August 22, 
1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRB BELLOC. 
THESE notes upon tho operations taking place oa the 
Continent are written upon the evening of Wednes- 
day. They are corrected or amplified according 
to the news received in London upon Thursday 
morning up to noon. Thej are in the hands of 
the public on Friday morning. 
It is impossible to avoid in the chronicle which they attempt 
to establish that gap between the Thursday noon and the Friday 
mominjr which printing demands. Tlie same criiicism applies 
to the deductions made from such news as has been received in 
London. 
It is the object of these comments, and of the deductions 
from news received which they will contain, to explain, as much 
as is in the writer's power, the natnre of the operations on land. 
In order to do this, it is first necessary to get some idea of the 
process of events in the Western theatre of war since the first 
days of mobilisation. 
I say " In the Western theatre of war " because operations 
in any way decisive of the result have not yet taken place in the 
Eastern theatre of tho war upon the Eastern and Southern 
frontiers of the Germanic allies, unless we are to accept the now 
detailed accounts of an Austrian reverse at the hands of the 
Servians at Shabat. 
In the Western field, upon the other hand, operations 
which will bo of weight in the final decision, and others which 
have begim to define the probable direction of the opposed 
armies, have already taken place. 
In thus attempting to establish the succession of events 
which have led up to the present situation in the Western field 
of tho war, we must exclude what is merely political and con- 
sider only what is military. 
Upon Saturday, August 1st, the French Government gave 
the first open orders for mobilisation. What previous steps it 
may have taken in preparation of the general mobilisation we 
do not know. But, at any rate, the life of the country was 
quite normal up to and including this Saturday, August 1st, 
and certainly nothing in the shape of genei-al mobilisation had 
yet taken place. The fuQ operation of mobilisation only began 
in France upon Sunday, August 2nd. 
What the corresponding steps may have been npon the 
German side wo do not know. Germany had already declared 
martial law, and she may have begun her mobilisation — in part, 
at least, and particularly in the North — before France did. Au 
examination of tho first operations makes this still more probable, 
but we have no positive information upon the point. 
PlxnAd 
Mw.f. >ckf 
The process of fuU mobilisation in both countries is at least 
12 and like to be in practice more nearly 14 days : using the 
phrase " full mobilisation " to mean not the bringing up of the 
troops to the field of action, but the putting of them all upon 
a war footing. How many days must elapse before the 
mobilised armies could begin to undertake their jirincipal 
actions would depend upon the field in which those operations 
would take place ; certainly, fifteen or sixteen days is not tco 
much to allow, seeing that the strict theoretical minimum (which 
was bound to be exceeded) was at least eleven days. 
Tho French mobilisation proceeded with quite unexpected 
smoothness ; a state of affairs most fortunate for the French, 
which was due to political factors with which we are not here 
concerned. The results of its accurate working will be later 
pointed out. 
Meanwhile, upon that same Sunday, August 2nd, the 
German Covering Troops from Treves had violated the neutral 
tcn-itory of Luxembourg, entering that independent State by 
several bridges, particularly by Ihoso of Wasserbillig aad 
Remich. 
At 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day the German 
^liuister in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgian 
Government demanding unopposed passage for German Troops 
through Belgian territory, in otlier words, demanding the aid 
of Belgium against France. Twelve hours were given for the 
reply, that is, until 7 a.m. of the following Monday morning. 
The Belgian Ministry met and discussed the position in the 
small hours of Monday, and somewhere about 4 o'clock returned 
a negative answer to the German demand. They determined to 
resist the violation of Belgian territory. 
Upon Monday, August Si-d, therefore, the German troops 
crossed the frontier between Germany and Belgium ; the troops 
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first effecting this violation of neutrality being those of tha 
Vllth Germany Army Corps coming from the region of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. Tliese troops were not nearly as numerous as 
has been represented. They could not have been fully mobilised 
troops, but only the covering troops of the region. The task set 
them was to force immediately the fortress of Liege. 
Lot me describe this task. 
The fortress of Lidge is a modem ring fortress : that is, it 
consists of an area roughly circular, about, or rather less than 
ten miles in diameter, protected by a ring of forts (twelve in 
number) surrounding the great industrial town of Liege. The 
River Mouse nms right through Liege and through the middle 
of the ring. One of the main railways of Europe runs through 
the same circle and leads from the chief German bases of 
supply in the North to the Belgian Plain ; other railways also 
come in and effect their junction with this main line within the 
circle of the Forts. This ring of forts lies quite close to the 
German frontier — a day's march at the most away ; at tho 
nearest point, less than a day's march. Further, there is here 
but a very narrow passage between Li^ge and the neutral Dutch 
border round Maestricht. The Germans, though prepared to 
violate the neutrality of Belgium, were determined not to violate 
the neutrality of Holland for political reasons that have nothing 
to do with these notes. Therefore until the Liege ring of forts 
were in their hands : (1) They could only use road trafiic to 
supply their advance into Belgium. (2) They could only use 
even road traffic over one very narrow belt, between the range of 
the Eastern forts of Li6ge and the Dutch border. 
To the North of the Li(?ge ring of forts, then, there was no 
entry into Belgium save by a very narrow gut between the 
eitrerao range of the forts and the Dutch frontier. Eight 
aeros3 this gap of five miles or less was the obstacle of the 
Mouse, having but one bridge, that of Yiso, a little town lying 
on the right bank of the Meuse, that is, the bank towards 
Germany. Upon the south side of Liege was difficult, high, 
and barren country consisting of upland woods and heaths 
through which the progress of supplies would bo difficult, and 
further supplies coming that way would have to crosa 
tho Meuse higher up to reach the Belgian Plains. (See Plan A.) 
7« 
