LAND AND WATER 
September 5, 1914 
3. THE UNEXPECTED RAPIDITY OF ADVANCE. 
The rate of the German advance, to wliich allusion has been made elsewhere, is tlie third lesson we 
have to leani from the openinf? phases of the war. , -, -^ , i i .„ , 
It was evident from the first mention of the generxil German plan (and it has been openly taJked 
of by no one more tlian the Germans for more than ten years past) that this phm demanded not only 
surprise, nor only superior numbers, nor even only the added success that was promised against 
fortifications, but also a power of exceedingly rapid advance ; for a blow is not a knock-out blow unless 
it is a swift blow. . . • ,-n t -l th 
Now, in this, as in the other matters I am here exammmg, the German theory has justified itself 
in the main, but, here again, not as completely as full and immediate success demanded; fui-thcr, tlio 
success is subject to a most impoi-tant qualification with which I shall deal in a moment. 
When tiic French feU back from the line of the Sambre after the fall of Namur, the pressure 
exercised upon the retreat by the.Gennan forces was never relaxed dui-ing the whole of three full days 
and nights. It was a maiTe'llous piece of oi-ganisation and of effective military will. 
The new line taken up by the Allies made an angle with the old line, and at the same time Avas 
more extended to the AVest than the old line. The conversion was roughly from the line A — B on 
the aecompanyiug sketch, held till Sunday night, tlie .23rd of August (12 days ago), through the dotted 
^ ' line E — E reached on Tuesday night (ten days 
ago) to the line C — D held on Wednesday 
MONS 
NAMUR* 
OS 10 15 20 ZS 
■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ 
(A 
SCALE OF MILES 
fcKETCH enOWIXO KATUEK AND KXTEXT OF THE HAPID AlLIJiD 
KJiTIRIMKXT A:;D OtfiMAN ADVAKCr, AUG. 23EU-:i(3TK. 
^"■■i«'^^— THE ALLIED LISB. . 
^^BM TKJ> ENGLISH CONTINGENT. 
THE INTEKIIEDIATE 
mii 20th. 
POSITION ON LVtNlXG Or 
averaged 
to 
night and Thursday morning a week ago ; and 
because there was this angle between the old 
front and the new, and because the new front 
extended more to the AV'est than the old front 
had done, the heaviest of the marching fell, 
as we have seen, to the western part of the 
line ; that is, upon the English contingent ; 
Avhicli is represented in my sketch by the thick 
part of the lines. 
But the remarkable thing about even that 
Avestern extremity is that the Germans Avere 
able] to keep up their jjressure throughout the 
AA'hole of so rapid a retreat. It Avas the true 
pressure of an army ; it AA'as not merely cavalry 
keeping in touch, nor advance bodies feeling 
the AA^ay for the main columns. When the 
fighting Avas fiercest upon Wednesday, the Allied 
line had still in front of it — after 20 to 30 miles 
of retreat — as heaA^y a body of attack as 
it had had upon the Sunday before upon 
in some places 12 to 15 miles a day fot those 
the Sambre. The Gennan advance had 
two and a half days. 
I repeat, the character of this advance, carried ovit by such an cnonnous body of men without a 
liit<:h, is unique. It Avould be fast going for a Avell-organised army approaching a distant goal undis- 
turbed. For an army actually fighting as it advanced, and fighting against so equal a resistance, and 
moving in such unprecedented numbers, it is amazuig. 
But after saying so much, we must again qualify our admission of the Gennan achievement by 
certain considerations which greatly modify its value to its authors. 
It is noAv apparent that these very rapid strategical moves upon the part of the Gennans are of a 
piece with the eorrespondmg tactical policy of a rush, dense and rapid, Avhich, if it fails, inA'olves a 
considerable period of recuperation to foUoAV. The three days of Monday, Tuesday', and Wednesdaj-, 
from ten days to a week ago, saw this very rapid rush from the line A — B to the line C — D. The 
four days foUoAving saw hardly any advance at aU ; and, so far as can be gathered from the very con- 
fused, fragmentary, and hitherto quite incomplete telegi-ams received this Avcek, the three following 
d:iys (Sunday, ^Monday, and Tuesday last) — making six days in aU — also saAv very little advance. 
In other words, this rapidity, .A\'hich it Avould be folly not to admire and pedantic not to be 
i'.stonished at, is a rapidity essentially local and essentially restricted to efforts isolated in tune. It is 
not like the rapidity Avhich marked the great advance of the Grand Army upon Uhn, or any other of 
the rapid general advances of history. It is not even a rapidity con-esponding to the marches Avhioh 
shut up the French Array in Sedan 44 years ago. It is a rapidity essentially not continuous. This is 
not to say that it fails to achieve its purpose — far from that : so far this strategical rush and halt h;is 
achieved its immediate purpose — but it has not achieved its end. The Germans have plenty of time 
bef(jre them, measured by the rate of their first advance. The time is more restricted if it be measured 
by the rat-e of their advance plus the first halt Avhich succeeded it. It is more restricted stiU if we 
ct>nsider another factor, to Avhich I Avill noAv tuiii. 
^J'hat factor is what I may call " the expense of rapidity." 
^'liiere are two principles upon which any great effort may be based in any form of human activity. 
You may strain to increase the productivity of your capital and spend only the income of it, or you 
may spend the capital itself. You may be aiming at creating an extra force Avhieh shall be ahvays in 
existence and alw;i\ s dopondable, or you may be aiming at an effect Avhich is necessarily restricted to a 
fihoit time because the achievement of it Avears away your veiy means of achievement. 
lO* 
