LAND AND WATER 
August 29, 1914 
Since these elderly men, women, and chiidren have, in the nature of things, no kind of 
orrfanization, the terror inspired by the fato of individuals may he expected to cow all the rest. 
Therefore, orders will he strictly observed to adopt any means of spreading such terror wheno^•cr there 
is so much as a suspicion of resistance upon the part of the civilian population, and on this account wo 
must he prepared for not only the summary shooting of elderl}- men and youths who have been caught 
with arms in their hands, but also of any who have been suspected. Again, Avhonever there is a 
suspicion against the population of any place, we must expect the putting to death of elderly men and 
women, and even children, the destruction of property upon all sides, the burning of homes. 
I do not say that this is wise upon the part of the Germans. Personally, I think that in so 
acting they are handicapping themselves politically, and probably, in the later phases of the campaign, 
militarih'- as well. But the point to remember is that these actions arc calculated actions. In 
]3cl"ium, for instance, there is no doubt that the absence of all civilian resistance after the first few- 
da vs has encouraged the German commanders in the belief that these methods are of immediate 
niilitary value. They will be pursued in France as in Belgium, and, should a force land in 
England, in England as in France. We must be prepared for it. 
The same rule applies to the ransoming of towns. Here it is not the town into which ten-or has 
to be struck, but the financial power of the enemy. Take, for instance, the case of the Belgian towns 
:nid provinces in the last few da^'s. A total of about £10,000,000 has been exacted. England and 
France at once granted this sum to Belgium, wliich is as much as saying that Germany, by her 
successful occnpation of Belgium, has fined her principal opponents already £10,000,000, and inspired 
in the minds of those who have no country in particular and whose principal object is cosmopolitan 
linauce, the dread of fui-ther loss. Gemiany knows how j^owcrful these men arc, and relies upon their 
indirect suijpoi-t. 
THE THREAT TO THE SEA COAST. 
Finally, there is the very powerful moral effect upon which Gennany is certainly counting, and 
for which we must in this country be specially prepared : ihc occiqudion of the sea coast. There is 
nothing to prevent comparatively small detached bodies of the Gennan armies, especially strong in 
cavahy, froni occupying Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and ultimately Boulogne, except a decision in the 
valley of the !Meuse adverse to German anns. If the Germans are successful in the valley of tlio 
Meuse they will certainly occupy the poi'ts of the Straits of Dover. 
We may tell ourselves, and tell ourselves truly, all manner of concrete, solid, and consoling things 
conceming such an occupation : — That the Fleet can always master any particular section of coast to 
%. liich it directs its attention ; that there are no vessels of war in these ports ; that it is just as easy 
to fly over to England from the western part of the Belgian plain as from the sea coast ; that no 
iinne-layer could get out of these porfs without observation from the fleet ; that British com- 
nr.mications over sea with the British forces and their Allies could be maintained further to the 
west, (S;c., &c. It is .still true that the presence of Gennan troops u])on the further side of the Straits 
(if Dover would profoundly affect the state of mind of the Allies. It would be of a " moral effect " 
apparently disproportionate to the effort required. Whether it Avill rcaUy be disproportionate or no 
• illy the event can show ; but at any rate it will be attempted — unless the series of actions upon the 
!Meuse goes adversely to the Gennan arms. And we shall be very unwise indeed unless we prepare 
ourselves for the news of such an occupation of the sea coast. 
Let me noAv return to the consideration of the series of actions that have taken place, and at the 
moment of writing are still taking place, in the Mouse valley. 
» L.'iLe 
.O'^ 
^=^ 
1 1 cat 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE MEUSE AND SAMBRE. 
We left those operations upon the Thiu-sday of last Aveek, when the Gennans were marching 
through Brussels. It v/as by the Friday, in the afternoon of that day, that the first German shell fell 
into the station of Charleroi, upon the Kiver Sambre ; and it is from this moment that the general 
operation of the Allied armies against the German armies of the Belgian plain and the Ardennes 
begins. 
If the^ reader will tm-n back to the general map published at the head of these comments, he will 
note that in the northern field of operations the Eiver iTeuse turns a sharp corner at the town of 
Namur ; after having run roughly from 
north to south it begins to run roughly 
from east to west. At this comer thci-e 
comes into the Meuse the Eiver Sambre 
which, running from cast to west, con- 
tinues the line of the Lower Meuse. 
North of this line lies, of course, that 
Belgian, plain of which mention is miulo 
so frequently in all dcscri2:)tions of the 
campaign. South of that line is to bo 
found rough wooded country, deeply 
ravined, and called the Ardennes. It is 
rougher and wilder to the east and to the 
south, and falls into cultivatable land as 
one goes westward and northward, the 
Sambre itself coining from soui'ces in almost 
flat country and only running through 
hilly countiy as it approaches Namnr. 
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