LA?JD AND AVATER 
ScptonLcr 1.^, I'JU 
the Hands bein? immense. A^eo, should Turkey bo at 
Ccrn;nv's disposal, lyirg in wait for the Goebmout.id, the 
Sv-dadl« vould not necessarily be of any avail, as coal is 
To b obtained at various points along the coast o As-a Mnion 
The principal of these arc marked en the map, but there are 
it Vast /dccn other harbours which could be -arranged 
for," and all of them well inside International Law. 
ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
The situation this week is best described as " Business as 
u»=ual." Certain German cruisers are still at large, but they 
BLACK 
\^ 
u\ 
^iO^ 
y'''N"'/iAUXANDRETTA 
MAP TO INDICATE THE rOSSIElLlTT Ol' THE "OOEEES IN TUB 
LLV.INT, AND TllK llIiriCULTlES OF CATCHING HY.3, BUOCin 
&1I£ EMEliQE. 
are apparently acting without any coherent pb.in, and their 
fcxtinction is merely a matter of time. 
Material damage done by tlicm is trivial, while the moral 
damage on which a '■ ijuerie de eonne" must r.eccssarily 
depend appears to be entirely nou-cxistcnt. 
It should be generally realised thai the duty of the British 
Navy is not so much the actual catching of commeixo 
destroyers as rendering them impotent. To date this has been 
done. British overseas trade is just as safe at present as it 
■was in the times of peace. The dianccs of German intercep- 
tion aro considerably less than the chances of running into a 
drifting iceberg. In this matter the plans of the German 
Naval Staff have gone hopelessly '' aglcy." 
For the last week no captures of moment have been 
r?corded. German trade, except via Holland, is practically 
wiped off the seas. 
Ill this connection the position of Holland is likely to 
become a problem in the early future. Germany is dependent 
oil oversea, -imports of foodstiifi's 
THE POSITION almost as much as we are. Her 
OF HOLLAND. indiscriminate mine-laying has at 
Ica.st had sufficient method in it 
not to interfere with Dutch Trade. The pro Pits to Holland 
are probably very great indeed — hence the pro-German atti- 
tude of the"Dutch. 
The Dutch Navy is of no great account, but it is .nill 
ample enough to have a potential danger where its small 
craft are concerned. An ultimatum to Holland would, how- 
ever, materially lessen the ta.<;k of the British Navy; and 
sooner or later seme such action soeias bound to occur. It 
is impossible that Holland shall indefinitely continue to 
act the "benevolent neutral" to Germany. At the present 
moment Holland is (indirectly) Germany's overseas foo<l 
centre. 
By the "silent pressure of Sea Power our Navy can 
6tai-ve Germany into surrender without regard to whatever 
happens in the Land Campaign, to which we are attaching 
just at present an undue importance. 
For an aimy to act, if mit^t he fr,l. The German 
"machine" is fed throvgh Holland. If this war is to be 
brought to a speedy conclusion, wc must declare war against 
;ill the neutrals who at present keep Germany in food su))p!ies. 
If they caro to keep their ships in harbour, it will be prob- 
ably a very benevolent war; there is no quarrel outside the 
food question. But — ue mu-<l xtarre C'erni.n':/ into firrraidfr. 
People generally regard this as a military war, with the 
Navy just playing round, picking up the scraps which fall 
from the Kaiser's table. Tlicy 
THE IMPORTANCE are wrong. On the. lirUiish T«r//, 
OF FOOD SUPPLY. """' ''" f'>"f "fone, the vlliinale 
■iyfirc (Ifpinih: Given an absolutely 
free hand, the British Navy would starve Germany into sur- 
render inside a month, though Germans ruled in Paris and 
beat all the Eussians back from Berlin. Psychology 
counts for much. Overwhelmin^g the enemy by waves cf 
soldiers counts for as much, or more. But — food supply 
is a larger target still. A soldier cannot f'ght on an empty 
belly. 
The trouble is that we do not realise our " Sea Power.' 
AVc have not" advanced an inch since a hundred years ago. 
We have still no conception of what a Navy (given a fiee 
hand) could accomplish ; for all that most of us are ready to 
subscribe to the theory that " Waterloo was v.on at Trafalgar," 
eleven years before. 
I have tried to think of a diagram which will explain 
how a British warship several thousand miles away can 
materially affect the local situation. I cannot produce that 
diagram. It is too complicated. 
But I can assert my conviction that, whatever may happen 
on land (in front of the footlights), the real issues depend 
upon the British Navy (not shown on the stage). Conie to 
think of it, stage effects are produced on somewhat similar 
lines. The " man behind" controls results. In this particu- 
lar World V/ar the " man behind " is the British Navy. If 
the British Navy has a free hand to stop German oversea food 
supplies, tTie inevitable result is " Exit Gcnnauy." 
THE FAR EAST. 
TuE Japanese investment of Kiao Chau is proceeding 
slowly. The whole of the sea approaches have been heavily 
minefl, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the 
report thAt the Japanese Fleet has already removed about 
1,200 mines. This work will probably continue for some time 
to come. Various adjacent islands have been occupied — 
mainly as look-out stations against further German efforts in 
the niiuc-laying directions. Japan is never likely to foigctf 
her terrible experiences with mines in the war with llussia 
ten years ago. 
In the course of this week's operations she has lost one 
destroyer, wrecked by going ashore — a very cheap sacrifice so 
far to the mines around Kiao-Chau. 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
So FAR wc have heard a good deal less than we 
expected about aenal warfare. To be sure, the 
Press has destroyed more Zenpe-lins than Genwuiy 
ever possessed, and it has now created a German air 
fleet of " 8'2 " destined to bombard Paris from 
above. Details of this sort are, however, not 
germane to serious facts. 
Turning to facts, there is good. reason to suppose that 
Germany's sudden embarkation on war was by no means 
entirely unconnected with her aerial position, and a belief in 
the proverb, " V\'ho rules the air, v.iil rule the world." At liic 
outbreak of war the approximate aerial forces available were 
as follows : 
Gkuman French Ku.=;.ii.vx Dkitish 
Battle Aiiohips ... 1-5 1 — — 
Scoiitiiij,' Airship.'... 10 14 3 2 
Acrojilanps — About equal eitlicr side. 
The Germans had Iv.o other battle airships in an advanced 
condition, and these two are by now probably completed. All 
Powers had airships building, both large and small. Austria 
pcvscssed uoliiing at the moment, but one Zeppelin building 
14* 
