LAND AND WATER 
August 29, 1914 
TVlien the nc-w"! of that Sundav and tliat ^roiidaj had been received in London and Pans, it was 
evident at once where the enemy had his main forces, and where the forces opposed to lumjiad proved 
inferior to his own. The consequences of " ' " ' 
*ii:...,. o„,i nr. nnimlK- pniisiflpriihlft advantage sraineu uv mt^ v.ciinau i^uivui.^. 
determines success 
that inferiorit\- were a very serious set-back for the cause 
the AliieT alid^an"equaiiy considerable advantage gained" by the Gprman po^vers 
Enough was said hist week to show that, other things being equal, A^•llat 
or faihire in war is the element of numbers. r .i .1 . c . ■ , 
Now because there were at critical points on two sections of the theatre of operations a larger 
number of the enemy than had been allowed for, that enemy has obtained the advantage which we 
must clearlv undershmd if we are to appreciate the gravity of the moment. The two sections of the 
whole theatre of war, the two fields in critical points of which these advantages had, by Tuesday last, 
been gained by the Germans are (1) that marked A— A upon the accompanying sketch, being that i)art of 
Lorraine Avhich lies between the Yosges and the foiiress of Metz ; (2) that marked B— B on the 
s:ime' sketch being all that country lying in front of and round the angle formed by the junction 
of the Sambrc and the Meuse l{iver.s. , ,^ , , -,-^. «, 
The German advance, the falling back of the Allies, was m each case over a belt of from 12 to 21 
miles in width, in each case occupied some few days, and in each case has been due to the presence, 
on one particular front of the Allies, of numbers superior to those that were expected — though in the 
second field, that of the Sambrc and the Meuse, another clement besides that of numbers entered into 
the calculations, to wit, the factor of Namur. 
I will take these two fields of Gemian success and of Erench and Allied failure in their order. 
1, THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LORRAINE. 
A French force, tlie position and size of which are not matter for public comment, but the 
movements and command of which have been communicated to the public by the French Government. 
liad for some days been undertaking a strong offensive moA-ement across the frontier of the annexed 
provinces, Alsace-Lorraine. 
It Avill be seen in the accompanying sketch that this frontier, running from in front of Metz doAvn 
to Belfort, is divided into tAvo sections by the Yosges Mountains, along the crest of which it 
runs for some little Avay. The French offen- 
MtTZ lFort!f!edJ 
LOB-RAINE 
SAARBURC 
NANCY 
(OpenTomO 
theDooon 
STRASSSUftC 
(Fortified) 
Bridge Head 
/.Bridge Heatf 
12 5 
Scale of Average Marching d3y$i 
sive, undertaken Avith considerable forces, Avas 
in the direction of the an-ows marked " passes " : 
that is, it included the passage of the Vosgcs 
Mountains by the capture of the passes 
across them. It included an adA'ance upon, 
and, as events turned out, the recapture of, 
the open town of IMulhouse ; it included the 
occupation of that high culminating mass at 
the northern end of the Yosges knoAATi as the 
Donon ; and it included a forward movement 
across the ojjen country in betAveen Metz and 
the "S'osges, particularly the capture and the 
holding of Saarbourg, a railway junction the 
occupation of Avhich cuts direct communication 
between Metz and Strasbourg. 
In all this vigorous offensive effort, the 
combined Anuy Corps forming the army of 
Alsace - Lon-aine under General Pau had, 
up to and including the day of Wednesday', 
August 19tli (that is, Wednesday of last 
Aveek) been successful. The object of this 
move was threefold : 
(1.) First, and least important, it had a political object. The two million population of Alsace- 
LoiTaine being for the most pai-t unfriendly to the Gennans, and the memory of their annexation 
l)eing veiy bitter to the French, the presence of French troops upon their soil was calculated to be an 
element of confusion for Germany and of moral advantage to the spirit of the French people at the 
inception of the campaign. 
(2.) Secondly, and far more imporfant, it had for its object the putting of pressure upon the 
extreme Gemian left, so that the enemy's forces might be drawn down in that direction and Aveakencd 
in their mam attempt, Avhich was likely to be in the north. At the same time, a successful campaign 
in Alsace-Lon-aine, proceeding from south to north, would gradually close one bridge-head after 
another across the Ehine, and cut the communications between 'the south Gennan depots and stores 
and the German armies in the field. 
(3.) Tliirdly and most important, it would so engage German attention upon the front Metz- 
fctrasbourg as to divert or delay any effort along the front Mctz-Longwy. 
The importance of this third point a little consideration will explain. The Allies occupying, as 
they did, positions in the north between Lille and Longwy, if the Germans had struck in between 
Metz and Long^^7, they would not only have taken the line of the Allies in the rear and have 
tlu-eatened it With envelopment, but they Avould in particular have cut off Avhat is technically called 
a mlient. A mhent, in this connection, means a position occupied bv troops such that it is thrust 
out like a horn from some general line. It is evident that in the line Lillc-Longwy, the allied 
forces upon the Sambre and the Meuse from ^lons through Namur to Mezieres (in the sketch opposite) 
Avere such a salient in the general allied line. . li ^ 
2» 
