August 29, 1911 LAND A:ND WATER 
of Liogo, and mucli tlic largest body of the total German forces bcjond tlio Rlinio lu tlie west 
■was massed to the north of the Meuse. A sufficient supply was accumulated for tliis groat effort, 
and it is probable that -^Nhen an accurate history of the war is available we shall find that not 
less than seven, and perhaps eight. Army Corps out of a total of certainly less than twenty, were 
massed thus north of the Meuse upon the extreme left wing of the Allies for the great flanking 
movement round their line by the north. 
The last stand that could be made by the Belgian Army to these immensely superior forces 
was made on that same Wednesday, a day's march east of Brussels, and after it the Bclgums 
retired behind the guns of Antwerp, leaving Brussels open to the advance. In the late morning 
of the morrow, Thursday, August 20th, the Thursday of last week, the heads of the German 
columns appeared before the cajjital of Belgium, which had been left open to admit them without 
resistance. From about half-past two o'clock of that day, throughout the whole of the remainder of 
that day, the German commanders organised a military parade, the object of which, though confined 
ta what is called " moral effect," was military and defensible. Thej' marched through Brussels one of 
their Army Corps specially picked for the job because it was quite fresh. They had speciallj- accoutred 
it, given it a good rest, put into it for a veneer a few of the units that had been in the earlier fighting, 
and bidden it pi-epare for the show as for a rcAiew. These 40,000 men they passed through the cit}-, 
accompanied by music, and by every adjunct which could impress the civilian spectator — even to the 
stiff" parade step which is characteristic of the Prussian drill. 
Xow it is here advisable, after the somewhat iU-timed ridicule which was poured upon this 
manifestation, to explain what is meant by moral effect in warfare, and why a commander will, under 
some conditions, wisely employ it. 
WHAT IS "MORAL EFFECT"? 
Strictly speaking, aU operations of v.'ar dej^end for their success upon moral effect, with the 
exception of that operation in which a hostile force is completely surrounded and maybe exterminated. 
In everj- other case you obtain your success over your enemy — or at any rate over the survivors 
among your enemy — by reducing them into a condition of mind in Avhich their opposition is ineffective. 
The whole discussion between closer and more open fonnations : between the power of modern fortifi- 
cations to withstand modern siege artillery, and the opposite theoiy : between the survivor and non- 
survivor and shock tactics for cavalry — all these depend ultimately upon one's judgment of " moral 
effect." 
But there is evidently a difference in degi'ee. No one can doubt the ovex-ttdielming result of a 
double flank movement enveloping an inferior force. To depend upon such a movement as that for 
success is to depend upon something like a certitude in human ps3chology. At the other end of the 
line you get the story of the Chinese troops that ten-ified the enemy by making faces and imitating the 
cries of wild beasts. 
There is a whole category of actions in warfare which are of doubtful use because they lie 
beyond tlie line after which the p.sychological effect is weak. Such actions are specially said to 
have no true strategic but only a " moral " effect. 
For instance, the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick threatening Paris with destruction 
before the invasion of France in 1792, is rightly regarded by historians as a blunder. Its moral effect, 
if any, was to strengthen the French moral. Again, Napoleon's entry into ^Moscow was effected at an 
enormous expense of men, after an advance far too prolonged, and the corresponding moral effect of 
holding the capital in such a country as Russia was in no way worth the expense of time, men, and 
energy which it cost. 
Now what we have to seize in the present campaign is that the German Government and the 
German military commanders have carefully estimated and intend to apply this factor of " moral effect " 
apart from direct action in the field, up to a certain point and in certain particular ways, for which Ave 
must be prepared. I do not say that their estimate is just : I should even imagine that they will 
exaggerate this factor. But what I do say is that their action here, as in eveiy other matter, will be 
detaUed and calculated ; and it will be veiy foolish on the part of those who are their opponents to 
imagine that any piece of parade, severity, or demonstration has been undertaken by the German 
commanders at random, or without their having seen, just as clearly as we see it, the vain side of 
such accessories to war. 
By marching through Brussels, for instance, the Gennan commanders added a full day's fatigue 
and a full day's delay to at least one body of their troops, and perhaps to as many more. The choice 
of a fresh Army Coi-j)s was a patent thing which deceived nobody into thinking that the troops which 
liad recently been fighting M'ere those fresh troops whom the populace of Brussels gazed upon. The 
breaking into parade step made no careful observer believe that those who indulged in it were on that 
account the more formidable in battle ; nor did the playing of brazen instruments, and the rest. 
None the less, the decision of the Gennan commanders to make this demonstration was not, as too 
many have imagined, a piece of emptj- theatricalism. Its effect was calculated beforehand, and that 
effect has been in part attamed. No one reading the press hostile to Germany on the morrow of last 
Tliursday, when the news was known, can have cloubted that this piece of parade did in some degree^ 
perhaps in a less degi-ce than the Gennan commanded had hoped — affect the spirit of their opponents. 
It is exactly the same with the much graver policy of torture and murder. The German troops 
have here direct orders from their superiors and a clear object before them. 
They expect to be operating in ho.stile coimtry — at any rate they have good hopes of being in liostiL? 
countr}^ during all the earlier, and perhaps more critical, phases of the campaign. If they meet with 
resistance upon the part of the civilian population (though that only consists of women, elderly men, 
and children), their difficulties will be enonnously increased. 
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