la:n^d A:^^D watee 
September 5, 1914 
Prom tlic next section agaia to tlie west, or loft, 
Section 
lY, "nliicli was tliut Lcld by the Britisb 
contini,'ent supported by French troops, the line bent back again to the south. There had been 
announced, for forty-eight hours past, strong German pressure towards the ring of forts round La Fere, 
and unless I misread the exceedingly interesting account given in a London morning paper on 
"NVediiesdav, and relating presumedly "to Saturday and Sunday, the line was then bent back beyond 
St. Quentin', Avhich is the town there described as having been abandoned. There were, even at that 
date, English soldiers as far back as Xoyon, though it does not follow that the lighting had got as far 
soutii as°that, for Noyon may have been no more than the headquarters of the resistance at this 
indented portion of the line. 
In the fifth section, still more to the west and the left, we had the defensive line of the Allies 
faciii"- along the line of the Sommc from Ham to Perrone and up as far as, and perhaps, a little behind, 
the town oF Bapaume ; the cannonade on this extreme left being heard from Yillers on the other side 
of the Sorame. 
Puttinf all these together, v,-e are now in a position to establish the defensive line which the 
Allies were holding against the Prussian advance at the end of last week. How far they had 
succeeded in holding, whether they had not even taken the coimter-offensive, no kind of information 
had reached London. 
That line, tlien — tlie suuious line held by the Allies during last week-end — ^the accompanying 
sketch describes. Its first section still held tlie Upj^er Meuse. Its second was bent back behind 
Soigny, and perliaps already to the Aisue. Its third, on the contrar}% 'i\'as pressed out towards Hirson 
CAMBRAJ ^^f ATEAU hIRSON MEZIEREs\ 
SEDAN 
AMIENS •^i<* 
RETHEL 
'^ QfTHEAISNe 
O 5 10 15 20 15 
i ! I 1 I I 
<'^3>>-. 
SO 
SCALE O? MILES 
7h PARTS 65 miles 
m. 
SKETCH SHOWIXO EOtTGHLT THE mOBABLE DE^■E^•S^VE LI-NK OF L.VST TL'iSDAT (oX THE LAST TELEGKAMS BECEIVSD BT 
WEDNESDAY KIGHt). 
Its fifth went 
right 
up 
an<l Guise. Its fourth was deeply indented towards La Fere and Noyon 
again and held the enemy from near Bapaume, through Peronne to Ham. 
It will be immediately apparent from such a conclusion that two main offensive efforts were 
being made by the Germans to break the AUied line, and that the attempt to outflank it only was for 
the moment abandoned. These two efforts correspond to the two indentations in the line, one in front 
of Bethel, the other in front of Noyon. If both and each of these sections could hold against the 
pressure directed against them, the line would remain intact, though it should still further retire. If 
either were forced, the line would be pierced and the first phase of the war decided in favour of the 
enemy. That was the peril six days ago. 
The indentation pointing towards Noyon corresponds to the valley of the Oise, and is the shoi'tcst 
road of approach to Paris. It was upon this notch presumably that the weight of the assault fell. 
Certain corollaries attach to these conclusions. Thus it "^is evident that from this week-end the 
mam communications between Paris and London, which run through Boulogne and Amiens, were so 
gravely threatened that travel along them had to be abandoned, while the supply of the English 
contingent had also in future to come from further west along the coast. 
It iij again evident that the threat on the Oise valley, the deep indentation of the line 
before Xoyon, meant two things. It meant, first, that the extensive left of the Allied line was in 
danger of being cut off, and therefore the numerical inferiority of the Allies— already pronounced— 
would be gravely emphasised, and that the Allies would have suffered their first defeat in the field. 
It meant, secondly, that, even if the Allies' left should succeed in retiring and escaping such a 
disaster, the advance of the German extreme right upon Paris would be the next step. Such an advance 
would not mean that the French Anny in the field had accepted an adverse decision. It would 
still be in being and still be able to continue the struggle indefinitely. It would not run the risk 
of shutting up any considerable portion of its total forces behind the forts of Paris. It would 
reserve itself for continued free action upon the flank, and (if possible) upon the communications 
of the enemy as he advanced upon the capital. To advance ujion the capital would be, for the 
enemy, nothmg but a stroke of moral effect. What moral effect means in war, how it may lead 
men to wasteful energy, when and in what degree it may be of value, I discussed last week. 
