August 23, 1914 
LAXD AND WATEB 
From all this one would conclude that the cliief blow 
against the French defensive is still intended to be delivered 
across the Belgian plains and on into the flat country of Xorth- 
East Franco. 
But it is here that the dilemma comes in, for while it is 
almost inconceivable that such a body of men as the Prussian 
Geneva 1 Staff would, or could, change a general plan before 
even 1 1 e first main shock was delivered, it is almost equally 
impossible to see how that general plan can be maintained. 
Consider first what evidence we have of its failure, and 
secondly, the sheer physical necessity of changing it, with which 
the enemy would appear to be confronted. 
(a) A s to evidence, we know that until Monday night or 
thereabouts all the advance through the Belgian plain had been 
the advance of a screen of cavalry. But hero there was some- 
thing abnormal — namely, no news of the presence of large 
bodies cf troops other than cavalry, even for two or thi'ee days' 
march I ehind this screen. 
Note that the news from the front in Belgium has been 
fairly full ; perhaps a little too full. Note, what is more import- 
ant than all in this connection, that, while time was essential to 
the operation, and rapidity its most necessary characteristic, you 
have a, whole week occupied in the covering or pushing forward 
by little more than twenty miles of this fan of cavalry, and that 
when, as has occasionally happened, the points on the fan have 
been pushed back, no considerable supports have been discovered 
behind it. 
(b). The other things we know which lead us to doubt, by 
surmise rather than by direct evidence, the continuation of the 
oiiginal plan, are : (1) The known fact that the forts at Liege 
were intact until at least the night of Wednesday, August Ifltli ; 
(2) the fact that the forts of Lioge command the junction of 
the main railways by which supplies could reach a large body 
in the Belgian plain north of the Meuse; (3) that to supply that 
body from the south of the Meuse across temporary bridges and 
across the bridge of Huy (which appears to bo in German hands) 
would seem impossible without a good line of railway to depend 
upon. 
The Meuse between Liege and Namur in the Plan L, 
with its single permanent bridge at Huy, with a gap of less 
than 20 mdes between the furthest point dominated by the 
western forts of Lii'ge and the furthest point dominated by 
the eastern forts of Liege, is a considerable obstacle to supply 
even when such supply is not opposed. Supply could not come 
by the main railway, which is seen marked running along the 
left or northern bank of the Meuse, because that railviay is 
commanded by the forts of Liege. Were there a railway 
running along the southern bank, or near it, and then leading 
to tlic German bases of supply, out of range of the forts of Liege 
to the south (as along the imaginary dotted line A — B), then 
certainly thi-ee, possibly five, Army Corps could have been kept 
supplied, though they were to the north of the river. For short 
road journeys across the bridge at Huy and across the other 
temjorary bridges (as at 0, P, Q., etc.) would have put little 
strain upon the organisation of that supply. But there is no 
such railway. 
Furthei-, the whole of this country, the Ardennes, which 
stretches south of the Meuse, has it communications running 
along defp valleys and precipitous ravines which lie north and 
south ; traverse communication east and west, even by road, is 
difiicult and slow. 
The alturnatire line of supply for any considerable body of 
invaders upon the Belgium plain would lie, of course, by the 
main line running through Lii'ge and following the left or 
northern bank of the Meuse. This main line directly taps the 
German bases of supply in the Ehine Valley, has ample accommo- 
dation (being one of the great European arteries) and is in 
every way fitted for the operation. 
2'here is no doubt at all that the use of this line was at once 
essential to the plan of the German General Staff, and taken for 
granted by that Staff. There is hardly less doubt that any 
proper forwarding of supply on to the Belgium plain from the 
bases in the Bhine Valley, until that line is clear, will be 
impossible. 
Here, then, you have the crux in guessing whether or no 
the main German effort could still bo made over the Belgian 
plain to the north of the river. On the one hand, it is almost 
impossible to change your general lino of advance; on the other 
hand, it seems equally impossible to maintain imder existing 
conditions the supply necessary to such an advance. But, sum 
up everything, especially considering the known existing 
concentration to the north and the bad conditions of the 
centre, and one can but believe that, against fearful odds, the 
original Prussian plan will still be finally attempted, and the 
effort to break through made over the Belgian plain, the 
northern field. 
