LAND AND WATEE 
August 22, 1914 
iavc the wcatei force. Sooncx oi ater tie superior force F. 
holdifl- E by an egual force, could detach a free portion of lii3 
men and tLrow a brid-e over the nver. fhe handicap whicOi 
the rivor V— B lajs upon F is solely a handicap of delay while U 
is comina up. The river is not eomcthing behind which E can 
defend himself indefinitely. It is something introducing the 
factor of <i«ie to the advantage of what is, m one particular 
place and time, the weaker party. .. , u 
\ ^ood delcnsive posllion, that is, a natural formation (sucU 
u a crest of rolling land with a long open space before it) from 
which the most effective fire can be delivered upon an assault, 
is but a particular case of an obstacle. A position artificially 
forti.'ied, all lorti/icalion, is but an obstacle rendered by human 
4rt particularly difficult to pass. Given sufficient time any 
\ 
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^ B 
fortification can be reduced— if only by famine ; but fortification 
introduces, for the benefit of thoie holding it, the clement of 
delay. 
A considerable space finnishcd, or fumishable, with lodgings 
for men and horses and with storehouses for ammunition and 
food and so fortified that it is defensible upon every side is 
termed a fortress, or, on the largest scale, an entrenched camp. 
And here a modern element of the utmost interest in the 
present campaign appears. 
The great range of modern heavy artillery involved a 
corresponding increase in the fortified circle that a complete 
enclosed defensive position would have to be surrounded by. 
To create a fortress under such conditions a wide ring of forts, 
each isolated and each designed to defend itself alone, was 
designed. Such a ring would be anything from six to ten miles 
across, and anything from twenty to tliirty miles round or more. 
The French constructed many such after their disasters of forty 
odd years ago, notably the great chain or barrier of fortresses 
Bclfort, Epinal, Tout, and Verdun, on the Eastern frontier. 
When it was first thought that Belgian neutrality was in 
danger yamur and Liege were added to continue the line. To 
some extent, and at wider intervals, the Germans copied this 
plan. But two schools arose with two opposite doctrines upon 
this liitherto xmtried system. 
The one school, largely German, would have it that witJi a 
fufficieHt sacrifice of men, some one^or more — of the forts on the 
ring could be " rushed," and the system broken. 
The other (mainly French) thought that such " rushing " 
was impossible. That, with a sufficient army to hold the spaces 
between the forts, the stores, etc., within the ring were safe for 
months, and that even with a small force the forts themselves 
could be held (though the ring might be pierced in the inteiTals) 
and would continue to bar any continuous supply. 
Supposing the second school to be right and such forts to 
be capable of long resistance, then a modern ring fortress would 
tirve the following purposes : — 
(1) To delay, till its forts were reduced, the passage of 
fiipplies past it or in its neighbourhood, whether by road or, 
much niore important, by railway. Thus such a ring protecting 
a junction of lines or covering one main line of supply is of great 
importance. 
(2) When it was supported by other neighbouring fortresses 
and was strongly garrisoned, to prevent an Army passing between 
it and the next fortress. 
(3) To serve as a refuge within which a force no longer 
strong enough to hold the field could still maintain itself and 
detain a "rcater number of the enemy before it. 
(4) lo act as the " pivot " upon which a turning movement 
could revolve. If (Plan XIV.) I want to move that end of 
my force A — B, marked as M to threaten the flank of my enemy 
C— D, I may not be quite superior enough in numbers to do so 
without leaving a dangerous gap at X. But if at X I have a 
foitress F baning tlio pafsage for some tv/cnty miles, I can use 
that fortress as a " pivot " for my projected movement. It ^ull 
also supply me, or at least supplement my supply. 
("j) To threaten the flank of an Army which desires to 
pass it. 
