LAND AND WATER 
August 
22, 1914 
TTow it was the plan of the Gorman Geueral Staff— a plan 
which thcT had foolishly divulged to the whole world, as la 
their custom-to tarn the whole of the French frontier from 
the North. . • t)i t> 
They designed to pursue the operation shown m I Ian 1.. 
The fortified French Frontier running from Verdun to 
to Belfort they thought too strong to be forced North of 
Verdun runs northward and eastward to the Channel the 
frontier between France and Belgium. The Germans proposed 
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with a sufficient force to " hold " the French upon their fortified 
frontier between Verdun and Belfort. They proposed upon a 
line A — B to keep the French there in check. Meanwhile 
they proposed using the fortress of Metz (at M) as a pivot 
round which to swing great masses E — F upon their right, 
some through the difficult Ardennes country south of the 
Meuse, but the greater part through the Belgian Plain (north 
of the Meuse. They proposed to appear very early in the 
operations — in quite the first days of the war— over the 
unfortified Belgian frontier of France along the line G — H, and 
this operation, this swinging round of their forces, threatening 
to envelop the French by the French left flank, they proposed 
to execute according to the following necessary conditions : 
(1) Since it is impossible to execute a flanking or 
enveloping movement unless you have superior numbers, and 
since the Germans had not superior numbers to the French, 
if the total of the national forces be considered, and trained 
men alone be counted, they proposed to have superior forces 
/or ihe moment, and in that particular field, by mobilising 
secretly some days before the French, and by appearing 
suddenly upon the position E — P (a) before the French were 
gathered in their full numbers ; (b) while the French were 
guardinar their frontier along C— D ; (c) with covei-ing troops 
only, to be rapidly followed by their fully mobilised main army. 
(2) This flanking movement pivoting upon the fortress of 
Metz and proceeding partly through the very difficult country 
of the Ardennes, mainly through the Belgian Plain (with its 
ample supplies, innumerable roads, easy open country, and 
exceptional mileage of railways and furniture of rolling stock), 
they would effect without any check or delay, because Belgium 
would be too weak to resist, and would allow them to violate 
her neutrality. As for the two great fortresses of Liege and 
Namur, they would, if defended, confuse the whole plan, but 
this discounted neutrality of Belgium forbade the idea that they 
would be defended. 
(3) By the time the German flanking movement had got 
to the position E — F the direct march upon Paris was open to it. 
This threat would so frighten the French along their main 
positions npon the Eastern frontier at C — D that they would 
either disarrange all their previous plans and begin hurrying 
Northward to save Paris (and so leave themselves open to be 
also turned by the left wing of tho Germans from the South 
along the anow line (1 )) ; or they would sacrifice Paris, in which 
ease the flanking movement would close upon theiu, disturb 
their mobilisation before it was completed, and throw them 
into irrecoverable chaos ; or at the least drive them southward 
find compel a surrender. 
When it was perceived that the Belgians would, most 
unexpectedly, interfere with the plan by refusing condition 2, 
tho order was given to rush the ring of forts at Liege. 
"We have seen that one school, especially favoured in Ger- 
many, believed that your ring fortress could always be broken 
by the rushing of particular forts. With a sufficient sacrifice 
of men and conducted upon a sufficient scale one fort at least, 
or two, could be swamped, and the ring would bo broken. Froiu 
the night of that Monday, August 3rd. until the afternoon of 
tho AVednesday, August 5th, this bold attempt was made and 
continued — especially during the hours of daAness. 
I desire to eliminate, as much as possible, from these com- 
ments all political considerations. But it is impossible not to 
pause in admiration of tho military effort here made. Men in 
fairly close formation (the density has probably been exag- 
gerated) sacrificed themselves in assault after assault upon that 
section of the ring which looks towards Germany. They wore 
but the men of the covering troops of the Seventh German 
Army Corps ; they canno* have been heavily supported. They 
had no siege artillery behind them as yet. The effort was hope- 
less because tho theory was wrong ; but the courage and th© 
discipline presented to that task must have been quite 
exceptional. 
In the mid-afternoon of this Wednesday, August 5th, 
the whole ring held as strongly as when it was first attacked. 
Tho Germans were, therefore, exactly forty-eight hours behind 
their time-table. 
Upon the Thursday, August 6th, the forts were still holding 
out, but the covering troops of two more Army Corps had been 
brought up from the south and south-east against them, and 
cither before or after darkuess fell upon that day the insufficient 
garrison of Liege found it impossible at once to hold the forts 
and to cover all the intervals between them. 
It must be remembered that Li<5ge requires for its full 
defence 50,000 trained men, and that the Belgian service was 
largely composed of Militia, and could not send two-thirds of 
that number at so short a notice to the defence of tho placo. 
The holding of the intervals, therefore, broke down ; and, 
though the forts were still intact, bodies of Gcrmaii troops 
penetrated in the darkness between those two forts which look 
to the south-east and cowards the German frontier. 
When the morning of Friday, August 7th, dawned, it was 
discovered that a considerable force of Germans had got into the 
ring, and were established in the town of Lidge itself. 
The situation was paradoxical. Liege in the military sense 
of that name had not fallen ; Li6ge in the civilian sense had. 
The ring of forts, not one of which had been captured, could 
still prevent supplies passing through tho roads and railways 
commanded by the forts. Therefore, no advance through the 
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Belgian ring was any more possible than it had been before the 
German entry. Liege, the military fortress — which only means 
the ring of forts — still blocked the way. But Liege, the great 
industrial city, was held by German soldiers. So far as mere 
strategy -was concerned, and apart from all moral effect, Liege 
tho fortress was nearly as sti-ong as ever. Nearly, but not 
quite, for the forts were now no longer co-ordinated by one 
central command, and it was now possible to assault them, 
each individually, upon every side. 
On this day, Friday, August 7th, the German Commander 
asked for an armistice, partly, no doubt, for purposes of parley. 
It was refused. 
On this same day, Friday, August 7th, appeared at the 
very other end of the field of war the first signs of a movement 
that was to have a profound effect (the future will show it) 
ujwn all succeeding operations. 
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