Se2)tcmber 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
v'crs seeking to complete the destruction, the next st^ige of the 
drama is one and the same thing. 
It is fairly clear that the German cruiser Mainz was sunk 
by our light cruiser squadron; lb is far more abundantly 
clear that our battle cruiser squadron performed the same 
office for the Koln and Ariadne. All three of thcss Gennan 
li"ht cruisers have now ceased to exist. 
In addition^ the Germans admit to the loss of the destroyer 
V 187. They do nob mention the actual loss of any other 
dcstioyet-. Personally, I think that only one was actually 
sunk, and that our " two sunk " ia duo to two conflicting 
accounts of the sinking of the V 187. 
It is the easiest possible mistake to make in v/ar. There 
is not the remotest reason to believe that the Germans, having 
officially admitted more serious lo.sses. would risk concealing 
tho loss of a further infci-ior vessel. 
I put the rc-sii't of tho battle as follows : — 
SCKK. 
BRITT3II. 
Ml. 
Badly Dahaoed. 
Arelhusa (light «ruissr). 
Lntirel (destroyer). 
TJherty (destrojcr). 
Davvcld. 
GERMAN. 
Ariadne (li^'ht cruiser). 
Koln (light cruiser). 
Maim (light cruiser). 
V 187 (destroyer). 
SO. 
10 to 20 dcetroyera (jiroLably 10 
only). 
All of which spells a British victory clea.rly enough, but it 
does not spell anything to which the epithet of " great " should 
be applied, because its material effect on the naval war cannot 
be other than subsidiary. 
In the matter of details : our light cruisers are of approxi- 
rnately the same speed as the German ones, but our battle 
cruisers are considerably faster. To this probably is due the 
fact that the other two German cruisers were accounted for. 
They could, of coui-se, neither fight nor run away from th • 
lAon and her sisters. Incidentally, the fact that our light 
cruiser squadron was undamaged further suggests that the 
CcJTn.ins were running from them. 
According to the first oflQcial report- — the second one is silent 
— at some time during the proceetlings the battle cruisers were 
" attacked by submarines and floating mines." There is a 
vagueness in this phrase. It may mean either that the big 
.ships nearly ran on to a mine field, or that the surprised 
German cruisers dropped mines in the hopes that the enemy 
would run on to tbenii — a very old device. If it were this 
latter, then probably the Germans will have to do a great 
deal of mine sweeping ere they can safely venture out again. 
It is difficult to believe that the submarine attack and 
tho "floating mine attack ' on our battle cruiser squadron 
took place at the same time or place, except in so far as tho 
submarines may have — by showing themselves — manoeuvred to 
drive or lure the British Fleet on to a mine field. 
The apparent impotence of the German submarines, whicli 
did no harm, is not a matter on which to lay much stress. The 
fact that they were on the spot at the psychological moment 
indicates that the German submarines are efficient. That their 
ffforts were unsuccessful comes in the chapter of accident. 
We have now to consider the psychological side of the 
matter. Had the German cruisers tamely surrendered to our 
battle cruisers, it would merely have been bowing to the 
i;iovitable. From things as they happened wo can therefore 
tlraw the inference that the morale of the German Navy on 
August 28th was still quite good, despite the deteriorating 
influences of being more or less shut in. 
The vessels which went out must have gone out knowing 
that theirs was a dangerous mission. It is easy to surmise 
their particular objective, and they must have known that 
that would be suspected by the British Fleet. But probably 
at the moment when they were surprised they were congratu- 
lating themselves on being safely back in their own waters, 
having met neither good fortune nor bad. 
Now comes in an interesting problem. The presence of 
British battle cruisers with the light squadron indicates that 
the possibility that the German battle cruisers would come 
c ut to support tho German light squadron was allowed for. 
.•lud likely enough it was thought or hoped that tho German 
High Sea Fleet would follow. 
No big German ship intervened. They may all havp 
been too far away to do so. But that attributes lack of 
prescience to the enemy— ever a dangerous thing to do when 
one is endeavouring to estimate hostile intentions. 
Rather, in my opinion, the German heavy ships kept out 
of tho way as part of a deliberate plan. A trap was to ba 
liuspscted. Nothing was to be gained by coming out, whereas 
a sortie w.".s bound (o nioaji fresh losses. Henc#. as I read it, 
the immobility of the High Sea Fleet. If this reading be 
correct, it goes to indicate tho correctness of my assumption 
in the first of these articles — that the High Sea Flo?fc intends 
playing a waiting game, and will only come out before " dor 
Ta'' '' under pressure of home circumstances. Such hom-j 
ciicv.mstances had obviously not arisen by August 28th. 
