Sq^temLcr 5, 1914 
LAND AND WxiTER 
waj'S : she asaores her position both against Russia and against 
England — the two States, that is, with whose hoflUity we liave 
to reckon. Turkey, also, is th<< only Power which can threaten 
ICugland's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea route 
and the land communications to India. V\'b ou^ht to spare no 
eacrifices to secure this country a"? an ally for tlie eventuality of a 
var with England or Russia, Turkey's intert^ts are onrs. It is 
also to tlie obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain Jicr 
oonimanding position on the Bosphorus and at tlie Dardanelles, 
tliat this important key should not be transferred to the keeping 
of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England. 
We have to count more on J:ipaneso hostility Uian Japanese 
friendship. . . . The apparently peaccfid state of things must 
not deceive us; we ore facing a hidden, but none the less fcrmi<V 
able, crisis — perhaps the most momentous crisis iu the history of 
the (!ennan nation. 
We have fought in the last great wars for our national union 
and our position .among the Powers of Kuro/tf : we now must 
decide whether we wish to d-^velop into and maintain a Worlif 
KmjJtre, and procure f<.r Ciiman .-ipirit and Cionnan idea.s tliat 
fit recognition which hue been hitherto withheld from thtni. 
Save as regards Japan, the further tho Prophet has 
departed from his own. coiiutry tho loss true have been his 
prognostications. The distant fields on to whicli he cast his 
vision were gi'een, but not as verdant as General Bernhardi, 
wlio appears to have taken cas true the leaflets used iu our 
domestic political strife where any and all sides predicted the 
v/oj to come from our English-speaking cousins across the sea, 
from our brothers in Cana<la, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa; from India, Egj-pt. and all other parts and depen- 
dencies of our Empire, if this, that, or the other political 
nostrum were not swallowed or rejected. He believes, or 
wishes his readers to believe, that the United States of America, 
are anxiously waiting the py.'ichological moment to blot our 
Emj)irc out for ever- — our great colonies and dependencies wcro 
■looking for the moment when they could shake themselves free 
from England's detestable grasp, India to drive the last of our 
race iuto the ocean and thus be free, Tuvkey to take Egypt 
Lack into its empty crop and (here digest her people at leisure. 
And when all these moments came about the day of Germany 
would arrive to shatter the British Empire to pieces and on 
the du«t build up her own. Pit}- he was too soon for Mr. 
" Odell " of the Constitutional Club. The Kaiser's spy system 
had not then como up to date. 
DOUBT ! THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM. 
With all Bernhardi's enthusiasm and prophetic ardour 
his military instinct warned him that (iiere were difTiculties 
ahead. These he sets out with a frankness equalling his 
ajiprccijitiou of the goal to which Germany means to march : 
Spain alone of the remaining European Powcr.s has any inde- 
pendent importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to 
France by her Morocco policy, an<I may, therefore, beconiei evcn- 
tu.-illy a factor in German ixjlicy. 'i'lie pe'tty State*, on the contrary, 
firm no independent centre* of triavity, but mny, in event of war, 
prove to possess a by no means negligible impoitanc? : the small 
Jtalkau States for Austria and Turkey ; Denmark, Holhind, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually" Sweden, for Germiuiy. 
Switzerland and Belgium count »s neutral. The former was 
declared neutral at tlie Congress of Vienna on November 20th, 
1815, under the collective guaraiitee of the fignatorv Powers; 
Belgium, in the Treaties of I^ondon of November 15th, 1831, and of 
April 19th, 1839, on the part of the five Great Power*, the Nether- 
lands, and Belgium itself. 
If W'e look at these conditions as a. whole, it .appears that on 
the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple 
Alliance and that of the Statues united against it by alliance an<l 
.-igreemcnt balance each other, providtfl that Italy lielongs to tlie 
J»aj{ne. If we take into calculation tha imponderabilia, whojie 
weight can only be guessed at, the Bcale i!« inclined slightly iu 
^ f.avour of the Triple Alliance. On the other band, England iiidin- 
putably rides the sea. In consequence of her crusliing naval 
Kiiperiority when allied with France, and of the geographical condi- 
tions, she may cause the greater damage to fSemiany by cutting 
off her maritune trade. 'J'here is also a not inconsiderable army 
available for a continental war. When all cf.nyiderations aje taken 
into account, our opponents have a. polilic.nl superiority not to be 
nnderestimated. If Frame succeeds in strengthening her army by 
large colonial levies and a strong English landing force, "this 
superiority would be as»erte<l on land aVo. If Italy really with- 
draws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly euperW forces will 
ba united against Germany ami Austria. 
Under these conditions the position of Germany is e.xlra- 
oinlinarily difficult. 
• ••••• 
An intensive colonial policy is for us fisp.cially an absolut? 
ne.e;.-ily. 
