August 29, 1914 LAXD AND WATER 
Xow, -ttlicn it was evident that the Germans would make their principal attempt throut^h the 
Belgian plain, the Allies occupied a line passing through Lille, Mens, along the Sambre bv Charloroi 
to Namur. That was a clear necessity, but they also massed some very large nu]nl)ers on a line 
bending back along the Upper Meuse from Kamur soutln\-ard. The English contingent lay about 
Mons. It was the French Eiftli Army, largely comjwsed of troops from Algiers, that lay along the 
Sambre from above Charleroi to as far as Kamur. Namur itself appears to have been somewhat 
insufficiently held by a Belgian contingent. Behind were the largo French forces continued up the 
valley of the Meuse. 
So much we know because it has been made public property by the authorities. Something more 
we know from official telegrams and from private accounts that have been printed in the press of Paris 
and London. But there still remains a much greater part to conjecture. 
Let us fii-st deal with what we know. 
The GeiTuan attack came in full force uj^on the line of the Sambre, and there, of course, greatly 
outnumbered the defender.s. It chief objective was not the extreme of the line to the west, 
as might be expected of German tactics and a desire to outflank, but in a direct attack, the 
bridges at and near Charleroi. This attack was maintained throughout Saturday and through 
the first 2>art of Sunday without result. The English contingent held its gi-ound on the left 
near Mons against forces which seem to have been superior to it by approximately 20 per cent. 
The French along the Sambre, particularly pressed for the possession of the bridge at Charleroi, 
lost and recovered, again lost and again recovered that passage. "VVhUe this was proceeding the 
hu-ger French forces along the Upper Meuse were proposing to pass east^-ard tlu'ough the 
Ardennes country. Had they succeeded in pressing far eastward through this difficult and highly 
defensible land of forests and deep ravines, they would have threatened more and more with 
every mile of their advance the communications and the supply of the Gemian armies in the 
Belgian plain, for that communication and those supplies largely come by road across the Meuse 
between Namur and Liege. Further, such an advance would have separated the northern German 
army fi-om the southern portion, which was operating from Luxembourg. 
One hypothesis of what followed upon and after the Sunday is the following : 
It is obvious that this advance eastward through the Ardennes would pivot round the fortress 
of Namur. The advance along the aiTOW marked (1) in the above sketch woidd march the 
furthest ; next that along the arrow marked (2), and last along the Meuse itself, depending 
upon the success of the two more southern columns, that along the an-ow marked (3). AVliilo, 
so long as the line on the Sambre was held, this turning movement roimd the Ardennes by 
the east was in no fear for its rear. 
Such is one hypothesis upon the nature of the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the 
vigorous German offensive undertaken from the Belgian plain. 
That counter-offensive — according to this conjecture — broke down ; and this breakdoAvn is the 
gravest news of all that has yet reached us from the seat of war. 
The ad\4ccs received and published in London and Paris up to and including the news of last 
"Wednesday morning pointed, indeed, to no decisive residt. They did not indicate that the one 
opponent had as yet appreciably diminished the miUtary power of the other ; but they did strongly 
suggest that the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the German advance had failed, and 
they made it seem exceedingly improbable that any immediate attempt to restore it would be attempted. 
Tlie failure appears to have depended upon two isolated events — a check in the southernmost 
French effort, marked (1) upon the above sketch, and, much more important, the fall of Namur : at 
least, the fall of the eastern forts and the consequent loss of the bridge-heads over the two rivers 
Sambre and Meuse at the critical point where these rivers meet. 
If Namur had stiU held as a pivot upon which the turning movement could depend, the fact that 
the southernmost French column was aiTCsted in the neighbourhood of Neuchateau might not 
liave had very permanent results. The second column to the north coming up on the flank of 
the German armies from Luxembourg might, indeed, have reversed that result ; and in any case, 
the occupation of even a part of the Ardennes countiy by French troops would have menaced 
the supply of their opponents upon the Belgian plain. 
But when (or if) Namur went, the hinge upon which all that arm was swinging went with 
it, and not only would the French turning movement eastward through the Ardennes become 
impossible, but it would become equally unpossible to hold the valley of the Sambre. 
All this, I repeat, is pure conjecture. It is based upon the supposition that the news of 
Namur came at the critical moment and that on receipt of it only was the retreat from the Sambre 
determined upon. The fuller accounts that will reach us later will show whether this hypothesis 
is sound or no. 
The way in which Namur was essential to the whole plan will be easily appreciated when 
we consider that the ring of forts protected the junction of 
the two rivers and of the bridges whereby they might 
simultaneously be crossed. 
Observe the effect of tliis. In the accompanying diagram 
you have the complex obstacle A. A. A., consisting of a 
main river and its tributar}-, which obstacle is presented both 
to M. advancing upon it and to N., who is preparing to meet 
him and to take a coimter offensive against him. A fortress, 
X, X, X, X, held by N.^s men, contains and protects the two 
opportunities, bridges (B.B.), whereby the obstacle can be 
surmounted. N. can move at his choice across the obstacle by 
