August 

1914 
LAND AND WATEB 
From all tliis one ■wro'iM cont'.udo that the cliir^f blow 
against the Freuch defciisive is still iutenJal to bo delivered 
across the Belgian plains and on into the flat country of North- 
East France. 
But it is here that the dilemma conies in, for while it is 
almost inconceivable that such a body of men as the Prussian 
General Staff vroald, or oould, change a general plan before 
even t! o first main shock was delivered, it is almost equally 
imposs ble to soe how that general plan can bo inaiutaiued. 
Ci iisidcr first what cvidouce we have of its failure, and 
secondly, the sheer physical necessity of changing it, wiih which 
the enemy would appear to be confronted. 
(a) A s to evidence, wo know that until Monday night or 
thereabouts all the advance through the Be'giau plain had been 
the advance of a screen of cavalry. But hero there was some- 
tliing abnormal — namely, no news of the presence of large 
bodies if troops other than cavalry, even for two or three days' 
march 1 ehind this screen. 
No!e that the news from the front in Belgium has been 
fairly full ; perhaps a little too full. Note, what is m'.;re import- 
ant than all in this connection, that, while time was essential to 
the operation, and rapidity its most necessary charactcrisiic, you 
have a whole week occupied in the covering or pushing forward 
by little more than twenty miles of this fan of cavahy, and that 
wbon, as has occasionally happened, the points on the fan have 
been ]'Ushed back, no considerable supports have been discovered 
behind it. 
(b). Tlie other things we know which lead us to doubt, by 
surmise rather than by direct evidence, the continuation of the 
original plan, are : (1) The known fact that the forts at Liege 
were intact until at least the night of Wednesday, August 19th ; 
(2) the fact that the forts of Liege command the junction of 
the main railways by which suppHes could reach a large body 
in the Belgian plain north of the Mouse; (3) that to supply that 
body from the south of the Meuse across temporary bridges and 
across the bridge of Huy (which apposirs to be in German hands) 
would seem impossible without a good line of railway to depend 
upon. 
The Meuse between Liege anl Namur in the Plan L, 
with its single permanent bridge at Huy, with a gap of less 
tlian 20 miles between (he furthest point dominated by the 
western forls of Lii'ge and the furthest point dominated by 
the eastern forts of Liege, is a considerable obstacle to supply 
even when such supply is not opposed. Supply could not come 
by the main raihvay, which is seen marked running along the 
kdt or northern bank of the Mouse, because that railway is 
commanded by the forts of Liege. Were there a railway 
I ut:ning along the southern bank, or near it, and then leading 
to the German bases of supply, out of range of the forts uf Liege 
to tlie south (as along the imaginary dotted line A — B), then 
certainly tlu'ee, possibly five, Army Corps could have Ijcen kept 
supplied, though they were to the north of the river. For short 
road journeys across the bridge at Hny and across the other 
temprary bridges (as at O, P, Q., etc.) would have put little 
strain upon the organisation of that supply. But there is no 
auch railway. 
Further, the whole of this country, the Ardennes, which 
stretches south of the Meuse, has it communications riinning 
along derp valleys and precij)itous ravines which lie north and 
souih; traverse communication east and west, even by road, is 
difiicult and slow. 
The alternative line of supply for any considerable body of 
invaders upon the Belgium plain would lie, of course, by the 
main line running through Lii'ge and following the left or 
noi thci-n bank of the Meuse. This main lijie directly taps the 
Geriuan bases of supply in the llhine Valley, has ample accommo- 
dation (being one of the great European arteries) and is in 
every way fitted for the operation, 
Tkcre is no douht at all that the use of this line was at once 
esscalial to the plan of the German General Staff, and taken for 
granted by that Staff. There is hardly less doulit that any 
proper forwarding of supply on to the Belgium plain from the 
bases in the Rhine Valley, until that line ia clear, will be 
impossible. 
Here, then, you have the crux in guessing whether or no 
the main German effort could still be made over the Belgian 
plain to the north of the river. On the one hand, it is almost 
impossible to change your general line of advance; on the other 
hand, it seems equally impossible to maintain under eiisting 
conditions the supply necessary to such an advance. But, sum 
up everything, especially considering the known existing 
Concentration to the north and the bad conditions of the 
centre, and one can but b«lieve that, against fearful odds, the 
original Prussian plan will still be finally attempted, and the 
effort to Ijreak through made over the Belgian plain, the 
northern field. 
