LAIS'D AND WATER 
August 29, 1914 
"Wlion tlic news of tliat Sunday and that ISronday liad been recel\-cd in London and Paris, it was 
evident at once A\licrc tlie enemy liad Lis main foi-ccs, and where the forces opposed to him had proved 
inferior to his o^ni. The consequences of tliat inferiority were a very serious set-back for the cause of 
the Allies, and an equally considerable advantage gained by the Grerman powers. 
]^noui,di was said last week to show that, other things being equal, what determines success 
or failure in war is the element of numbers. 
jS'ow, because there were at critical points on two sections of the theatre of operations a larger 
number of the enemy than had been allowed for, that enemy has obtained the advantage which we 
must clearly understand if we are to appreciate the gravity of the moment. The two sections of the 
whole theatre of war, the two fields in critical points of which these advantages had, by Tuesday last, 
been gained by the Germans are (1) that marked A — A upon the accompanying sketch, being that part of 
Lorraine which lies between the Yosges and the fortress of IMetz ; (2) that marked B — B on the 
s.nne sketch being all that country lying in front of and round the angle formed by the junction 
of the Sambre and the Mouse IJivers. 
The German advance, the falling back of the Allies, Avas in each case over a belt of from 12 to 21 
miles in width, in each case occupied some few days, and in each case has been due to the presence, 
on one particular front of the Allies, of ninnbers superior to those that were expected — though in the 
second field, that of the Sambre and the Meuse, another element besides that of numbers entered into 
the calculations, to wit, the factor of Xamur. 
I will take these two fields of German success and of French and Allied failure in their order. 
1. THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LORRAINE. 
A French force, the position and size of which are not matter for public comment, but tlie 
movements and command of Avhich have been communicated to the public by the French Government, 
had for some days been undertaking a strong offensive movement across the frontier of the annexed 
jirovinces, Alsace-Lorraine. 
It will be seen in the accompanying sketch that this frontier, running from in front of Metz down 
to Belfort, is diA-ided into two sections b}- the Yo.-^ges JNEountains, along the crest of which it 
runs for some little way. The French oifen- 
METZ IFortKedl 
LORRAINE 
SAARBUftC 
NANCY 
*^TheDof)on 
STRASSaURG 
(Firtiried) 
Head 
,Bridge Heg^ 
12 5 
sive, undertaken with considerable forces, was 
in the direction of the aiTOws marked " passes " : 
that is, it included the passage of the Vosges 
Mountains by the capture of the passes 
across them. It included an advance upon, 
and, as events turned out, the recapture of, 
the open town of Mulhouse ; it included the 
occupation of that high culminating mass at 
the northern end of the Vosges known as the 
Donon ; and it included a forward movement 
across the oj^en country in between Metz and 
the Yosges, particidarly the capture and the 
holding of Saarbourg, a railway junction the 
occupation of which cuts direct communication 
between Metz and Strasbourg. 
In all this vigorous offensive effort, the 
combined Army Coi-ps forming the army of 
Alsace - Lorraine under General Pau had, 
up to and including the 
August 19th (that is, 
week) been successful, 
move was threefold : 
(1.) First, and least important, it had a jjolitical object. The two million population of Alsace- 
Lorraine being for the most part unfriendly to the Gennans, and the memory of their annexation 
being very bitter to tlie French, the presence of French troops upon their soil was calculated to be an 
element of confusion for Germany and of moral adA'antage to the spirit of the French people at the 
inception of the campaign. 
(2.) Secondh', and far more im2>ortant, it had for its object the putting of pressure upon the 
extreme German left, so that the enemy's forces might be drawn down in that direction and Aveakened 
in their main attempt, which Avas likely to be in the north. At the same time, a successful campaign 
in Alsace -Lon-aine, proceeding from south to north, Avould gTadually close one bridge-head after 
another across the lihine, and cut the communications between the south German depots and stores 
and the German armies in the field. 
(3.) Thirdly, and most important, it Avould so engage German attention upon the front Metz- 
Strasbourg as to divert or delay any effort along the front jMetz-Longwy. 
The importance of this third point a little consideration Avill explain. The Allies occupying, as 
they did, positions in the north between Lille and LongAvy, if the Germans had struck in between 
i*kletz and LongAvy, they Avould not only have taken the line of the Allies in the rear and have 
threatened it Avith envelopment, but they Avould in particular have cut off Avhat is technically called 
a sahent. A salient, in this connection, means a position occupied by troops such that it is thrusfc 
Sc^le ofA-^cr^gT Mjrchtng tJ^y$; 
day of "Wednesday, 
Wednesday of last 
The object of this 
position occupi 
general line. It is evident that in the line Lille — Longw^', the allied 
out like a horn from some „.. ,„_. ^, ..,^, ....... ,,.„„ ,„ ,..^ ....>. ..^„,v. ^v^^. • „ , ^.^^ cil»i>..* 
forces upon the_ Sambre and the Meuse from IMons through Kamur to Mczieres (in the sketch opposite) 
were such 
a salient in the general nllied line. 
2» 
