August 29, 101 i LAND AX D WATER 
of Licgo, and much tlie largest body of the total German forces beyond the Ilhiue in tlie west 
•was massed to the north of the Meuso. A sufficient supply was accumulated for this great effort, 
and it is probable that -when an accurate history of the Avar is available we shall find that not 
less than seven, and perliaps eight, Army Corps out of a total of ceiiainly less than twent}-, were 
massed thus nortli of the Meuse upon the extreme left wing of the Allies for the great flanking 
movement round their line by the north. 
The last stand that could be made by the Belgian Army to these immensely superior forces 
\\as niade on that same Wednesday, a day's march east of Brassels, and after it the Belgians 
retired behind the guns of Antweii^, leaving Brussels open to the advance. In the late morning 
of the morrow, Thursday, August 20th, the Thui-sday of last v.eek, the heads of the German 
columns appeared before the capital of Belgium, which had been left open to admit them without 
resistance. From about half-past two o'clock of that day, throughout the whole of the remainder of 
that day, the German commanders organised a military parade, the object of which, though confined 
to what is called " moral effect," was military and defensible. They marched through Brussels one of 
their Army Corps specially picked for the job because it was quite fresh. They had specially accouta-ed 
it, given it a good rest, put into it for a veneer a few of the units that had been in the earlier fighting, 
and bidden it prepare for the show as for a review. These 40,000 men they passed throiigh the city, 
accompanied by music, and by every adjunct which cotdd impress the civilian spectator — even to the 
stiff parade step which is characteristic of the Prussian di-ill. 
Now it is here advisable, after the somewhat ill-timed ridicule which was pom-ed upon this 
manifestation, to explain what is meant by moral effect in warfare, and why a commander will, under 
some conditions, wisely employ it. 
WHAT IS "MORAL EFFECT"? 
Strictly speaking, all operations of -war depend for their success upon moral effect, with the 
exception of that operation in which a hostile force is completely' surrounded and may be exterminated. 
In ever}' other case you obtain your success over your enemy — or at any rate over the survivors 
among yoirr enemy — by reducing them into a condition of mind in which their opposition is ineffective. 
Tlie whole discussion between closer and more open fonnations : between the power of modern fortifi- 
cations to withstand modem siege artillery, and the opposite theory : between the sur\'ivor and non- 
survivor and shock tactics for cavahy — all these depend ultimately upon one's judgment of " moral 
effect." 
But there is evidently a difference in degree. No one can doubt the overwhelming result of a 
double flank movement enveloping an inferior force. To depend upon such a movement as that for 
success is to depend upon something like a certitude in human psj-chology. At the other end of the 
line you get the story of the Chinese troops that tenufied the enemy by making faces and imitating the 
cries of wild beasts. 
There is a whole category of actions in warfare which are of doubtful use because they lie 
• beyond the line after Avhich the psychological effect is weak. Such actions are specially said to 
have no true strategic but only a " moral " effect. 
For instance, th'e proclamation of the Duke of Branswick threatening Paris with destruction 
before the invasion of Fi-ance in 1792, is rightly regarded by historians as a blunder. Its moral effect, 
if any, was to strengthen the French moral. Again, Napoleon's entry into Moscow was effected at an 
enormous expense of men, after an advance far too prolonged, and the corresponding moral effect of 
holding the capital in such a country as Russia was in no way worth the expense of time, men, and 
energ}' which it cost. 
Now what we have to seize in the present campaign is that the German Government and tho 
Gennan military commanders have carefully estimated tmd intend to apply this factor of " moral effect " 
apart from direct action in the field, up to a certain point and in certain paiiicular ways, for which we 
must be prepai-ed. I do not say that their estimate is just : I should even imagine that they will 
exaggerate this factor. But what I do say is that their action here, as in every other matter, will be 
detailed and calculated ; and it will be very foolish on the part of those who are their opponents to 
imagine that any piece of parade, severity, or demonstration has been imdertaken by the German 
commanders at i-andom, or without their having seen, just as clearly as we see it, the vain side of 
such accessories to war. 
By mai'ching through Brussels, for instance, the Gennan commanders added a fuU day's fatigue 
and a full day's delay to at least one body of their troops, and perhaps to as manj' more. The choice 
of a fresh Army Corps was a patent thing which deceived nobody into thinking that the troops which 
liad recently been fighting were those fresh troops whom the populace of Brussels gazed upon. The 
breaking into parade step made no careful observer believe that those who indulged in it were on that 
account the more fomiidable in battle ; nor did the playing of brazen instraments, and the rest. 
None the less, the decision of the German commanders to make this demonstration was not, as too 
many have imagined, a piece of empty theatricalism. Its effect was calculated beforehand, and that 
effect has been in part attained. No one reading the press hostile to Germany on the morrow of last 
Thursday, when the news was known, can have doubted that this piece of parade did in some degree — 
l)erhaps in a less degree than the German commanders had hoped — affect the spirit of their opponents. 
It is exactly the same with the much graver policy of torture and murder. The German troops 
have here direct orders from their superiors and a clear object before them. 
They expect to be operating in hostile country — at any rate they have good hopes of being in hostile 
country duriug all the earlier, and perhaps more critical, phases of the campaign. If they meet with 
resistance upon the part of the civilian population (though that only consists of women, elderly men, 
and children), their difficulties will be enormously increased. 
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