August 29, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
^ 
STRASBURC 
ULLE 
MONS 
loncwy metz 
mezTeres j^ « 
VERDUN 
K 
^•MULHOUSE 
lOO 
-.J — 
Sca/e of Miles 
■J — 
300 
—J 
m 
Now. if a salient is taken m reverse the effect is the more disastrous, from the fact that in a 
salient so many of the men are at a distance from and nnahle to get back to the rear .xhere their 
communications are threatened. To cut off an enemy occupying^ salient angle thus is a more 
complete operation than the mei;e turnmg of a line. One great historic example of'such a peril is that 
in which the French stood a ittle before the battle of Tourcoing. They wei thrown out in exactly 
tins way on a projecting angle, and the Duke of York di-ew up his plan of battle with the object of 
cutting them off along the base of the salient angle. x- r j t ut 
I said last week why it seemed unlikely tlfat the principal Gei-man effort would be made from 
vt ll l?r?l "°^^f/^- ^.^'^ ^ 7^ff«^t would have to be made right in fi-ont of the fortress of 
\erdun. ^ut though i\x<, prmapal German effort would, as I thought, probably be made in the 
Belgian field to the noi-tli and against the Allied line from Mons^ to Nammf yet it miobt be 
+1 . ^T'<1 ^T "" ^'^T''^ f ?"•*''' ''}?''^ ^•^^•^^- ^^^^'^ ^«"^^ ^"&^g« ^U ^^^ attention of the enemy on 
the Metz-htrasbourg line and brmg all the troops he had to spare" in the south at N.N., you would 
T nn^r % ^T ^^"^^'7,^^' &««d or bad, prevent him fim going from M.. betwee/Metz and 
Longwy H the direction of the an-ow, and you would to that extent be saving your northeiii positions 
between Lille and Long^vy from anxiety. ° "' position!, 
thp liti^A}!!f,\1°^l!i''''' ^""^ *^l! ''T^ i!''^^, ^"^ ^^'"'^^'° •" Alsace-Lon-alne. ultimat^^ly threatening 
the hne Metz-Sti-asbourg, was attempted by the French, let us see why and how far it failed 
th. .?Tl° 11 V-TPf,' '"^ ^\ P^^"' ^^ ^^-'^^^ *^^« success was considerable, especially in 
aII f w7 r i,'?i^^r'i ^^'^^P'-^^^ i^ «^e Vosges was taken, that at Saale , that at^Ste 
Mane, and that called the Bonhomme fmihcr south, being the most important. The gmit mountain 
In 7w ir '^'" '"^TttT '^f!. ^^F' ^^°^« «^ i^^^^oriX and caUed the Donon^^i. Tcu^" 
fl?p%r "'"' "P.i*' ^^' ^"^^ °^ *^? ?^,^^*^ ^* ^^•^•' ^^"^^ ^^^ ^'^ ^ <^o«^plete success. He drove 
M.n? rr fT''*^.7''''rrT*'^ Mulhouse.and took twenty-four guns and many priso ers 
^itw.'! f 7 ^A *^' ""'"'h *,^^* '' ^ ^^-^^^ ^^ ^'^^••b^^^g ^"d Metz, the left wing of this a ™y 
^:X^:r;^^C:!^o^'''''' '' — ^«%^ot across the Metz-Strfsbourgrailwa]; 
.nn.,•ii'^fTt P^Ff '^® movement into Alsace and Lorraine had the effect of brin-in- a very 
X 1 !' f ^"^^ '^ !^' '"/"^y ^^'^ '^^^^ ^^^ ™««* it- How many we do not yet know! "l doulft 
"pont elX^^^^^^^^ .P''^ ""« ^-™- /ounter-offensiie was concenti-rd 
upon the ^^esteln part of tins particular field, that is, upon the left of General Pan's army, betNveen 
Met. and the mountains. It threw back the inferioV French forces opposed to it, recfoss^d the 
frontier, and by Sunday, August 23rd, it had bent back 
the whole of that French left wing to such a positi(m as is 
indicated in the following sketch. The French were only 
holdmg the line of the Kiver Meurthe, nor everywhere holding 
that. The Germans were in Luncville. The troops on the 
Donon and in the Pass at Saales had had to retire Avith the 
general French retirement lest they should be left isolated. 
The passes on the southeni part of the mountains, hoAvever, 
Avere still held by the French, and their troops still dominated 
the upper plain of Alsace, the to^vn of Mulhouse, and the left 
bank of the Ehine at this part. 
The Gei-man success to the west of the mountains, when 
they pushed the French back on to the line of the Meurtlie 
and beyond it, did not only consist in compelling the inferior 
