LAND AND WATER 
August 29, 1914 
IS 
these bridges, unaer protection of the foi-trcss, and appear in forec where he chooses He could appear 
in W attacking along line (1) or along line (2) at Ins choice. 'Ihe various parts oflus enemy M arc 
sepiu-ated and delayed by the obstacle : /le 
bridge-heads which surmount that obstacle 
'"""But suppose the fortress X. X. X. X to fall, and the conditions are exactly reversed. Then it is 
M that has the brid-es : it is M that is no longer suftcring from the obstacle, and it is N who is 
M that tue DiKi e^ ^^^^.^^ .^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ o£ ^i^e obstacle up to and 
(2) 
not. So long as the fortress holds, N commands the 
nt that'obstacie in his favour, Avhile leaving it still a cause of delay to his 
is 
restricted by it. Fm-ther, tlie Ime wincn ^y i^ auming a.w.,g ^^.^^.. of the obstacle up to 
.cr upon the fortress is turned by the fallmg of the fortress into the hands of M. M can pour 
rcposiu^ 
over ou to N's flank. 
holding is no longer an 
obstacle to him, because he 
• LiLLt 
.^\^^ 
©V 
® © /' 
©V 
©^ 
V 
^^MititJita 
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over uu lu x-i s ua^^. The obstacle which N IS ^. , -, r„ , , . -,. , , 
Ijossosses the bridge for crossing it ; and N will be rolled up unless he falls kick immediately 
M bein- here the German attack, N the allied defence along the Sambre X, X, X the fortress of 
Nanuir prote'cting the brtdges across the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse (which together form 
the triple obstacle in question), with Namur in German hands, the position of the AUies defendnig the 
Sambre becomes impo.ssible. The Mies have to faU back, and at the same time the counter-offensive 
to the east across the Meuse through the Ardennes can no longer be pui-sued. 
The total result under this hypothesis is that from holding the positions (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) on the 
accompanying sketch, the Allies had by last Monday evening 
to fall back upon positions roughly represented by (2) (2) (2) 
(2) (2). Here, hoAvever, conjecture becomes necessarily vaguer 
and less well based, because we shall not precisely know (and 
even for those who know, it would be a duty to be silent) 
Avhere the icliole defensive line against the next German 
advance will lie. We shall not know this untH the ncAvs of its 
retention, or the failure to retain it, reaches us. It is even 
possible that a large French force is still free to act and to 
take the counter-offensive — we do not knoAV. 
It is however already evident that the full plan of the 
Allied General Staff involves what is called a " refusing " of 
their left ; that is a bending back of their left wing from the 
general line. This left Aving was lying upon Wednesday last 
along the line Cambrai — Le Cateau. This extreme portion 
Avas held by the English contingent. That of com-se leaves 
the whole of the north-east open to a Gennan advance, but at the same time it leaves the flank of 
that advance open to attack from the south if that unknoAvn factor, the French masses upon the right, 
can come up in time and in sufficient numbers. This is indeed the whole object of refusing a Aving — 
you do it when your enemy is trying to turn you if you think that you have enough men to strike uj) 
at his flank dm-ing the tm-ning moAement. 
Our infoi-mation, then, 24 hours before this appears in print, is no more than the foUoAving : the 
Allied line has retired from its original positions (1) (1) (1) by very heavy marches for three days to (3) 
(3) upon its extreme left. It has fallen back 
from the neighbourhood of Mons to the 
neighbourhood of Cambrai. The task of the 
heaviest marcliing has fallen upon the English 
contingent, which is extended between 
Cambrai and Le Cateau. To the right, any- 
Avhere within the triangle, ABC, are the 
main French masses, certainly 10 Army Corps 
in number, perhaps already more. What they 
liaA-e in front of them Ave do not knoAV : they 
cei-tainly had superior numbers in the fighting 
of last Sunday; the ncAv arrivals from the 
.south may aheady haA'e redi-essed the balance. 
Meanwhile, there is of course nothing to pre- 
A'cnt the German cavalry from Avorking round 
by the left in raids if they think it AviU be of 
useful moral effect to do so, and some of that 
cavalry has already appeared near Lille and 
near Douai, and even further upon French 
territory. 
THE NATURE OF THE FALL OF NAMUR. 
It is again a matter of coujectm-e, but of conjecture most vital to the fortunes of the whole of our 
campaign, what exactly happened at Namur. For, if Namur was sufficiently held and was taken — or 
at least, certain of its forts Avero taken — so quickly only under the effect of shell fire, it must mean 
that the whole theory under Avhich ring fortresses Avere built, and upon which the Allied plan Avas 
based, is eiToneous ; it must mean that the German theory is sound and the French theory is unsound 
in the matter of fortification ; it must mean that your rmg fortress can be carried in a comparatively 
short time, if not by a rush, then under the effect of siege artillery. 
^ Now, putting together all the very slight evidence Avhichhad reached this country by the morning 
of llmrsday last, it is Iry no means certain that so graA'e a conclusion can be drawn. The eastern 
forts of Namur appear to have been silenced late upon Saturday, or early upon Sunday, the toAvn to 
have been occupied in the course of Sunday, and certain of the Avestern forts to be still holding out iu 
.NAMUa 
\ 
ME2IEI)ES 
SKETCH SHOWIKQ KETIKEMEKT OF ALLIED TKOOPS FEOM THEIB 
rOSlTIOIf OF LAST WEEK, 
(1) (1) to their present position (3) (3), of which the portion hetween 
Cambrai and Le Cateau is published, while that representing the main 
French Body to the riglit is not cortain, but lies somewhere within the- 
space marked with a query. 
8* 
