Au^ist 29, 1911 LAIs^D AND WATER 
Now, when it was evident tliat the Germans woukl make their principal attempt thronirh the 
Eelgian jJain, the Allies occupied a line passing through Lille, Mons, along the Samhre by Cliarleroi 
to Namur. I'hat Avas a clear necessity, but they also massed some very large numbers on a line 
bending back along the U])per ISIeuse I'rom Kamur southward. The English contingent lay about 
Mons. It was the French Fifth Anny, largely comjjosed of troops from Algiers, that lay along the 
Sambre from above Cliarleroi to as far as Naiuur. Namur itself aj)pears to haxe been somewhat 
insuificicntly held by a Belgian contingent. Behind were the large French forces continued up the 
valley of the Meuse. 
So much we know because it has been made public property by the authorities. Something more 
we know from official telegrams and from private accounts that have been printed in the press of Paris 
and London. But there still remains a much greater part to conjecture. 
Let us first deal with what ^ye know. 
The German attack came in full force upon the line of the Sambre, and there, of course, greatly 
outnumbered the defenders. It chief objective was not the extreme of the line to tiie west, 
as might bo expected of German tactics and a desu-e to outflank, but in a direct attack, the 
bridges at and near Cliarleroi. This attack was maintained throughout Saturday and through 
the first part of Sunday without result. The English contingent held its ground on the left 
near Mons against forces which seem to have been superior to it by approiimately 20 per cent. 
The French along the Sambre, particularly pressed for the possession of the bridge at Cliarleroi, 
lost and recovered, again lost and again recovered that passage. AVliile this was proceeding the 
larger Fi-ench forces along the Upper Meuse were proposing to pass eastward through the 
Ardennes countiy. Had they succeeded in pressing far eastward through this difficult and highl\- 
defcnsible land of forests and deep ravines, they would have threatened more and more with 
every mile of their advance the communications and the su2)ply of the Gennan armies in the 
Belgian plain, for that communication and those supplies largely come by road across the ^Meuse 
between Namur and Liege. Further, such an advance would have separated the northern German 
army from the southem portion, which was operating from Luxembourg. 
One hj'pothesis of what followed upon and after the Sunday is the following : 
It is obvious that this advance eastwai-d through the Ardennes would pivot round the fortress 
of Namur. The advance along the arrow marked (1) in the above sketch would march the 
furthest : next that along the arrow marked (2),- and last along the ^leuse itself, depending 
upon the success of the two more southern columns, that along the arrow marked (3).' While, 
so long as the line on the Sambre was held, this turning movement romid the Ardennes by 
the east was in no fear for its rear. 
Such is one hypothesis upon the nature of the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the 
vigorous Gennan offen.sive undertaken from the Belgian plain. 
That counter-offensive — according to this conjecture — broke down ; and this breakdown is the 
gi-avest news of all that has yet reached us from the seat of war. 
The advices received and published in London and Paris up to and including the news of last 
Wednesday morning pointed, indeed, to no decisive result. They did not indicate that the one 
opponent had as yet appreciably diminished the military power of the other ; but they did strongly 
suggest that the counter-offensive designed by the Allies again.st the Gennan advance had failed, and 
tliey made it seem exceedingly improbable that any immediate attempt to restore it would be attcHipted. 
The failure appears to have depended upon two isolated events — a check in the southernmost 
French effort, marked (1) upon the above sketch, and, much more important, the fall of Namur : at 
least, the fall of the eastern forts and the consequent loss of the bridge-heads over the two riAcrs 
Sambre and Meuse at the critical point where these rivers meet. 
If Namur had still held as a pivot upon which the tuniing movement could depend, the fact that 
the southernmost French column was arrested in the neighbourhood of Neuchateau might not 
have had very permanent results. The second colimin to the north coming up on the Hank of 
the Gennan armies from Luxembourg might, indeed, have reversed that result ; and in any case, 
the occupation of even a part of the Aixlennes country by French troops would have menaced 
the supply of their opponents upon the Belgian plain. 
But when (or if) Namur went, the hinge upon which all that arm was swinging went with 
it, and not only would the French turning movement eastward through the Ardennes become 
impossible, but it woidd become equally impossible to hold the valley of the Sambre. 
AU this, I repeat, is pure conjecture. It is based upon the sujjposition that the news of 
Namur came at the critical moment and that on receipt of it only was the retreat from the Sambre 
determined upon. Tlie fuller accounts that will reach us later will show whether this hypothesis 
is sound or no. 
The way in which Namur was essential to the whole plan will be easily appreciated when 
we consider that the ring of forts protected the junction of 
the two rivers and of the bridges whereby they might 
simultaneously be crossed. 
Observe the effect of this. In the accompanying duigrani 
you have the complex obstacle A. A. A., consisting of a 
main river and its tributars', which obstacle is presented both 
to M. advancing upon it and to N., who is preparing to meet 
him and to take a coimter offensive against him. A fortress, 
X, X, X, X, held by N.'s men, contains and protects the two 
ojiportnnities, bridges (B.B.), whereby the obstacle can l>e 
siinnoHuteJ. N. can move at his choice across the obstacle by 