In the central field there is a fairly broad avenue of opera- 
tions in the southern half from before the fortress of Metz up 
to and beyond Longwy. The country, though hilly, is full of 
good roads, well populated, and served by great main lines. In 
the north of the central field, in the Ardennes from Namur to 
Longwy, the country is difiicult, ravined, wooded, ill-provided 
with transverse roads and railv.ajs. It would seem, therefore, 
that if the blow is to be delivered in the central field, the main 
German mass must be organised to strike in the southern part 
of that field. 
It is true that in the case of the Belgian attempt the 
march would present a flank to the fortress of Namur; but 
Verdun lias to the south of it a fortified line )-uuning all the 
way to Toul, generally known as the Cutcs dc Meuse (which I 
have indicated in the sketch by little crosses), and behind this 
there is room for a rapid French concentration northward 
against and upon the flank of anyone attempting to break 
through above Verdun. There is no such lino running south 
from Namur, only the natural strength of the difiicult Ardenues 
country. 
One may sum up the elements of the whole situation as it 
appeared in the news of yesterday — that is, as it was in the field 
upon Wednesday, by the use of the accompanying diagram : 
There is a strategical front consisting in three main sections 
which lie slightly convex and facing the west: the three main 
sections, A B to the north, C D in the centre, and E F to the 
south. A B is the body in the Belgian plain, C D, the body 
between the Mouse and the Moselle, E — F, the body between the 
Moselle and the Ehine. 
Of these, the central portion C— D naturally subdivides 
itself into two, a portion C Q corresponding to the difiicult 
Ardennes country, and a portion Q D corresponding to the 
easier Lorraine and southern Luxembourg country ; while the 
southern section E — E is again naturally subdivided into that 
part which lies in the Lorraine basin E E, and that part which 
lies in the mountains and the plain of Alsace E — F. 
In front of this line you have the corresponding line of the 
French .and their Allies, G — H, marked black. [See PLin 0]. 
Somewhere behind the German Line from A to well past E, 
but not quite as far as F, there is concentrated a force larger 
than elsewhere, whose business it is to strike such a blow on 
G — H as will break that line. It may bo at S, in the Belgian 
plain ; it may be at T, in the Ardennes ; it may be 
at TJ, in southern Luxembourg and northern Lorraine. It 
is certainly not further down, ,uor anywhere between U and 
the Ehine. 
The chances of its being at S. depend upon the difliculty of 
abandoning an oiiginal plan, for at S. the concentration was 
undoubtedly originally intended, and the blow to be struck 
along the arrow marked (1) ; but against this is the difficulty of 
keeping supplied across the Meuse and the impossibility o£ 
providing it through Liege until the forts of Liege are 
taken. The chances of its being behind T. depend upon 
the fact that in front of T. there is no fortified line; 
it is an open gap. But, on i the other hand, such a 
blow along arrow (2) would have to be given against naturally 
strong defensive positions, and to bo delivered from badly 
supplied and badly communicated country. The chances of 
its being at U, and of the blow being delivered ah>ng the arrow 
marked (3), depends upon the good communications and the 
ease of advance in this direction, but they have against them the 
fact that such a blow would have to be struck with the fortress 
of Verdun on its tiauk and beyond A'erdun the wall of forts 
from Verdun to Toul, behind which the French masses could 
come up securely. 
Now at one of those three points at least a German mass 
must break through if the whole German forces are to escape 
disaster, for to the south they are already being pressed back by 
a turning movement of the French vigorously pursued across 
the Vosges along the line of the arrow (4). If the centre and 
the north of the German line can bo held by the French while 
this turning of the weak German south succeeds, the general 
communications of the whole German forces across the Ehina 
would be daily more and more imperilled, and the German 
armies would at last be compelled to abandon all attempt at 
breaking through the line before them upon the north ; they 
would have to mass southward against this French advance in 
forco from Alsace-Lorraine, and to fight it with the risk, if they 
were pushed back on their left, of finding their commimications 
with their bases of supply to the east imperilled. 
To sum up, what seems the chance of tho immediate future 
is an attempt to break the allied lino north of the Meuse-Samlu 
line and across the Belgium plain. If it succeeds, the pressure 
on the German armies from the south will at once cease and all 
French effort will be concentrated to save the north. If it fails, 
the French advance on the German left flank from Alsace- 
Lorraine will decide the campaign. 
That conjecture, at least, seems to repose on better grounds 
than any other : but a mere conjecture it remains until wo have 
news of the main German advance to decide our judgmeut. 
It need hardly be added that if this main German attack is 
delivered, as I have presumed, through Belgium, then how many 
men, and what men, may be in Antwerp on its flank will be one 
decisive factor in the result. 
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