In the central field there is a fairly broad avenue of opera- 
tions in the southern half from before the fortress of Metz up 
to and beyoud Longwy. The country, though hilly, is full of 
good roads, well populated, and serred by great main lines. In 
the north of the central field, in the Ardennes from Namur to 
Longwy, the country is difficult, ravined, wooded, ill-provided 
with transverse roads and railways. It would seem, therefore, 
that if the blow is to be delivered in the central field, the main 
German mass must be organised to strike in the southern part 
of that field. 
It is true that in the case of the Belgian attempt the 
march would present a flank to the fortress of Namur; but 
Verdun lias to the south of it a fortified lino ruuning all the 
way to Toul, generally known as the Cotes de Meuse (which I 
have indicated in the sketch by little crosses), and behind this 
there is room for a rapid French concentration northward 
against and upon the flank of anyone attempting to break 
through above "Vei'dun. There is no such lino running south 
from Namur, only the natural strength of the difiicult Ardennes 
country. 
One may sum up the elements of the whole situation as it 
appeared in the news of yesterday — that is, as it was in the field 
upon Wednesday, by the use of the accompanying diagram : 
There is a strategical front consisting in three main sections 
which lie slightly convex and facing the west : the three main 
sections, A B to the north, C D in the centre, and E F to the 
south. A B is the body in the Belgian plain, D, the body 
between the Meuse and the Moselle, E — P, the body between the 
Moselle and the Rhino. 
Of these, the central portion C— D naturally subdivides 
itself into two, a portion C Q corresponding to the difficult 
Ardennes country, and a portion Q D corresponding to the 
easier LoiTaine and southern Luxembourg country ; while the 
southern section E — E is again naturally subdivided into that 
part which lies in the Lorraine basin E R, and that part which 
lies in the mountains and the plain of Alsace E — F. 
In front of this line you have the corresponding line of the 
French and their Allies, G — H, marked black. [See Plan O]. 
Somewhere behind the German Line from A to well past E, 
but not quite as far as F, there is concentrated a force larger 
than elsewhere, whose business it is to strike such a blow on 
G — H as will break that line. It may be at S, in the Belgian 
plain ; it may be at T, in the Ardennes ; it may be 
at U, in southern Luxembourg and northern Lorraine. It 
is certainly not further down, .nor anywhere between U and 
the Rhine. 
The chances of its being at S. depend upon the diffi.culty of 
abandoning an original plan, for at S. the concentration was 
undoubtedly originally intended, and the blow to be struck 
along the arrow marked (1) ; but against this is the difficulty of 
keeping supplied across the Meuse and the impossibility of 
providing it through Liege until the forts of Liege are 
taken, 'llie chances of its being behind T. depend upon 
the fact that in front of T. there is no fortified line; 
it is an open gap. But, on •: the other hand, such a 
blow along arrow (2) would have to be given ajainsl naturally 
strong defensive positions, and to be delivered jrom badly 
supplied and badly communicated country. The chances of 
its being at U, and of the blow being delivered ah. ng the arrow 
marked (3), depends upon the good communications and the 
ease of advance in this direction, but they have against them the 
fact that such a blow would have to be struck with the fortress 
of Verdun on its Hank and beyond Verdun the wall of forts 
from Verdun to Toul, behind which the French masses could 
come up securely. 
Now at one of those three points at least a German mass 
must break through if the whole German forces are to escape 
disaster, for to the south they are already being pressed back by 
a turning movement of the French vigorously pursued across 
the Vosges along the line of the arrow (•!■). If the centre anil 
the north of the German line can bo held by the French while 
this turning of the weak German south succeeds, the general 
communications of the whole German forces across the Rhine 
would be daily more and more imperilled, and the German 
annics would at last be compelled to abandon all attempt at 
breaking through the line before them upon the north ; they 
would have to mass southward against this French advance in 
force from Alsace-Lorraine, and to fight it with the risk, if they 
were pushed back on their left, of finding their communications 
with their bases of supply to the east imperilled. 
To sum up, what seems the chance of the immediate future 
is an attempt to break the allied line north of the ilouse-Samlu 
line and across the Belgium plain. If it succeeds, the pressure 
on the German armies from the south will at once cease and all 
French effort will be concentrated to save the north. If it fails, 
the French advance on the Genuan left flank from Alsace- 
Lorraine will decide the campaign. 
That conjecture, at least, seems to repose on better grounds 
than any other : but a mere conjecture it remains until wo have 
news of the main German advance to decide our judgment. 
It need hardly be added that if this main German attack is 
delivered, as I have presumed, through Belgium, then how many 
men, and what men, may be in Antwerp on its flank will be one 
decisive factor in the result. 
!!• 
