LAND AND WATEE 
September 5, 1914 
impcssiblc not to respect 'W'hcn we cousider tlio Goelen 
fiasco, I am by no means sure that, dc":pitc the losses siis- 
t.vined, the Hcligolacd affair may not be a German moral 
success. 
The more ne appi-eciato matters from this point of view, 
the b«tter for our ultimate success. 
ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
The most iiaportant event during the past week has been 
the sinking by U.M.S. Hi{jhfhjer, off tho West Coast of Africa, 
of tho armed German liner Kaiser Wilhelm der Grossf. As 
the Hujhfli/er sustained some casualties, the liner evidently 
put up a fight of some sort. That she was brought to book is 
a jnatter for sincere congratulation. She was capable of a 
speed of 23 knots. It is doubtful whether the Uitjhfli/cr at 
the present time is good for more than about 20, and tho other 
British ships on the station are slower still. At any rate, the 
liner was far the swifter, and tho fact that she was brougiit to 
look comes in the chapter of luck. 
The career of the Kaiser WiUidm der Grosse was sonie>- 
what mystra-ious. When war broke out she was at New York, 
vhore rightly or wrongly the Germans have long been sus- 
pected of having a secret store of guus and anunuuition 
rtpresentod as " spar© parts." 
The liner left New York, and for eleven days nothing 
whatever was heard of her. Then off the African coast she 
fctopped the Castle liner Gaiician, asked for news of H.M.S. 
Carnarvon, ajrrested two passengers, but did no more. A little 
'later she stopped another Castle liner, but again mado r.o 
attempt at capture. On the other hand, she ordered the 
wireless to be thrown overboard. Her next meeting was with 
the Highflyer. 
One explanation of the mystery is that this commerce- 
destroyer which destroyed no commerce had been oiHlered to 
reserve herself for some special purpose. Another possible 
solution is that she was so flurried with the possibilities of 
meeting British cruisers that she did not dare risk standinjf by 
to capture a prize. Yet another, that having found herself on 
the scene of operations, she realised the impossibility of doing 
.■mything with a prize, and so trusted to damaging trado by 
teiTorisJng. This last seems to me the most probabTe explana- 
tion. 
Elsewhere on the high seas the process of clcanng thern of 
hostile merchant shipping continues. It is an example of what 
Mahan has called " the silent pressure of Soa Power." It is 
far less dramatic than the fighting side of naval operations, 
Init it was none the less useful on that account. Also, whereas 
fighting entails expenditure, elimination of the enemy's trade 
rtprosents a substantial profit both for the immediate present 
and for the future also. 
In this connection, however, I would once more draw 
attention to what I mentioned last week : tha danger that 
German diplomacy may drag the United States into the 
quarrel and on to the German side. An ofBcial note from Uio 
British Government to the U.S. Government on the subject of 
German liners interned in U.S. ports brings the matter one 
step forward. The American Press and tho American people 
aro splendid in tho matter of realising what wc are fighting for. 
But " business is business." 
Mr. Churchill spoke nothing but the bald truth when ho 
told the United States, " If we go under it will be your turn 
next." On that particular point I have already elaborated. 
It is waste of space to reiterate. But hero lies a very real 
danger point. 
W«lnesday brought us an official Brazilian announcement 
to the effect that the German cruiser Dresden had sunk a 
British merchant ship off the Brazilian coasts. The Drrsdi n, 
normally belongs to the cruiser division of tho Iligh Sea Fleet 
{I.e., German " Home Fleet "). It would look as though sho 
hai^j^ome secret base in or near Brazilian waters. Her ecal 
stipply is nominally sufficient for 5,500 miles at slow speed ; 
It actually suffices for hardly a thousand miles at full speed 
or standing by for full speed, as a commerce destroyer must 
do— that is to say, three, or at tlie outside, four days' steamin.'r. 
Kven making a;'.l allowances for her having lain by a good deal, 
the must have had to coal at least twice since v. ai- v.as declared. 
THE FAR EAST. 
Japanese operations against Kiao-Chau have commenced. 
The whole of the Gcnnan squadron, which consists of tho 
rrmourod cruisers SchnmhorH and Gnekenau, the small 
cruisers ifmrffn, Lripsi:, and yuryiheri;, four gunbats, and two 
destroyers, together with the old Austrian cruiser Kahcr:ir. 
}:iUahctk, is understood to be blockaded inside the harbour. It 
will probably lie their inactive till such time as tho Japanese 
Jiavc established howitzer batteries for its destruction. We 
may depend upon it that they will attack it as they attacked 
the Port Arthur Fleet in the Kusso-Japanese War. 
