Anm-.st 29, 1 914 L A ^^ D A N D W A T E R 
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the evening of that day. At least this view of the matter is established by two convevging pieces of 
evidence, the one from German, the other from French sources. Again, by the Sunday evening th.e 
retreat from the Sambre was in full swing and tlie Allied cannon were iu front of Phillipevillo back 
several liours' marching from the Sambre. We hear of a very small garrison in Namur, and that 
gan-ison Belgian — 3,000 is the almost incredibly small figure given. AVe are further told that the 
most eastern of the forts round Namur, that furthest advanced down the !Mcuse, Avas silenced almost 
immediately ; and more than that we are not told. !Now we can be perfectly certain from the experience 
at Poi-t Arthur, that the immediate silencing of a modern fort by mere shell lire is quite abnormal, as 
■we know by the experience of both Er-lung-shan fort at Port Arthur and of Fleron fort and others at 
Liege that it is impossible (also under nonnal circumstances) to rash it. IMore than that we do not 
know. But it wiU require very strong evidence indeed to prove that modem fortification is subject, 
when it is properly defended, to immediate disaster of this sort. If it is, not only Namur, 
but Toul and Verdun — and not oidy Toul and Yerdun,' but Metz and Strasbourg — are in the 
tame boat. 
^Ul this reading, from sparse and unco-ordinated news of Avhat has happened daring this week 
upon the Sambre and Meuse, is based upon the hypothesis that Namur did fall as was announced, and 
that the Anglo-French line did retire from one to two days' marcli behind the line Mons-Namur, which 
is roughly the line of the Sambre. 
But there is a f ui-ther element in the combination which had not been accounted for by "Wednesday 
night last. Much more important in number, and even in composition, than the French forces upon 
Sambre, were the French masses to the South of that river, which were destined to ojierate in the 
.t\a"dennes. 
AVe have seen that of these gi-eat bodies, one Avas checked in front of Neufchateau by the Gennan 
forces proceeding from southern Belgian Luxembourg ; but until we have news of those masses as a 
■whole we cannot detennine the result of the conflict upon the north-eastern frontier. Even though 
■we know that the troops holding the line of the Sambre fell back, their ultimate fortune, their 
immediate future task, and the chances of a decision one way or the other, would stiU depend upon 
tlie positions taken up by these masses to the south of the Sambre line, and the action upon which 
they might be directed. The most probable conjecture is that we shall find them, Avhen the veil is 
lifted again, extending the line of the others towards the south. We remain — late upon Wednesday 
night — in necessaiy ignorance of their position and their movements. 
One or two things which may explain the postponement of a deci-sion appears through the very 
nieagi-e information to hand, It is evident, for instance, that the mass of the (jcrman attack was 
directed against the Sambre line, and liad there a great superiority in numbers over the defensive. It 
is further evident, since men cannot be in two places at once, that there is a correspondingly weak 
body opposite the Middle Meuse, where the French forces should be strongest, l^ut, on the other 
liand, we know that in this country of the Middle Meuse, and to the east of it, are the best defensive 
positions for a force Aveaker than its opponents, and wooded comitry in which the superiority of the 
French field gun is largely lost. 
Another thing that comes through from the telegram is that the Gennans liave used in this great 
effort the very best of their troops. Not only numbers, quality also has been demanded for this 
supreme effort. The guard Avas there. 
Finally Ave knoAv that, up to the last telegrams received, the enemy's movement had, as a turning 
moA-ement, failed. The German offensive had not yet threatened the Allied line in flank. If or 
Avlien tlic concentrated Gennan mass in the north noAv passing the Sambre could achieve a decisive 
result, the general Allied line along the French frontier Avould be turned. If this, its extreme 
northern portion, AA'as either pierced or euA-eloped, the success of what is knoAvn to be the Gennan 
strategy iu this campaign would be scaled. AVe knoAv that the enemy avUI nnike every effort to 
achieve tluit end. 
At one moment, Avhen the ncAvs of the fall of Namur came in upon Monday niorning (the general 
public had it early in the afternoon of that day), it looked as though the Allied Hank Avas broken or 
cut. The later telegi-ams, extending over more than tAvo full days, though they tell us little, do not 
confirm that ; AvhUe the position in Avhich the guns of the retreat Avere draAvn up, accoixling to the 
" Times " con-espondent upon Sunday night, point to the falling back of the line as a whole, not 
to its having been pierced. AVc may be quite confident that up to the time this last telegram was sent 
the line Avas intact. 
It shoidd further be remarked that the direction of the full Piiissian advance upon Charleroi 
makes us susi)end our judgment as to a further attempt at outflanking by the Avcst. You cannot 
outflank indefinitely, unless you have indefinitely superior numbei-s ; and, though the numbers which 
the enemy lias here massed against the extreme of the Allied line are superior to Avhat is m front of 
tliem, they are not so greatly superior, apparently, as to permit of an immediate further extension 
Avcstward beyond Avhat they have already achieved. AYerc that so, their effort AA'ould not ha\'e been 
against Charleroi, but to the Avest of Mons. They Avould only have attempted to hold the French 
forces upon the line of the Sambre Avhile they brought their gi-eatest pressure to bear upon the Avesteni 
extreme of the line against and beyond the English left. 
AYe may sum uj) and .say that, until further ncAvs is receiAcd, there is no evidence of a decisive 
rcsult here upon the Franco-Belgian frontier, but only of a retirement on the part of the Allies, a\ ith 
a corresponding advance on the part of the Germans. 
^Meanwhile, Avhat is most probable is an attempt of the Gemians to turn the Allied line round 
Cambrai. AVhether that operation can be .successfully carried out or not Avill depend almost entirely 
\ipon the unknown factor — the numbers the French have gathered Avitliin striking distance south and 
cast of Lc Cateau. 
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