September 5, 1914 LAND AND WATER 
frontier and to some extent in the belt immediately west of it, (3) the presence of considerable opposing 
forces. 
As to (1) : I think the most striking way of showing to the eye of the reader what this depen- 
dence npon " the Eussian steam roller " means, is to put before him the following diagi-am. It is 
absurdly simple, but I think it is effective. Ilere are three arrows. The first (a) represents the 
advance which a Eussian Ai-my must make from it.s 
extreme starting point to Berlin : even if it were as 
rapid in its advance (which is impossible) and as 
successful (which it has not hitherto been) as the 
German forces in the west. The second aiTOw (.}) 
represents the distance which the Eussian ai-mics 
would still have to cover after they had masked or 
taken the frontier fortresses, thoroughly invaded the 
heart of Prussian territory, and had passed the town 
of Posen — an advance which could not be made until 
the Austrian menace upon theii" flank had been 
destroyed. The third broader aiTow (c) represents 
upon the same scale the distance at the present 
iRBows sHowiNQ coMP.vEATivK LI.NOTH OP ADYA.Nci : niomcnt scparatiug thc Prussian Army (with its 
(a) foe RUSSIANS IK EAST PRUSSIA UPON BERLIN. AustHau atixillaries) froffi Paris. I think the contrast 
(B) FOB RUSSIANS BEPORE POSEN UPON BEHLIN. -^ sufficiently strikiug. 
(c) JOB OERMANS ON TUBIE PRESINT POSITION UPON T-.i'i' 11 ■! ijli.l Tt 
PABM. i>ut it is au-eady evident that the liussian 
advance vrill be neither unchecked nor particularly 
rapid. Two things have happened this week, the one certainly fortunate to Eussia, the other certainly 
unfortunate, wliich g^ve one the right to speak in tliis fashion. 
The unfortunate thing is a heavy defeat suffered by the forces which have been invading East 
Prussia. This defeat appears to have taken place in front of Osterode. We have the German official 
account (and German official accounts have hitherto been singularly accurate) which speaks of 30,000 
prisoners and of a total defeat. We have the Eussian admission of a check, and we have the further 
admission of great numbers having been brought up against two army corps which were caught in 
isolation. We ought not to attach undue importance even to an action of this kind, which would have 
been decisive in any of the smaller wars of the past ; but it is a very important thing. It wiU be 
retrieved ; and it will be retrieved by numbers, as also by the intense determination of the Eussian 
people. But, for the moment, it makes progress towards the line of the Vistula, Danzig, Graudenz, 
Thorn, impossible, and the Eussian SAvecp through Eastern Prussia towards the lower Vistula has 
been held up. 
The second piece of news, fortunate rather than unfortunate to Eussia, though not yet conclusive, 
equally proves with what deliberation the western advance must be undertaken. It is upon a larger 
scale than the check received to the north of Eussian Poland in East Prussia, and the field in which it 
has taken place is Gahcia — that is, the northern belt of the Austrian dominions between the Carpathians 
and the Eussian border, and the southern part of that western projecting lump of Prussia which 
corresponds to Eussian Poland. Here an Austrian advance had been proceeding during the week, not 
without successes that might be called victories, towards Lublin, and attended by a peculiar success at 
Kielce. This advance appears to have been checked by the Eussians and to be heavily threatened at 
this moment by a counter-offensive directed against the town of Lemberg to the south. We have now 
authoritative news that this counter-offensive was entirely successful. Thus the main Austrian 
attack upon Eussia has failed, and its momentum has been checked and broken. Therefore, after due 
delay for re-organisation and for coming up westward, the Eu.ssian masses wiU be free to cross the 
extreme western boundary of Eussian Poland, and begin their march upon the line of the Oder. 
But not tiU some time hence. 
But the process, even though unchecked for the future, must necessarily be a slow one. Until the 
line of the Oder is reached, there is no threat to Berlin, let alone any heavy pressure which could make 
Pi-ussia retire her men from the Western theatre of war. And in general, I repeat what I have said 
before in these notes : I think there will not be, under the most favourable circumstances, any anxiety 
in the We&iern field for what is going on in the East until after the middle of October. If the 
circumstances are not favourable, but are unfavom-able, then there will be no such pressure for months. 
For, after October, the few roads will be difficult and the approach of winter wiU handicap all advance. 
If anyone has placed reliance on the extraordinary telegrams which announce the retirement of men 
from the Western field of war to help in the Eastern, he may be content to forego that consolation. 
The Prussians (and Austrians) to the west of the Ehine will use every man they can in that Western 
theatre of war for many weeks to come. The train-loads seen going eastward through Belgium are 
either train-loads of wounded evacuated towards the base, or men being moved from one part of the 
Western field to another. Men drafted to the East they most certainly are not. 
I will conclude by some appreciation of what, I think, has been in everybody's mind during the 
past week — the success of certain German theories, the coming tiiie of many Gemian prophecies, and 
the achievement of tasks which Germany had openly proposed to herself. But I will suggest not only 
the success of Germany in these matters, but also the modifications of that success, which I now append. 
We are, at this stage of the war, at last able to appreciate more or less in their right 
proportion certain facts which were conjectural and doubtful during the first weeks; and before 
we proceed to our weekly summary and reading of what has happened to date in the two fields of 
operations, the Western and the Eastern, it woidd be well to enumerate those facts and to grasp 
them for the purposes of our fm-ther judgment. 
