LAND AND WATEE September 5, 1914 
1. THE FACTOR OF NUMBERS. 
As vas pointed out in tlxc first of these aiticlcs, other things being equal, the deciding factor in 
■ a campaign is tlie factor of numbers— not necessarily of numbers as a whole, but of numbers at the 
decisive place and time. 
Now the first fact dominating all the others is this : Tlie attack of the German and Austi-Jan 
Empires upon France has been made in far larger numbers than Avas expected by the French and tluir 
Allies. That is the simple explanation of all that has happened hithei-to in the "West. 
If Ave go by the elementary method of counting the adult nudes subject to the Hohenzollerns and 
the Hapsbm-gs and contrasting them with the adult males citizens of the French Eepublic, we get a 
disproportion of roughly 13 to 4. It is, as a fact, rather more than 12 to rather less than 4 : it is 
almost exactly 121 to 31) : it is an overwhelming disproportion. 
I repeat : in military affairs, other things being equal, the deciding factor is numbers. It Avas so 
in the gi-eat effort of the French Ilevolution. It Avas so in 1870. Those " other things " are nearly 
equal in the great modern conscript armies: training, equipment, and the rest. Numbers should 
decide. 
If, then, the proportion of more than three to one had held, the result in the Western theatre of 
Avar Avould have been a foregone conclusion. It should not have taken three Aveeks. But there Avere, 
of course, a great number of most important qualifications to so crude a conti'a,st. These modifications 
may be roughl}- but accurately summarised under Aa'C heads, which I place in order of theii* importance 
from least to most : 
(1) Xot all, nor nearly all, of the adult male population of the two central Empires is 
trained to arms. This is of less and less vabie to the French as everj' day of the Avar passes, 
for the untrained men are being Avith every day digested more and more thoroughly into the 
trained mass. 
(2) One of the two Germanic monarcliies, the ITapsburgs, had to deal Avith a heterogeneous 
population, much of Avhich Avas iU disposed to the German spirit and to goA'ernment by German speaking 
men. Therefore, the numbers Avhich Austria could lend to German}' for action against France, though 
large, Avas, in any case, very much less than the mass of her forces. And this heterogeneous 
character of the Hapsbiirg dommions further Aveakened Austria in a matter Avhicli Avas the match that 
lighted the Avhole Avar — the Sla\'s, upon her southern boundary, Avho had escaped her control, and Avhom 
slie had foolishly proposed to govern against their Avills ; the Servians. 
(•3) The French Army discovered, Avhen the crisis came, tAvo influences in its favour — the Belgian 
rcsistajice and the English alliance. The unexpected and A^ery A'aluable resistance of the Belgians Avho, 
though not possessed of an army trained on the same lines as the great conscript armies, though able 
to put innnediately into the field but a very small proportion of theu* total adult males, and tliose, in 
pirt, militia, determined a delay of at least twelve days in the plans of the German General Staff. It 
is not exaggerated but sober language to say that the sacrifice of Belgium promises the redemption of 
Eiu-ope. It will not count less but more as time goes on. 
Far more unportant, in the military sense, Avas the final decision of the British GoA^ernment to 
su],port the French. That decision effected two things. It gave to France a small but very valuable 
accretion of troops, six per cent, of all forces, not quite ten per cent, to the total of the first line, but 
jnore than 10 per cent, of the total in the area Avlierc tlie chief blow fell, and the Bi-itish contmgent 
tlr.is afforded Avas not only of most excellent military character, but, Avhat is even more valuable, 
under-estimated by the Germans. Fcav things are Avorth more in Avar than an under-estimate on the 
part of your enemy, either of the numbers or of the quality of the troops he is going to meet at any 
particular point. 
Of further and still greater importance to the French Avas the opening of the sea to them by the 
l^ntlsh Fleet. So long as the sea remains open to the one group of enemies and closed to the other, 
.so long there is necessarily a slowly increasing strain upon the one and a permanent source of sui^ply 
open to the other. 
(4) The plan of attack long designed and openly described by the German Powers Avas one in 
Avhich everything had to be done at once and in the first stages of the campaign. There Avas no 
iin-angement in fortification or in strategy for delay. There Avill prove to be little ai-rangemcjit for 
retirement. 
It will be asked Avhy this last feature can be counted as a modification of the enormous numerical 
preponderance again.st the French. The ansAveris that though it does not affect that preponderance at 
the beginning of the war, though, on the contrary, it is actually due to the presence of such a 
pi-eponderance ^thc rush system Avas only designed because those avIio designed it counted on superior 
rannbers — yet if it is checked it modifies the A-alue of numbers in two Avays. First, the checks, partial 
and temporary though they be, involve enormous losses quite out of proportion to the losses of the 
(.efence ;_ second, they bring the front of the defence more and more parallel to the German lines of 
communication. That is, until the defending line is outflanked or pierced the offensive opposed to it 
goes on into a more and more perilous position Avitli a les ■ and less chance, lat/css it acccceds, of securing 
its hnc of ^suppl}- against a counter attack. 
(o) Finiilly, the most important modification, Avliich everybody has noticed, is that in the long 
run the uuniense numbers of Hussia Avill begin to tell. When or if they arc telling with all their 
torce, the numerical preponderance Avhich Avas so enormous at the beginning of the campaign AviU 
gradually turn to its opposite. The Cierman Powers will be putting not a little more than 12 men 
agamst somcAvhat less than 4 men, but a little more than 12 (even if thoy had had no losses) to a good 
i.eal over IG or 17. Already, from the presence of Russian armies over the Eastern frontiers, the 
proportion of German and Austrian troops to French west of the Rhine can hardly be more than 
7 to A, and is perhaps by this time as low as G to 4. And the great main business of the /dlies is, 
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