A-iigust 22, 
1914 
LAND AND WATER 
tie Frencli Fleet just at tie present time is extremely efBcient 
— anotlier of those points which the Germans have overlooked. 
The French camaraderie between officers and men has been 
described by competent independent witnesses as " beyond 
belief." Little wonder, therefore, that no boggling occurred in 
the rush for the Adi-iatic, though we may accept stories of naval 
battles with judicious scepticism. 
Austria had nothing out except some small cruisers 
»perating against Montenegro, and the circumstance that the 
Aspern was stmk merely goes to indicate that the French 
irrived before they were expected. 
calculations). Against these the Second Squadron and Eeserva 
Squadron, value 56, appear to have been sent. This Second 
Squadron consists of pre-Dreadnoughts, of no immediate value 
in the North Sea. It was possibly reinforced by some Dread- 
noughts sent through the Kiel Canal ; indeed, there is some 
reason to suspect that the bulk of the German Fleet is at present 
based on Kiel and not at Wilhelmshaven. 
The reported battle and defeat of the Russian Baltic 
Squadron lacks confirmation. It is doubtful whether the ships 
have left Libau, as there would be no object in facing certain 
defeat, and Kussia has everything to gain by delay, because one. 
Yt 
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE CONDITION OF THINGS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AS CALCULATED 
IN THE GERMAN WAR PLAN. 
The tinted section shows the anticipated bases of attack. 
Austria had nothing to gain by risking her battle fleet 
against heavy odds — here as everywhere else in the war there is 
a species of stale-mate with battle fleets. Nowhere do they face 
each other in anything like equal strength — everywhere the 
moral effect of the larger force paralyses the lesser. 
It is improbable that the French will go any considerable 
distance up the Adriatic. To keep the Austrians in ensures the 
safety of aJl Mediterranean trade ; to attempt a close blockade 
would be to run serious risk of torpedo attack without any 
prospect of gain worth the adventure. As things are, if too 
much pressure is felt, torpedo attacks are likely to be attempted. 
if not two, of her new Dreadnoughts are very shortly to be 
available as a reinforcement. Meanwhile the Baltic must be a 
German lake, with the Russian trade more or less completely 
stopped and German trade probably proceeding without 
hindrance. 
Once the Russians can utilise two of their new Dreadnoughts 
their approximate fighting strength would be 55, and a move 
against the Germans may be expected. Such a move would 
have a most useful effect, not only from the consequent 
weakening of the main German Fleet in order to reinforce their 
division ia the Baltic, but also in its demands upon the German 
\^'^ 
THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS GERMANY FOUND IT. 
The tinted section iliowi the Triple Alliance actual bases. The ecnrse of the i^nominous flight of The Pride of the German Fleet 
u shown in a dotted line. For such conduct • British Officer would have been court-martialled end shot. 
sluce, though the Austrians have only eighteen destroyers, they 
are known to be extremely efficient. 
But it is even chances whether Austria will not presently 
<-liango sides. Of the sentiment in her army I cannot speak 
with authority, but I do know that the feeling in her navy is 
distinctly pro- British. The close friendship between the British 
a!id Austrian navies is a very long-standing affair indeed, and 
it may bo taken as certain that Austria will not throw away 
anything that she can avoid against tha British Navy in order 
to satisfy the German Kaiser in his role of War Lord. 
Turning to nearer homo we come first of all to tlie Baltic. 
The total It iLssian force has anutmost paper value of 33 (here 
as elsewhere I am using the figures used in German official 
destroyer flotilla. This flotilla consists of about 150 boats, and 
something like one-third of this fores would have to bo 
withdrawn from the North Sea in order to meet the Russian 
advance. 
Indeed, as Russia has some eighty destroyers, the demand 
might well be heavier. It will thus be seen that the main 
German Fleet is not in a position to operate against us at any- 
thing like full strength, and it is by no means improbable that 
the bulk of the fleet will be used against the Russians in the 
Baltic, because it is there that the " greatest danger " threatens. 
There is nothing to entice the German Dreadnoughts into major 
operations in the North Sea, as nothing short of a decisive 
Tictory over the British Fleet could materially affect the situa- 
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