If in the accompanying El-etch (see Plan XV.) the area 
A B C is that commanded by the guns of a ring fortress, and if 
this ring fortress contains a large boJy of armed rnen with thoii 
munitions ; then another army of the enemy's trying to pass by 
it along the line D — E will bo exposed to a two- fold peril. It 
may be caught in the act of marching, when an army is unable to 
defend itself, or, having marched by, the communications which 
it unrolls behind it will be in danger of being cut at any moment, 
for the large force within the fortified area ABC can come out 
and attack the comparatively weak and highly extended forces 
which defend a lino of communications. Tliis junction in a 
fortress is greatly exposed when not one fortress but two, joined 
by a line of forts, presents a large concentration behind that line 
as in the line 9 — P. 
So obvious is that that there is never any question of passing 
a fortress containing a considerable garrison without first 
" Masking " it. To Mask a fortress is to leave over against it, 
and between it and the line of march of your own forces an Aimj 
(as at G — H) large enough to check any sally which the Army 
contained within the fortress might make against your 
communications. 
With this we nearly exhaust the terms technical to this 
kind of news, and the comprehension of them. There remain to 
be mentioned certain other terms requiiing a brief mention : — 
All those operations which are subsequent to the general 
movements of an army and are concerned with its immediate 
fate when it is at grips with the enemy, are called Tactical 
Operations as distinguished from strategical. They are so called 
because they take place after the opposing forces have come 
in touch with one another or, to use the common term, are 
In Contact. 
A number of other terms arc too familiar to need more than 
a mention. We speak of the Defensive when we mean the 
expenditure of energy in the resisting of an attack and of 
the Offensive when wc mean the expenditirre of energy in the 
delivering of it. Wellington, for instance, fought a defensive 
action at Waterloo because ail the earlier part of that day 
and much the prcater pnit of it was taken up in prevent- 
ing the French from 
P I «. ri O" piercing his lino until 
Blucher should come 
up in flank and threaten 
them with envelopment. 
We say that a 
General has the Initia- 
tive or is " taking the 
initiative " not precisely 
when he is on this 
Offensive (though the 
two things usually go 
together), but when ho 
is in a position to choose 
his point of effort and whtn his opponent is only in a positon 
to meet such a movement after, and as soon as he has dis- 
covered it. 
There is in connection with military news not only the difficulty 
of following military terms, but a certain confusion resulting 
from the way in which modern news is at once haphazard, far 
too quickly delivered, and deliberately and wisely stai-ved by 
military censorship. I cannot do better in order to explain how 
I, at least, should read this news, and how in my comments I 
shall try to piece it together, than put down in a list certain 
rules which occur to me : 
Rule /.—This rule is, not to believe things physically 
impossible. Thus in one week we have had such statements as 
the presence of a German force upon the River Aisne in France, 
a Brigade (of 6,000 men) suffering a loss of 30,000 men (in front 
of Mulhouse), and French Cavalry East of Liege a week before 
there were any French troops near Namur. 
Rule //.—Pay attention only to reports which deal with 
definite results. Words like "havoc," "rout," "disorder," 
usually mean very little in military news. On the other hand 
a precise account of a number of guns taken, of places actually 
occupied, of the number of prisoners, etc., is information upon 
which you can base an estimate. 
Rule ///.—Always believe the enemy's reports to be more 
ac^curate and sober than those from your own side. Thus, 
Berlin let us know through Holland that Lie'^e 
when 
had fallen, the phrase was misleading and false, but verbal 
accuracy could be pleaded for it, for though Liege the fortress 
had not fallen, German troops Lad got into Liege the town. 
On the other hand, the statement that 25,000 Germans had been 
hit in the first assault was manifestly an impossible exagger- 
ation. J r oo 
Rule /F.— Rememler that observers nearly always over- 
Aitiller'' ''^''^ "^ ^""'^ "^"^ ^'"' P^i'^'^'^l'^rly i^ *!»« c^sc of 
Rule F.— Follow, upon a large scale map, every movement 
01 wliich you hear, and compare the scheme of those movements 
Irom day to day, noting the Lature of the arm and the supposed 
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