LAND AND WATER 
August 22, 1914 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
IT is now possible to discorer with eorae rensonable 
accuracy what were the German plans for the naval 
side of the war — plans which have been hopelessly 
wrecked in the Metliterranean hj Italy's refusal to 
co-opc-rate with the Austrians. The scheme there was 
that the combined Italian and Austrian Fleets, rein- 
forced by the Goe)>en, should move against the French, the bulk 
of whose fleet is based on Toulon. 
A glance at the map (in this and in all other diagrams the 
sizes of the squares correspond to the approximate fighting 
value of tho various squadrons) will show that half the Medi- 
terranean would at once have been behind the allies, and the 
French in mai-hed inferiority. 
Taking the unit of tho original Dreadnought as worth 10, 
tho approximate relative figures of the available Mediterranean 
forces — fchips available for fleet action — under the Gennan plan 
were as follows : 
Itily ... 
... 80 
Franco 
... 130 
Austria ... 
... 70 
Biitiah 
... 43 
German... 
9 
169 
178 
This gives a slight superiority to the Triple Entente, but it 
has to be remembered that in the fii-st place Germany espected 
us to remain neutral, and, in the second place, it involved that 
our Mediterranean ships would immediately return to Home 
waters. Never for one moment did Germany imagine that our 
Mediterranean Squadron was anything but a temporary blulf. 
The Goeben was detached to the Mediterranean and kept there 
in that eure and certain hope. 
What Germany planned for was 
"What sho actually had ^^•as ... 
169 to 130 
79 to 173 
Which explains why the Gothen ran for the safety of the 
Dardanelles directly she had secured such mild glory as was to 
be cbtained by the bombardment of an inoffensive and in- 
nocuous Algerian town. The programme arranged for her was 
the capture of prizes, what time Italy and Austria did the work 
required to bottlo up the French in Toulon and Bizorta. 
However, as Admiral TViron said about tho last days at Port 
Arthur, •' Things did not come off quite as expected." 
All the same, however, the Goeben could easily have fought 
with the certainty of taking a British battle cruiser to the 
bottom with her. Her tactics were not " blue water school " 
but " blue funk school," and the moral effect on the German 
Navy is likely to be serious. For the Goeben was tho show 
shipof the German Navy. Everything in her was " for war." 
In her, for at least eighteen months was demonstrated the 
difference betv/een the " inefBcient British Navy " and the 
" business-like efficiency of the German Fleet." It was the 
stock subject j and it was so realistic that all of us who saw 
her thoroughly believed the latter. As for tho G-erman Navy, 
it swallowed both the ideas in tolo. It was taught to despise in 
a qiiiet way the British Navy. This was not arrogance but 
carefully calculated policy. 
And — the Goeben did what, had she been a British warship, 
her captain would have been shot for ! Eank cowardice is tha 
only explanation of her captain's action, despite all the allow- 
ances we can ma!ce for the upsetting of eveiything by the 
discovery that Italy declined to sacrifice herself for the War 
Lord's dream of " Der Tagg." Or if not rank cowardice, 
ordinary common sense — which in war comes to about the 
same thing ! 
I have devoted a good deal of space to this matter of the 
Goeben — more space than it may seem to warrant. But, 
personally, I believe that it is the real Trafalgar of the War. 
Big battles we may have, and if so they will make headlines 
beside whioh the story of the ranaway Goeben will appear quite 
a trivial side issue. Very likely. The war will very ix)ssibly 
bo long and strenuous as generally supposed, but the star of the 
German Navy set for ever what time the Goeben turned and fled 
for the safety of the Dardanelles. 
Years ago the experts used to write that the history of the 
world would be settled in the Mediterranean. For the last ton 
years we have laughed at that. And now, in an utterly unex- 
pected way. Time has proved them right. The crack ship 
of the German Navy in the Mediterranean funked the 
British cruisers. The moral effect of this is bound to be abso- 
lutely unlimitable. Whether the Goeben becomes the Turkish 
Alitylene, v.-hether she remains interned, whether presently she 
comes out again, matters nothing. The Chino-Ja panose' War 
result was settled when the Tche Yuen ran away from Captain 
Togo of the Naniwa at Asan. Yalu was merely a sequel. And 
so the flight of tho Goeben has settled the result of future 
battles. 
That the French should have penetrated the Adriatic at 
the earliest possible moment was, of course, obvious ; but that 
they should have done so so quickly augurs well for their 
efficiency. A month or two ago any home prophet would have 
described it as highly improbable. The fact, however, is that 
SITUATION IN THE BALTIC AT THE START OF THE WAR. 
For ohvlau, re«o« the porition of the British Fleet la not shown. Proportionate ,Izes of the Fleet .re .nifomi. 
■i in the other maps. 
12* 
