LAND AND WATER 
August 22, 1914 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
IT is now possible to discoTcr with Bome reasonable 
accuracy what were the German plans for the naval 
side of the ^ar-plans which have been hopelessly 
wrcckea in the Mediterranean by Italy a refusal to 
co-operate with the AusU-iaus. The schetne there was 
thit the combined Italian and Austrian Fleets, rein- 
lotLci bv tha Ooehen, should move against the French, the bulk 
of whose fleet is based on Toulon. 
A dance at the map (in this and m all other diagrams the 
sizes of the squares correspond to the approximate fighting 
vah^ of the various squadrons) will show that half the Mec i- 
terranean would at once have bctn behind the allies, and the 
French in marked inferiority. . , ^ , , . ,, , ^^ 
Taking the unit of the original Dreadnought as worth W, 
the approximate relative figures of the available Mediterranean 
forces— thips available for fleet action— under the German plan 
were as follows : 
Austria . . 
Oermaa.. 
90 
70 
9 
169 
France 
Britisli 
130 
43 
173 
This gives a slight superiority to the Triple Entente, but it 
has to be remembered that in the firet place Germany expected 
us to remain neutral, and, in the second place, it involved that 
our Mediterranean ships would immediately return to Homo 
waters. Never for one moment did Germany imagine that our 
Mediterranean Squadron was anything but a temporary blufi. 
The Goehen was detached to the Mediterranean and kept there 
in that sure and certain hope. 
What Germany planned for was _. 
TVhat sho actually had was 
109 to 130 
79 to 173 
Which explains why the Goihen ran for the safety of the 
Dardanelles directly she "had secured such mild glory as was to 
bo cbtainsd by the bombardment of an inoffensive and in- 
nocuous Algerian town. The programme an-angod for her was 
the capture of prizes, what time Italy and Austria did the work 
i-equired to bottle up the French in Toulon and Bizerta. 
However, as Admiral Wiren said about the last days at Port 
Arthur, •' Things did not come off quite as expected." 
All the same, however, the Go^n could easily have fought 
with the certainty of taking a British battle cruiser to the 
bottom with her. Her tactics were not "blue water school" 
but " blue funk school," and the moral effect on the German 
For the Goehen was the show 
ing in her was "for war." 
Navy is likely to be serious. For 1 
ship of the German Navy. Every tbi _ 
In her, for at least eighteen months was demonstrated the 
difference between the " iueflicient B.nfish Navy" and the 
" business-like efficiency of the German Fleet." It was the 
stock subject; and it was so realistic that all of us who saw 
her thoroughly believed the latter. As for the German Navv, 
it swallowed both the ideas tit tolo. It was taught to despise in 
a quiet way the British Navy. This was not arrogance but 
carefully calculated policy. 
And — the Goefcen did what, had she been a British warship, 
her captain would have been shot for ! Eank cowardice is tha 
only explanation of her captain's action, despite all the allow- 
auecs wo can make for the upsetting of everything by the 
discovcrv that Italy declined to sacrifice herself for the War 
Lord's dream of "Der Tagg." Or if not rank cowardice, 
ordinarv corumon sense — which iu war comes to about the 
same thing ! 
I have devoted a good deal of space to this matter of the 
Goehen — more space than it may seem to warrant. But, 
personally, I believe that it is the real Trafalgar of the War. 
Big battles we may have, and if so they will make headlines 
beside which the story of the runaway Goehen will appear quite 
a trivial side issue. Very likely. The war will very possibly 
bo long and strenuous as generally supposed, but the star of the 
German Navy set for ever what time the Goehen turned and fled 
for the safety of the Dardanelles. 
Years ago the experts used to write that the history of the 
world would be settled in the Mediterranean. For the last ten 
years we have laughed at that. And now, in an utterly unex- 
pected way. Time has proved them right. The crack ship 
of the German Navy in the Mediterranean funked the 
British cruisers. The moral effect of this is bound to be abso- 
lutely unlimitable. Whether the Goehen becomes the Turkish 
Mitylev.e, whether she remains interned, whether presently she 
comes out again, matters nothing. The Chino-Japanese W'ar 
result was settled when the Tchc Yuen ran away from Captain 
Togo of the Kanhra at Asan. Yalu was merely a sequel. And 
so the flight of the Goehen has settled the result of future 
battles. 
That the French should have penetrated the Adriatic at 
the earliest possible moment was, of course, obvious ; but that 
they should have done so so quickly augurs well for their 
efficiency. A month or two ago any homo prophet would have 
described it as highly improbable. The fact, however, is that 
7i 
SITUATION IN THE BALTIC AT TIIE START OF THE WAR. 
For obviou, r«,on, tbe position of the British Fleet i, no. shown. Proponloaat. sl«, of the Fleet « unlfor,. 
•s in the other maps. 
12* 
