LAND AND WATEE 
August 29, 1914 
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these bricl^i-os, under protection of the foiiress, aud appear in force Avhere he chooses. He could appear 
in force at'tackiiig along line (1) or along line (2) at his choice. The various pai-ts of his enemy M are 
se])iu-atcd and delayed by the obstacle : he is not. So long as the foiiress holds, N commands the 
bridge-heads which sui-mount that obstacle in his favour, while leaving it stiU a cause of delay to his 
oucmy. 
But suppose the foi-trcss X, X, X, X to fall, and the conditions are exactly reversed. Tlien it is 
3>I that has the bridges -. it is !M tliat is no longer suffering from the obstacle, and it is N who is 
restricted by it. Further, the line wdiich N is holding along one part of the obstacle up to and 
reposing upon the fortress is turned by the falling of the fortress into the hands of M. M can pour 
over on°to N's flank. The obstacle which N is holding is no longer an obstacle to hun, because he 
possesses the bridge for crossing it ; and N. will be rolled up unless he falls back immediately. 
M beino- here the German attack, N the allied defence along the Sambre X, X, X, the fortress of 
Namur protecthig the bridges across the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse (which together fonn 
the triple obstacle in question), with Namur in German hands, the position of the AUies defending the 
Sambre becomes hnpossible. The Allies have to fall back, and at the same time the counter-oli'ensive 
to the east across the Meuse through the Ardennes can no longer be pui-sued. 
The total result under this hypothesis is that from holding the positions (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) on the 
accompiinying sketch, the Allies had by last Monday evening 
to fall back u2)on positions roughly represented by (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2). Here, however, conjecture becomes necessarily vaguer 
and less well based, because we sbaU not precisely know (and 
even for those who know, it would be a duty to be silent) 
where the rclielc defensive line against the next Gei-man 
advance AviU lie. We shall not know this until the news of its 
retention, or the failure to retain it, reaches us. It is even 
possible that a large French force is still free to act and to 
take the counter- offensive — we do not know. 
It is however already evident that the full plan of the 
Allied Gfeueral Staff involves what is called a " refusing " of 
their left ; that is a bending back of their left wing from the 
general line. This left wing Avas lying upon Wednesday last 
along the line Canibrai — Le Cateau. This extreme portion 
was held by the English contingent. That of coui-se leaves 
the whole of the north-east open to a Gennan advance, but at the same time it leaves the flank of 
that advance open to attack from the south if that unknown factor, the French masses upon the right, 
can come up in time and in sufficient numbers. 'j'liis is indeed the whole oljject of refusing a wing — 
you do it when your enemy is trying to turn jou if you think that you have enough men to strike up 
at his flank dm-ing the turning movement. 
Our information, then, 24 hours before this appears in print, is no more than the following : the 
Allied line has retired from its original positions (1) (1) (1) by very heavy marches for three days to (3) 
(3) upon its extreme left. It has fallen back 
from the neighbourhood of Mons to the 
neighbourhood of Cambrai. The task of the 
heaviest marchmg has fallen upon the English 
contingent, which is extended between 
Cambrai and Le Cateau. To the right, any- 
■\vhere within the triangle, ABC, are the 
main French masses, certainly 10 Army Corps 
in number, perhaps already more. What they 
have in front of them vre do not know : they 
certainly had superior numbers in the fighting 
of last Sunday; the new arrivals from the 
south may already have redressed the balance. 
Meanwhile, there is of course nothing to pre- 
vent the German cavalry from working round 
by the left in raids if they think it will be of 
useful moral effect to do so, and some of that 
cavalry has already appeared near Lille and 
near Douai, and even further upon French 
territory. 
THE NATURE OF THE FALL OF NAMUR. 
It is again a matter of conjecture, but of conjecture most vital to the fortunes of the whole of our 
campaign, what exactly happened at Namur. For, if Namur was sufiiciently held and was taken — or 
at least, certain of its forts were taken— so quickly only under the effect of shell fire, it must mean 
that the whole theory under which ring fortresses were built, and upon which the Allied plan was 
based, is eiToneous ; it must mean that the German theory is sound and the French theory is unsound 
in the niatter of fortification ; it must moan that your ring fortress can be carried in a comparatively 
short time, if not by a rash, then under the effect of siege artillery. 
^ Now, putting together all the very slight evidence which l)ad reached this country by the morning 
of Thursday last, it is by no means certain that so grave a conclusion can be drawn. The eastern 
forts of Nainur appear to have been silenced late upon Saturday, or early upon Sunday, the town to 
have been occupied in the coiu-se of Sundav, and certain of the vvcstern forts to be still holding out in 
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6KETCH EHOWIXG I!ET:EEliEj;T OF ALLIED TROOl S FKOM THEIB 
I'OaiTION or LAST WEEK, 
(1) (1) to their present position (3) (3), of -nliioli the portion between 
Cambrai and Le Cateau is published, -nhile that represeutinj tha main 
French Body to the right is not cortain, but lies somewhcro within tho- 
space marked with a query. 
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