Sept<?inber 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
OX iLe iXiOiuing of August 28th there occuiTed 
certain opeintious which were hailed by the daily 
Press as a " gi-eat navaj victoiy " which is, ofi 
course, an iucorrccb term to employ for whab 
after all was merely a ' minor operation " of war. 
The mere fact that the Gorman official report 
conceals nothing indicates that the vanquished so regard it; 
and in naval welfare it is always the opinion of the vanqwlshed 
u/iich mutters most. Had the German Admiralty issued an 
incorrect report, our advantage would have been greater. Bub 
of this later on. Let us fii-st review what hajipened in detail, 
and then proceed to draw conclusions. 
Heligoland is a small island some 46 miles from Cuxhavcn, 
which guards the entrance to the Kiel Canal, and in or near 
which Ih© German High Seas Flctt was probably lying at the 
same time. It is also about equidistant from the naval arsenal 
at Wilhelmshaven. Lying as it does at th<j apes of a triangle 
The first act of the drama was a species of prologue. "SVe 
learn from the official report that British submarines have for 
the last three weeks been in the habit of cruising in what is 
known as " outside the enemy's front door." It is the first 
time in histoiy that submarines have been used as scouts; 
hitherto they have always been i-egarded as sharpshooters and 
agents of destruction generally, their unique possibilities in 
the way of inshore obsei"vation having apparently escaped 
attention. Those who knew of the intention to use submarines 
in the scout capacity have ever been, careful to ignore the 
subject. 
The Germans — so far as we can sxirmise — were ignorant 
of the submarine scouts. They doubtless kept a very sharp 
look-out for submarine attack; but not being attacked con- 
sidered the coast as clear — a legitimate assumption on the parb 
of any Fleet which I'egards the submarine from the conveu- 
tional standpoint. 
For reasons which — since nothing al)out the miilter hsa 
J& = Approximate scene of 
ttdS engagement 
NORTH 
SEA 
HELICOLANO 
\5 
THE HAGUE 
"V-^. 
-'.x^ 
Y 
tvji 
4- 
immm^^mmm^ 
between these two impoiiant points, Heligoland is a vital out- 
post in the German scheme of coast defence. Enormous sums 
have been expended on fortifying it, and in the construction 
of a harbour proof agaiiist torpedo attack. 
The utmost secrecy has always been observed about Heligo- 
land, but it was obviously always intended to be the advanced 
base of the Gc;-man light squadrons and submarines, behind 
A. iiich the battle fleet could move with impunity between Kiel 
;ind 'WilliebnBliaven, via Brunsbrnttel and Cuxhaven. 
The cx.-.tt constitution of the attacking British force has 
not been stated, nor for various rer-sons is it likely to be stated 
for some time to come. We are simply told of " strong forces " 
of destroyers (under Commodore Tyi-whitt) supported by light 
cruisers (undc^r Commoflorc Goodcnough) and battle cruisors 
(under Rcai-Adniirals Beatty, Moore, and Christian), acting 
in conjunction with submarines (Commodoio Keys). From 
the Navy List the names of most of the principal ships em- 
ployed can l.e conjectured ; but such conjectures may not jieces- 
Mrilv bo correct. M'v t/oit.! than th.Tt the official act unt 
Bcto,sAr;.y j;ivfcti all Uie story. 
appeared in the public Press at tho time of writing — need not 
l)e more speci.lcally referred to, there were grounds to believe 
that a German torpedo squadron would be creeping out somcn 
time on or about August l;7th. 
It came; light cruisers and a number of destroyers, prob- 
ably two divisions of twelve each, as the Gennans generally 
woi-k in groups of that number, with a ciuiser at the head of 
each. The third Geniian cruiser, Ariadnr, was old and 
slow. Sho was not in commission before the mobilisation 
of the fleet, and it is improbab'e that .ihe was leading a 
destroyer elivisiou. It is more likely that she was an ordinary 
look-out ship. 
Accounts, other than the official report, are ncre.<?'^r.rily 
vaguo and conflicting. In matters of this sort personal impres- 
sions go for vei-y little, save from the psychologic.-il standpoint. 
The oielinary participant sees iittle or nothing of the game 
savo in bis own immediate vicinity, and he is generally too 
mvcli occupied to see very much even thev(\ His fiH^linjTS are. 
thore-forp, ii)ore valuable evidence than his virion or n.j'pcscd 
vision. 
U 
