors to date. 
More: I am of opinion that — thanks to the additional 
circumstance tljat we have since lost the SjieeiJ;/ and I'a/Ii- 
fuller by mines in quick succession 
THE EFFECT — those responsible for the 
OF MINES. destinies of the German High Sea 
Fleet are neither disheartened nor 
dissatisfied with the present situation. 
They have, it is true, lost three small cruisers and a 
destroyer, plus an unknown number of other destroyers 
damaged. Against this, however, they can place the fact that 
their mines kave destroyed three British warships, and some- 
thing approaching a reign of terror is iu process of being 
created in the North Sea. This, of course, is exactly according 
to the plan of campaign. 
Results have not in any case come up to full expectations, 
but here, at least, Germany is iu a position to play a waiting 
game. We shall do well to remember this and to keep 
on remembering it. The appended diagram indicates that so 
far Germany has lost more than she has gained so far as 
iiiali ritf is concerned. But I am by no means sure that in 
her opinion '' honours easy " is not the prevailing conviction. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
The item of chief interest so far this week is that Admiral 
Sir Berkeley Milne should have relinquished his command 
and a French Admiral taken his place in command of tho 
Anglo-French force. 
It is desirable to state the reason. The British admiral 
was tho senior, while tho French Admiral de Lapeyere had by 
far the biggest number of ships under his own command. Tho 
Austrian Navy is France's especial affair, and so as a matter 
of international courtesy matters have been placed iu his 
hands, and the senior British admiral has come home. A 
senior officer cannot serve under a junior one. 
There was no other solution of the problem. Everywhere 
near homo the British Commander-in-Chief, Admii'al Jellicoe, 
controls things; in the Mediterranean France is supreme. The 
weak point of allied Fleeta is two leaders and the consequent 
divergence of ideas. Admiral Milne is sacrificed to a principle. 
It is a valuable principle, so no more is to be said. For good 
or ill the Allie-j must be one and undivided. Thus, and thus 
only, is victory to be assured. 
Tho ilofhen is .still '' interned " in Turkish waters, and has 
nominally passed into the Turkish Navy. But her own crew 
are apparently still aboard her, and tho possibilities of what this 
battle cruiser can do, using the Dardanelka as a base, are 
immense. 
Just at present Turkey is adopting a peaceful policy, 
but there is no telling how long that policy v.-ill endure. In 
any case the Turks arc notoriously easy to '' manage," .so that 
the prospect of tho Gadien's reappearance hns to be calculated 
for in the genoi-al plan. 
The appended sketch ni.np indicates tho value of tho 
Dardanelles as a base, the possibilities of dodging about around 
13» 