If Admiral Beatty sought to draw the Main Fleet, his 
oi>eration, brilliantly conceived and executed though it was, 
was to that extent a failure, or rather uill bt so rccjarchd hy 
the (/frmans. 
Hence the iuappropriateness of that term " Great Naval 
Victory " in which our Press has so freely indulged. To adopt 
a chessboard simile, we have had a success; but that success 
is merely the capture of a pawn. It brings us matorially 
nearer to checkmate, but a series of several such captures will 
be needed beforo checkmate is arrived at. 
Since the Oueben affair — especially since it has transpired 
that this battle cruiser and th© Breslau ran away together 
from the small British cruiser Gloucester, little more powerful 
than the Breslau — thei-e has been a tendency on the part of 
the public to despise the German Fleet. We have all of us 
perhaps forgotten that the truth about tho affaire Goehcn has 
probably been sedulously concealed so far from the Gennan 
Navy. At any rate, the affair of Heligoland seems to indi- 
cate that we shall have to wait awhile before reaping the 
moral benefit of the Goeben incident. 
Or it may be that, having realised the deceit of tho 
policy under which they were educated to despise the British 
Navy, German sailors (possibly ever less credulous than their 
loaders imagined) have risen to the occasion, and are seeking 
to prove Uiemselvcs. However things may stand, even from 
the! bare official reports (I place no reliance whatever on 
published personal narratives), it is abundantly clear that off 
Heligoland the German Navy did acquit itself well against 
overwhelming odds, and that we shall do best to esteem our 
enemies accordingly. 
For the rest, the most pleasing feature of the action off 
Heligoland is that our Admirals obviously take nothing for 
granted, any more than Nelson and his compeers did in the 
great wai-s of a hundred years ago. " One Englishman is 
worth three Frenchmen " was taught to raw recruits; but our 
Admiralty wisely saw to it that their forces were ever two to 
one at the crucial point I 
In concluding this survey of the Heligoland affair, it is 
necessary to dr.iw attention to the curious story (vouched fur 
by the official Press Bureau) that when the German cruisers 
sank, and their survivors were being rescued, German officers 
were observed shooting their own men. 
Unofficial stories to the effect that German prisoners 
assert that they had been given to iinderstand that if captured 
they would be put to death by the British with great barbarity 
may be dismissed as a fiction, probably invented this side of 
the North Sea. Even if told it on the other side, it is very 
unlikely that the most unsophisticated German sailor would 
really have believed it; it is certa.in that no German officer 
did or does. So the " to save them from a worse fate" story 
can go by the board at once. 
The shooting incident would never have appeared in an 
official report unless it were absolutely authenticated. It did 
take place, and the explanation, as I read it, is this : " Dcr 
Tag " (which we used to believe was merely a British scare- 
monger's fancy) was a very real thing indeed to the officers of 
the German Navy. 
^^'e have probably even now no conception as to what it 
meant to those who treated our Fleet so handsomely at Kiel 
only a few short weeks ago. 
In tlie past I 'have known German naval officers fairly 
well. At any rate, well enough to know that they would never 
lose their heads in any circumstances sufficiently badh' to 
shoot their own fellow sufferers without some very good and 
valid reason. 
That reason is not to be supplied over the circumstance 
that small cruisers were sunk by the battle cruiser squadron. 
Tlie obvious is necessarily the obvious. 
We must, therefore, seek further back for tho cause of 
this extraordinary incident. It is probably to be found in the 
vague happenings of Act Two. I take it that in one or more 
of the German cniiser-s under fire from our destroyers and 
light cru'sers panic occun'ed. Or, if there were no actual 
pai;'f, there was shooting so wild that it amounted to the 
sanio tiling. Game to the last, the German officers spent their 
ln.sf moments in avenging themselves upon those who they 
ciclitixl with being responsible for the failure of "Der Tag" 
as tiijy had realised it. 
Ia a general way, this action is probably regarded as 
insensate and insane. It may be so, but I view it in quite 
another light. To my mind it indicates that, whatever the 
Gorman bluejacket may be, his officers are of the highest 
posiiblo metal. We will do well to rev>.lreuce and respect them 
as enemies worthy of our steel. 
Officially, Germany has admitted a defeat in the affair of 
Heligoland. But v.o shall bo wiso to realise that at sea we are 
fighting against men who are inspired by a spirit v.'hich it ia 
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