LAND AND WATER 
August 22, 101 4 
T^ow it was the plan of the German General Staff— a plan 
^Lioh thcT ba^ f^^^^l-'y divulged to the whole world, as is 
Thdr ciSm-^o turn the whole of the Freuoh frontier from 
the North. . . , • t>i«^ t* 
They designed to pursue the operation shown m Flan a. 
The fortified French Frontier running from Verdun to 
to Belfort they thought too strong to be forced^ ^..ul 
Verdun runs northward and eastward to the Channel the 
frontier between France and Belgium. The Germans proposed 
PLAN. C 
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with a sufficient force to " hold" the French upon their fortified 
frontier between Verdun and Belfort. They proposed upon a 
line A — B to keep the French there in check. Meanwhile 
they proposed using the fortress of Sfetz (at M) as a pivot 
round which to swing great masses E — F upon their right, 
some through the difficult Ardennes countiy south of the 
Meuse, but the greater part through the Belgian Plain [north 
of the Meuse. They proposed to appear very early in the 
operations — in quite the first days of the war— orer the 
unfortified Belgian frontier of France along the line G — H, aod 
this operation, this swinging round of their forces, thrcatenin!* 
to envelop the French by the French left flank, they proposed 
to execute according to the following necessary conditions : 
(1) Since it is impossible to execute a flanking or 
enveloping movement unless you have superior numbers, and 
since the Germans had not superior numbers to the French, 
if the total of the national forces be eonsiJerod, and trained 
men alone be counted, they proposed to Lave superior forces 
ioT (lie moment, and in thai particular field, by mobilising 
secretly some days before the French, and by appearing 
suddenly upon the position E— F (a) before the French were 
gathered in their fuU numbers ; (b) while the French were 
guarding their frontier along C— D ; (c) with covering troops 
only, to be rapidly followed by their fully mobilised main army, 
(2) This flanking movement pivoting upon the fortress of 
Mctz and proceeding partly through the very difficult country 
of the Ardennes, mainly through the Belgian Plain (with its 
ample supplies, innumerable roads, easy open country, and 
exceptional milrago of railways and furniture of rolling stock), 
they would effect without any check or delay, because Belgium 
would be too weak to resist, and would allow them to violate 
her neutrality. As for the two great fortresses of Liege and 
Namur, they would, if defended, confuse the whole plan, but 
tuis discounted neutrality of Belgium forbade the idea that they 
would bo defended. 
(3) By the time the German flanking movement had ^ot 
^ the position E— F the direct march upon Paris was open to^it 
This threat would so frighten the French along their main 
positions npon the Eastern frontier at C—D that they would 
cither disarrange all their previous plans and begin hurryin^ 
Northward to save Paris (and so leave themselves open to be 
a so turned by the left wing of the Germans from the South 
along the anew hue (1)) ; or they would sacrifice Paris, in which 
casa the flanking movomcut would close upon them, disturb 
tlieir mobilisation before it was completed, and throw them 
into irrecoverable chaos; or at the least drive them southward 
and compel a surrender. 
When it was perceived that the Belgians would, most 
unexpectedly, interfere with the plan by refusing condition 2, 
the order was given to inish the ring of forts at Liege. 
AVe have seen that one school, especially favoured in Ger- 
many, believed that your ring fortress could always be broken 
by the rusliing of particular forts. With a sufficient sacrifice 
of men and conducted upon a sufficient scale one fort at least, 
or two, could be swamped, and the ring would be broken. From 
the night of that Monday, August 3rd, until the afternoon of 
the Wednesday, August 5th, this bold attempt was made and 
continued — especially during the hours of darkness. 
I desire to eliminate, as much as possible, from these com- 
ments all political considerations. But it is impossible not to 
pause in admiration of the military effort here made. Men in 
fairly close formation (the density has probably been exag- 
gerated) sacrificed themselves in assault after assault upon that 
section of the ring which looks towards Germany. They were 
but the men of the covering troops of the Seventh German 
Army Corps ; they canno^^^ have been heavily supported. They 
had no siege artillery behind them as yet. The effort was hope- 
less because the theory was wrong ; but the courage and the 
discipline presented to that task must have been quite 
exceptional. 
In the mid-afternoon of this Wednesday, August 5tb, 
the whole ring held as strongly as when it was first attacked. 
The Germans were, therefore, exactly forty-eight hours behind 
their time-table. 
Upon the Thursday, August Gth, the forts were still holding 
out, but the covering troops of two more Army Corps had been 
brought up from the south and south-east against them, and 
cither before or after darkness fell upon that day the insufficient 
garrison of Liege found it impossible at once to hold the forts 
and to cover all the intcrvab between tliem. 
It must be remembered that Lifige requires for its full 
defence 50,000 trained men, and that the Belgian service was 
largely composed of Militia, and could not send two-thirds of 
that number at so short a notioo to the defence of the place. 
The holding of the intervals, therefore, broke down ; and. 
though the forts were still intact, bodies of German troops 
penetrated in the darkness between those two forts which look 
to the south-east and cowards the German frontier. 
When the morning of Friday, August 7th, dawned, it was 
discovered that a considerable force of Germans had got into the 
ring, and were established in the town of Liege itself. 
The situation was paradoxical. Liege in the military sense 
of that name had not fallen ; Litjge in the civilian sense had. 
The ring of forts, not one of which had been captured, could 
still prevent supplies passing through the roads and railways 
commanded by the forts. Therefore, no advance through the 
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NAMUR. 
DIN ANT' (J 
Belgian ring was any more possible than it had been before the 
•jerman entry. Lie^e, the military fortress— which only means 
the ring of forts— still blocked the way. But Liege, the great 
industrial city, was held by German soldiers. So far as mere 
strategy was concerned, and apart from all moral effect, Liege 
the fortress was nearly as strong as ever. Nearly, but not 
quite, for the forts were now no longer co-ordinated by ono 
central command, and it was now possible to assault them, 
eachindividually, upon every side. 
On this day, Friday, August 7th, the German Commander 
asked for an armistice, partly, no doubt, for purposes of parley. 
It was refused. 
On this same day, Friday, August 7th, appeared at the 
very other end of the field of war the first signs of a movement 
that was to have a profound effect (the future will show it> 
upon all succeeding operations. 
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