LAXD AND WATER 
August 29, 1914 
Since these elderly men, women, and cliildren bave, in the nature of things, no kind of 
or'^anization, the terror inspired by the fate of individuals may be expected to coav all the rest. 
Therefore, orders will be strictly observed to adopt any means of spreading such terror Avheuever there 
is so much as a suspicion of resistance upon the part of the civilian population, and on this account we 
must be prepared for not only the summary shooting of elderly men and youths who have been canglit 
u ith arms in their hands, but also of any who have been suspected. Again, Avhenever there is a 
suspicion against the population of any place, we must expect the putting to death of elderly men and 
women, and even children, the destruction of property upon all sides, the burning of homes. 
I do not say that this is wise upon the part of the Germaas. Personally, I think that in so 
acting they ai'e handicapping themselves politically, and probably, in the later phases of the campaign, 
inilitarily as well. But tlie point to remember is that these actions are calculated actions. In 
Ik'lgiuni, for instance, there is no doubt that the absence of all civilian resistance after the first few 
days has encouraged the German commanders in the belief that these methods are of immediate 
military value. 'J'hey will be pursued in France as in Belgium, and, should a force land in 
England, in England as in France. AVc must be jweparcd for it. 
Tlie same rule a])plies to the ransoming of towns. Here it is not the town into which terror has 
to be struck, but the financial poAver of the enemy. Take, for instance, the case of the Belgian towns 
and provinces in the last few days. A total of about £10,000,000 has been exacted. England and 
France at once granted this sum to Belgium, which is as much as saying that Germany, by her 
successful occupation of Belgium, has fined her principal oj^ponents already £10,000,000, and inspired 
in the minds of those who have no country in particular and whose principal object is cosmopolitan 
iinance, the dread of fui-ther loss. Genuany knows how powerful these men are, and relies upon their 
indii-ect suppoii. 
THE THREAT TO THE SEA COAST. 
Filially, there is the vciy powerful moral effect upon which Germany is certainly countino-, and 
for which we must in this country be specially prepared : l//e ocmpaHon of the sea coast. There is 
nothing to prevent com])aratively small detached bodies of the German armies, especially strong in 
cavaliy, from occupying Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and ultimately Boulogne, ccccejd a decision in'^the 
valley of the Meuse adverse to German amis. If the Germans are successful in the valley of the 
2\Ieuse they will cei-tainly occupy the ports of the Straits of Dover. 
We may tell ourselves, and tell ourselves truly, all manner of concrete, solid, and consoling things 
concerning such an occupation :— That the Fleet can always master any particular section of coast to 
which it directs its attention ; that there are no vessels of war in these ports ; that if is just as easy 
to fly over to England from the Avestem part of the Belgian plain as from the sea coast; that no 
mine-layer could get out of these ports without observation from the fleet; that British com- 
JHunications over sea with the British forces and their Allies could be maintained further to the 
west, &c., &c. It is still true that the presence of German troops upon the further side of the Straits 
ot Dover would profoundly affect the state of mind of the Allies. It would be of a " moral effect " 
ajiparently disproportionate to the effort required. Whether it will really be disproportionate or no 
(^nly the event can show; but at any rate it will be attempted— unless the series of actions upon the 
.Meuse goes adversely to the Gennan anns. And we shall be veiy unwise indeed unless we prepare 
ourselves for the news of such an occupation of the sea coast 
i.n,.i.f T "7 ''*"™ *?-,w T'^'^^'f''''' ^^ *^'" '•'^^ ^^ ^^*^«^« t^^* l^ave taken place, and at the 
moment of wntmg are still takmg jjlace, in the Meuse vaUey. 
THE CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE MEUSE AND SAMBRE. 
throu^I'sm'''' opei-ations upon the Thui-sday of last week, when the Gemans were marching 
ntotfie ftS on of H n I ^' ' ^.f ^T,' '^ *'^' "^^"^"^^ ^^ ''^''^ ^^^' «^'^* «^« «»'«* G^ei-man sheU fell 
pmtiW the IW Sambre; and it is from this moment that the general 
b!^bs '"'' '^""'^ *^" ^"^^^^^ ^™^^« «^ *1^« B^lgi'^^^ Pl«"^ and the AiSenucs 
note thS V'She' wV.''™ J"?? p^ *^'' ^"''^"^^ "^^P P^^^^^^^^'^ ^* «^« ^^^^^ ^^ these comments, he will 
note that m the northern field of operations the Eiver Meuse timis a sharp corner at the town of 
Namur ; after having run roughly from 
north to south it begins to run roughly 
from east to west. At this corner tliere 
comes into the INIeuse the Eiver Sambre 
Avhicli, running from east to west, con- 
tinues the line of the Lower Meuse. 
North of this line lies, of course, that 
Belgian plain of which mention is made 
so frequently in all descriptions of the 
campaign. South of that line is to be 
found rough wooded countiy, deejjly 
ravined, and called the Ardennes. It is 
rougher and wilder to the east and to the 
south, and falls into cultiAatable land as 
one goes westward and northward, the 
Sambre itself coming from sources in almost 
flat country and only running through 
hilly countiy as it approaches Namur. 
litet 
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