A higidy interesting examination follows of the political 
eomplicationg of tho European Powers. Bernhardi does not 
permit himself to harbour delusions. Although he had pre- 
viously set forth the position of Belgium as neutral, he now 
mora minutely discusses her position, foreshadowing her 
<iitering into a combination opposed to the Gtrmanic alliance, 
a.'ul the Germanic view of tho right to violate bcr neutra.!ity. 
COMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED. 
We must endeavour to obtain in this svstem onr merited 
position at the he.ad of a federation of Centra"l European States, 
»nd thi's reduce the imaginary European efptilibrium, in one way 
or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase oar 
own power. 
A fui'ther question, suggested by the present political position, 
13 whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the 
beginning of the last century under quite oUier conditions — in fact, 
uiuler a different conception of what constitutes a State — can, or 
ought to be, periuaneiitly observed. When Belgium was pro- 
claimed Jieuti-al, ilo one contemplat;d Ih.at she would lay claim t> 
a large and viuuable region of Africa. It may well be asked 
whether the acquisition of such territory is not ifuso facto a brciicli 
of neutrality, for a State from which — ^theoretically at least — all 
danger of war has been removed has no right to enter into political 
c.nnpetition with the other States. Tltis argume:it is the more 
justiliable bacause it may safely be assumed that, iu event of a 
war of Germany against France and England, the two last-men- 
t'oned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. La.stly, 
•the neutr.ality of the Congo State'' must be termed mora than 
problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to n, 
non-neutral country. The conception of permanent neutraTity is 
<ntirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, whichcviu 
• mly attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. 
Its complete development presupposes such competition. 
Again, the principle that no State can ever interfMTe in tlie 
internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights 
of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously inter- 
preted, and powerful States have never retrained from a high- 
handed interference iu ihe internal affairs of smaller ones. 
THE RUSSIAN STEAM-ROLLER. 
If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast 
Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, 
from a I'us<;ian standpoint, a war in tlie West holds out better 
prospects of .success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly 
with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful 
allies, v. ho are impiitieiitly waiting to join illi an attack on 
Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communi- 
<ation there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of 
power tha« in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of 
tlemiany is as persiistent .as ever, would be in favour of such a 
^■..•l^, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only 
open the road to Const.antinople, but would greatly improve tho 
political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. 
.Siich^a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats 
in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected 
oil the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. 
Shoidd Russia, then, after weighing these chances, launch out 
into an offensive war in the Wert, the struggle would probably 
rssume a quite different character from that, for example, of a 
Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the 
fiict place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat 
lier centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian w.ar can hardly 
ever, th&cefore, become a struggle for political existence, au'd 
cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. 
A\'e cannot count on seeing a great commander at our head ; 
a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. 
•••••• 
We cannot blink the fact that we have to de.al with immen.ss 
military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends 
or r^pel successfully the attack of our opponents. 
GERMANY'S DOORS— OPEN AND SHUT. 
In the first pface, the geographical configuration and position 
of our country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier 
offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre 
of the Government and axlministration, lies in dangerous proxinuty 
to it. Our western frontier, in itself s.trong, can be easily turned 
on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstaeI«, 
no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion, and 
neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier 
of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland. There, 
tji course, the character of the country offers considerable difti- 
culties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might iMt 
lie easy to break down their resistance. Their army is no despicaljie 
factor of strength, and if they were attacked in" their mountjins 
they svould fight as they did .at Senipach and Mmien. 
The natural approaches from the North Sea to th» BiJlic, 
the Sound, and tlie Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, 
and can easily fall a. prey to our enemies. 
The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms 
in itself a strong front, but can e3.sily be taken in the rear through 
Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner 
that our entire oversea commerce can be eatily bkn-ked. In tli« 
Fouth and sonth-eaat alone are we secure*! by Austria from direct 
invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We ni.oy 
have to face attacks on three side.s. Thi"s cirtiim.itance compels n» 
to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but 
it is also fraught with dangers, if onr opponents underitand how to 
act on a correct and consistent plan. 
ISOLATION. 
If we look ,at our general political position, wc cannot conceal 
tho fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from 
anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, 
France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking dowii our 
pov.er. This interest will sooner or Later be asserted by arms. It 
is not therefore tho interest of any nation to increase" Germany's 
power. If we wish to a<ttain an extension of our power, as is 
natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly 
superior foes. 
Such a w.ar— for ns more than for any other nation— mn.it 
be a war for our political and national existence. This mnist b^i 
so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims bv ahii'-.^t 
annihilating us by land and by sea. 
We must thcref.i-e prepare not only for a short Avar, but for 
a, protracted campaign. We miist lie armed in order to complete 
tho overthrow of our enemies, should the vicilory be ours; .and if 
worsted, to continue to defend ourselves in the verj- heart of OUT 
country until snocesa at last is won, , 
k 
19» 
