LAND AND WATER 
Augnst 
22, 1914 
the first blows of tlio main shock might be felt, stretched m a 
long line, slightly coutcx towards the west and concave towards 
the East, froiu a point about 10 miles south and west of Brussels 
to Strasburg: suuth of that town bodies of German troops 
occupied the Alsatian plain to a point 10 miles south and east 
of Mulhouse ia Alsace. We had not exact inforumtion as to 
where tins lina ran across the Ardennes country betweea 
A, and B., but we can be pretty certain that it ran much 
as the dotted line does on plan K., because it would bo 
foUr to beud it too miwh forward ia front of that line, 
and' an equal weakness to leave it too far baelc. We come to 
certain knowledge of it again just south of Longwy, where 
there had been contact with the French troops, and again south 
of Metz, and in a line leading from south of Metz up round by 
the north of Saarbourg to points on the east side of the Vosges, 
where the mountain valleys open on to the plain of Alsace. 
The Allies lie immediately in front of this Hue and presumably 
everywhere in contact with it, or were nearly in contact. The 
public information we have is sufficient to tell us that contact 
has actually been established on the Belgian plain (and that of 
course, for some days past), on the Meuse between Namur and 
the French frontier, in the open country between Lcngwy and 
Verduu, and, most important of all, right along a line stretching 
from just south of Metz to Mulhouse. 
Now, such a situation as this obviously and necessarily 
connotes a few clear issues. Exactly where the German forces 
are chiefly massed — and where, therefore, the first Gorman 
offensive will come — we can only guess. We can be certain 
that the main concentration is in the north of this prolonged 
line, because the south of it has already partly yielded. 
The first thing we notice is that a general German offensive, 
which is too commonly taken for granted, is not yet the neces- 
sary result of the situation. It is true that everywhere from 
the Meuse, and along the Meuse, and down as far as Verdun at 
least (it would be more accurate to say as f*r as Toul), the 
French, np to this moment, are standing upon the defensive. 
PLAN />/.' 
, TO oenMAN 
* SAsra or 
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It seems to be no part of their plan to do anything but 
hold the enemy between those points and all along that Hue. 
But to the south of that line, along the whole field of the forti- 
fied frontier south of Toul, the French hare evidently begun a 
vigourous offensive, and that offensive is no longer merely the 
work of covering troops — it is clearly the beginning of a move- 
ment in force. 
Now, circumst;inces such as these may bo resolved into a 
few simple elements. 
(1) There is a northern field of operations, the extreme 
left of the allied line, the extreme right of the German. This 
field of operations is the densely jwpulated and well provisioned 
Belgian plain north of the River Meuse and of the River 
Sambre. 
(2) There is a centre, most of which runs through the 
barren, difficvdt, sparsely inhabited, and ill-supplied district of 
the Ardennf 8. 
(3) There is a southern field of operations (the 
French right, the German left), which runs through well- 
populated, fertile, and provisonsd land, from Southern 
Luxembourg to southern Alsace. But this southern field (tho 
French right wing, the German left), is sub-divided into a 
northern portion next the centre, which is the basin of Lorraine, 
and a southern portion which is the plain of Alsace ; between 
these two subdivisions lies the very difficult country of tho 
Vosges. This difficult country does not separate the two 
portions of the southern part of the field into two entirely 
distinct portions, for tho Vosges sink gradually as they go north- 
ward until they merge with the rolling country characteristic of 
Lorraine: but those mountains, the Vosgesj are a sufficient 
obstacle wherever they correspond with the French frontier, to 
determine at once, when we have news of action in their 
neighbourhood, which of the two forces upon either side of 
them is acting upon the defensive. 
Of these three fields of operations, which together make 
up the whole field of the war to the west of Germany, it is 
certain that ia the soutJiern £eld and over nearly tho whole 
extent of it (up to the point where that field is covered by tho 
fortress of Metz) the French Lave massed so many men as t> 
be able to deliver a vigorous oSeasive, which they intend to 
continue. 
It is equally certain that there is not as yet in tho southern 
field a German force sufficiently strong to meet this oSeosiro 
and beat it back. 
If, tlierefore, a German offensiro is anywhere to bo lookod 
for, it must either be in the northern or in tho central field. 
In one of these — that is, either on the Belgian plains north 
of the lower Meuso or to tho south of that river, an attack ia 
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(3),^ 
force must be delivered by tho German armies if they are to 
escape disaster. And in this second alternative, tho central 
attack, thci-e are two possibilities. Tho concentration of tlia 
Germans to the north-ct'utre, through the Ardennes. Tho 
concentration of the Germans to tho south-centre near, and 
north of, Metz. 
Weil, in trying to determine whether the German plan would 
be to attack in strength towards the north, or to attack in 
strength upon one of the two regions of the centiv?, and, if so, 
which one, we are met by this very difficult dilemma. 
On the one hand the original German plan was undoubtedly 
to deliver the first, and, as it was hoped, overwhelming offensive 
stroke by way of the extreme north, across the Belgian plain. 
They intended to be across the French frontier to th; north of 
the Meuse in very considerable force, probably five, certainly 
over three. Army corps, before the French mobilization was eveu 
complete. All this has been described above. The turning 
columns of this great Banking movement should have been upon 
French soil between Lille and Mezieres more than a week ago. 
We all know how that plan, the essential of which was its 
rapidity and surprise, was checked, delayed, and confused in its 
development through the defence of Liege. By the evening of 
Monday, August 17th, only the cavalry screen and its few 
supports had reached the line turning north of Namur. 
But though there was delay, it did not follow that the plan 
should be abandoned. The turning movement was now too 
late to bo executed as against an inferior foe. But when a 
General Staff has worked out all the plans for a main advanoa 
along oae piece of country, it is extremely difficult for it to 
Qerman 
PUn P, 
change its lina of advance, even though nnforcseeu accidents 
render the use of that line perilous. 
To abandon your detailed plans, whicli had prepared ona 
line of advance for tho mass of your troops, and to compose 
another set of plans for another line, at high pressure and with 
the shortest possible delay, involves such a choice of results as 
we are continually meeting in everyday life. 
Knowing what everyone knows of tho Prussian character, 
the highly methodical, very stiff and inelastic work, immensely 
detailed and correspondingly strong and brittle, which is the 
Prussian tradition in the.se things, it seems impossible that a 
main line of advance, once determined upon, can be abandoned 
in the midst of the first great decisive effort. 
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