Kiao-Chau is believed to be veiy strongly fortified. Tha 
garriscn, 5,000 strong, has made every preparation for a sicga 
and bombardm.cnb — all buildings likely to bo useful as marks 
for Japanese gunners having been destroyed. So a^lso have 
tha Chinese villages insido tho territory. The place is said 
to bo provisioned for eight months, but this is probably a very 
generous estimate. 
The financial conditions of Japan are liliely to influence 
laigcly tho plan of campaign, that is to say, it is probable that 
tho naval part of tho operations will bo entrusted to the 
ordinary " active fleet," which is ample to deal with aJl con- 
tingencies. Tho place is, of course, ccrtnjn to be taken ; con- 
soquontly Japan can well a.lord to proceed economically. 
Tho operations of British warships in Far Eastern waters 
will necessarily bo of an undramatic, but none the less useful 
nature. German trade with China has been very considerable, 
i-.nd a great deal of useful spadcwork will bo done by " showing 
the flag " in all Chinese hai-bours. The Chinese are an 
unimaginative people, and the mex-a cessation of GeiTnan 
imports will not of itself give us the markets as schemed for 
by the Government.. The Chinese will have to be impressed 
with object lessons in the shape of eoutinually seeing British 
warships and having the disappearance of German ones pointed 
out to them. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
The situation here, up to the time of writing, continues 
normal. The Austrian Fleet remains effectually shut in while 
the French are bombarding Cattaa'O, which is one of the several 
Austrian naval stations in the Adriatic. The indications are 
that the majority of these stations will eventually be reduced. 
The Austrian battle fleet is hopelessly inferior to tha Anglo- 
Fi-ench blockading force. It is probably cruising near Lissa, 
but common prudence will prevent it from engaging in a fleet 
action unle-ss compelled. 
Such action could in no way affect the present general 
situation in the Adriatic. Torpedo attacks will come along 
Oater, but at present the Anglo-iFrench forces axe at least 200 
miles from the main Austrian base at PoLa, and so too far 
away for a concei-ted effort to promise much if any success. 
The probability of immediate hostilities between Turkey 
and Greece may profoundly affect the Mediterranean situation. 
At the present moment the Goehcn and Bredau are Turkish, 
but once war is declared German crews for them, ajo likely 
enough to materialise from somewhere. 
The possibility of this will necessitat« a certain weakening 
of tho Adriatic blockade, and this may tempt the Austrian 
fleet to come out to try conclusions with tho Anglo-French 
force. 
THE BALTIC. 
Baltic operations are somewhat obscure. As mentioned 
last week, it is probable that the Russians are more or less 
waiting and that the Germans are more or less blockading. 
The " Russian battleship driven ashore " of earlier reports is 
now almost /Certainly to be identified with tho German light 
cruiser Magdeburg, which is officially admitted to have gone 
ashore and subsequently to have been blown up. 
Of the various official and non-official tales of this inci- 
dent, I am most inclined to believe the story that sho got 
aground by pure accident, and was subsequently found and 
blown up by tho Russian cruisers. There is nothing to indi- 
cate that any actual battle on a considerable scale ever took 
place. AVe have to remember that Russian trade interests 
are comparatively trivial, and that nautically Russia has every- 
thing to gain by delaying major operations till some of the 
Gangoots ai-o ready for sea. 
It is an open secret now that Russia knew that this war 
was coming, but that she did not expe«t tha Kaiser to strike 
for another two years. Consequently she did not accelerate 
her new ship construction, wisely consideiing that her first 
task was to train tha necessary crews, without which mere 
ships ara useless. 
AVhen tha Russian fleet does go into action the men who 
m.an it will be something very different from those who perished 
at Tsushima. So long as Germany has a numerical superiority 
she can keep the Russian Navy at bay in the Baltic; but I 
question whether the Germans would have much chance 
against an equal Russian force. The Russian Navy is now 
trained along Franco-British lines — that is to say, officers and 
men have cultivated the cetmeraderie of the French Navy v.hile 
they have imitated the British in playing football together. 
It is things of this sort that count altogether beyond " paper 
calculations." 
On the water, the Germans appear to have regarded the 
Russians as a negligible factor or thereabouts. Wo may yet 
see them vciy seriously undeceived on this point. There is 
a very wide gulf between the Grigorovitch Navy of to-day 
and the Rodjcstvensky Navy of ten years ago. 
IC* 
