LAND AND WATEB 
August 22, 1914 
tlui fir«t Uows of die Buifl .laock miglit be felt, stretclied in » 
tbe aj«t ,. T.i .7.„,..T towards the west and concave towards 
the Last from a poiai ^^.^^^ ^^ German troops 
iS^AiTtSL ulntoa point 10 .des south and east 
T^^ iLTp in Alsace We had not ewct information as to 
wL^"tbUL"o^T- across tl. Ardennes country between 
I ^.d R. but we can be prettT certain that . ran much 
t the dotted line does o« plan K.. because .t would 1^ 
foUv to bt-ud it too much forward in front of that lin« 
aii an equal weidues. to leave it too far back. ^\o como to 
^rtain k^owled-e of it again just south of Longwj, where 
S had S contact with the French troops and aga.n south 
of Mctz and in a line leading from south of Met z up round bj 
the north of Saarbourg to points on the east side of the \ osges. 
where the mountain valleys open on to the plain of AUace. 
The Allies lie immediately in front of this hueand Fesumably 
everywhere in contact with it, or were nearly m contact Tha 
public information we have is sufficient to tel us that couUct 
Ls actually been established on the Belgian plain (^^J_ J^'t of 
course, for 'some days past), on the Mouse between ^amur and 
the French frontier, in the open country between Lcnswy and 
Verdun, and, most important of all, right along a line stretching 
from iust south of Metz to Mulhouse. 
Now, such a situation as this obviously and necessarily 
connotes a few clear issues. Exactly where the German forces 
are chiefly massed-and where, therefore, the first German 
offensive will come-we can only guess. We can be certain 
that the main concentration is in the north of this prolonged 
line, because the south of it has already partly yielded. 
The first thing we notice is that a general German oflensive, 
which is too commonly taken for granted, is not yet the neces- 
sary result of the situation. It is true that everywhere from 
the' Meuse, and along the Mease, and down as far as Verdun at 
least (It would be more accurate to say as far as Toul). the 
French, up to this moment, are standing upon the defensive. 
FLAM A/. 
certiin that in the southern field and over nearly tie who.a 
extent of it (up to the point where that field is covered by the 
fortress of Metz) the French have massed so many men as t» 
be able to deliver a vigorous offensive, which they intend to 
It is equally certain that there is not as yet in the southern 
field a German force sufficiently strong to meet this offensive 
and beat it back. „ . . ^ * i. i i i 
If, therefore, a German ofTensire is anywhere to be looted 
fa'- it must either be in the northern or in the central field. 
' In one of these— that is, either on the Belgian plains north 
of the lower Mouse or to the south of that river, an attack ia 
e Etc I AH fl.A.lf^ 
It teems to be no part of their plan to do anytliiug but 
hold the enemy between those points and all along that line. 
But to the south of that line, along the whole field of the forti- 
fied frontier south of Toul, the French have evidently begun a 
vigourous offensive, and that offensive is no longer merely the 
work of covering troops — it is clearly the beginning of a move- 
ment in force. 
Now, circumstances «tjch as these may bo resolved into a 
few simple element!. 
(1) There is a northern field of operations, tha eitreme 
left of the allied line, the extreme right of the Gorman. This 
field of operations is the densely populated and well provisioned 
Belgian plain north of the River Meuse and of the Eiver 
Sambre. 
(2) There is a centre, most of which runs through th? 
barren, difficult, sparsely inhabited, and ill-supplied district of 
the Ardcnn»8. 
(3) There is a southern field of operations (tbe 
French right, the German left), which runs through well- 
populated, fertile, and provlsoned land, from Southern 
Luxembourg to southern Alsace. But this southern field (the 
French right wing, the German left), is subdivided into a 
northern portion next the centre, which is the basin of Lorraine, 
and a southern portion which is the plain of Alsace; bel^Tecn 
these two subdivisions lies the very difficult country of the 
Vosges. This difficult country does not separate the two 
portions of the southern part of the field into two entirely 
distinct portions, for the Vosgcs sink gradually as they go north- 
ward until they merge with the rolling country characteristic of 
Lorraine: but those mountains, the Vosgcs, are a sufficient 
obstacle wherever thoy correspond with the French frontier, to 
determine at once, when we have news of action ia their 
neighbourhood, which of the two forces upon either side of 
thein is acting upon the defensive. 
Of these three fields of operations, which together make 
up the whole field of the war to tbo west of Germany, it b 
(■). 
Plan O, 
mM 
-r M«uj« 
foico must be dolirercd by the German armies if thoy are to 
escape disaster. And in this second alternative, the central 
attack, there are two possibilities. The concentration of the 
Germans to the north-centre, through the Ardennes. The 
concentration of the Germans to the south-centre near, and 
north of, Metz. 
Well, in trying to determine whether the German plan would 
be to attack in strength, towards the north, or to attack in 
strength upon ono of the two regions of the centre, and, if so, 
which ono, we are met by this very difficult dilemma. 
On the one hand the original German plan was undoubtedly 
to deliver the first, and, as it was hoped, overwhelming offensive 
stroke by way of the extreme north, across the Belgian plain. 
Thev intended to be across the French frontier to thj north of 
the Mouse in very considerable force, probably five, certainly 
over three. Army corps, before the French mobilization was even 
complete. All this has been described above. The turning 
columns of this great flanking movement should have been upon 
French soil between Lille and Mezieres more than a week ago. 
We all know how that plan, the essential of which waa its 
rapidity and surprise, was checked, delayed, and confused in its 
development through the defence of Liege. By the evening of 
Monday, August 17th, only the cavalry screen and its few 
supports had reached the line turning north of Namur. 
But though there was delay, it did not follow that the plan 
should be abandoned. The turning movement was now too 
late to be executed as against an inferior foe. But when a 
General Staff has worked out all the plans for a main advance 
along one piece of country, it is extremely difficult for it to 
Comm"a.cdr.O«l 
P/4a f> 
ch.%ngo its line of advance, even though unforeseen accidents 
reader the use of that line perilous. 
To abandon your detailed plans, which had prepared ona 
line of advance for the mass of your troops, and to compose 
another set of plans for another line, at high pressure and with 
the shortest possible delay, involves such a choico of results as 
we are continuallj- meeting in everyday life. 
Knowing what everyone knows of the Prussian character, 
the highly methodical, very stiff and inelastic work, immensely 
detailed and correspondingly strong and brittle, which is the 
Prussian tradition in the.se things, it seems impossible that a 
main line of advance, once determined upon, can be abandoned 
in the midst of the first great decisive effort. 
10* 
