August 29, 1914 LAND AND WATER 
the evoniug of Unit day. At least tliis view of the matter is established by two converging pieces of 
evidence, the one from German, the other from French sources. Again, by the Sunday evening tlie 
retreat from the Sambre was in full swing and tbo Allied cannon were in front of Phillipeville back 
several hours' marching from the Sambre. We hear of a very small garrison in Naraur, and that 
garrison Belgian — 3,000 is the almost incredibly small tigure given. We are fm-ther told that the 
most eastern of the forts round Namur, that furthest advanced down the Meuse, was silenced almost 
inmiediately ; and more than that we are not told. Now we can be perfectly cei-tain from the experience 
at Poi-t Arthur, that the immediate silencing of a modern fort by mere shell fire is quite abnonnal, as 
we know by the experience of both Er-lung-shan fort at Poii Ai-thur and of Fleron fort and others at 
Liege that it is impossible (also under nonnal circumstances) to nish it. More than that we do not 
know. But it will require very strong evidence indeed to prove that modern foi-tification is subject, 
Avhen it is properly defended, to immediate disaster of this sort. If it is, not only Namur, 
but Toul and Verdun — and not only Toul and ^^erdun,' but ^Metz and Sti-asbom-g — are in the 
fcame boat. 
AU this reading, from sjiarse and unco-ordinated ncAvs of what has happened during this week 
npon the Sambre and ^Meuse, is based upon the hypothesis that Namur did fall as was announced, and 
that the Anglo-French line did retire from one to two days' march behind the line Mons-Namur, which 
is roughly the line of the Sambre. 
But there is a further element in the combination which had not been accounted for by Wednesday 
night last. Much more important in number, and even in comjjosition, than the French forces upon 
Sambre, were the French masses to the South of that river, which were destined to operate in the 
Ardennes. 
A\''e have seen that of these gi-eat bodies, one was checked in front of Nenf chateau by the Gemian 
forces proceeding from southern Belgian Luxembourg ; but until we have news of those masses as a 
whole we cannot determine the result of the conflict upon the north-eastern fi-outier. Even though 
we know that the troops holding the line of the Sambre fell back, their ultimate fortune, their 
immediate future task, and the 'chances of a decision one way or the other, would still depend upon 
the positions taken up by these masses to the south of the Sambre line, and the action upon which 
they might be directed. The most probable conjecture is that we shall find them, when the veil is 
lifted again, extending the line of the others towaixls "the south. We remain — late upon Wednesday 
night — in necessary ignorance of their position and theii* movements. 
One or two things which may exi)lain the postponement of a decision appears through the very 
meagre information to hand. It is evident, for instance, that the mass of the German attack was 
directed against the Sambre line, and had there a great superiority in numbers over the defensive. It 
is further evident, since men cannot be in two places at once, that there is a correspondingly weak 
body oi:)posite the Middle ileuse, where the French forces should be strongest. But, on the other 
liand, we know that in this country of the Middle !Meuse, and to the east of it, are the best defensive 
positions for a force weaker than its opponents, and Avooded country in which the superiority of the 
French field gun is largely lost. 
Another thing that comes through from the telegram is that the Germans have used in this gi-eat 
effort the very best of their troops. Not only numbers, quahty also has been demanded for this 
EU2)reme effort. Tlie guard was there. 
Finally we know that, up to the last telegrams received, the enemy's movement had, as a tui-ning 
movement, failed. The Gennan offensive had not yet threatened the Allied line in flank. If or 
■when the concentrated German mass in the north now passing the Sambre could achieve a decisive 
result, the general Allied line along the French frontier would be turned. If this, its extreme 
northern portion, was either pierced or enveloped, the success of what is known to be the German 
strategy in this campaign would be sealed. We know that the enemy wiU make every effort to 
achieve that end. 
At one moment, when the news of the fall of Namur came in upon Monday morning (the general 
public had it early in the afternoon of that day), it looked as though the Allied flank was broken or 
cut. The later telegrams, extending over more than two full days, though they tell us little, do not 
confinu that ; while the position in which the guns of the retreat were di-aA\'n up, according to the 
" Times " coiTespondent upon Sunday night, point to the falling back of the line as a whole, not 
to its having been pierced. AVe may be quite confident that up to the tune this last telegi-am was sent 
the line was intact. 
It should further be remarked that the direction of the full Prussian advance npon Charleroi 
makes us suspend our judgment as to a further attempt at outflanking by the west. You cannot 
outflank indefinitely, unless you have indefinitely superior numbers ; and, though the numbers which 
the enemy has here massed against the extreme of the Allied line are superior to what is in front of 
them, they are not so greatly superior, apparently, as to pennit of an immediate further extension 
westward beyond what they have already achieved. Were that so, their effort would not have been 
against Charleroi, but to the west of Mons. They Avould only have attempted to hold the French 
forces upon the line of the Sambre while they brought their greatest pressure to bear upon the western 
extreme of the line against and beyond the English left. 
AVe may sum up and say that, until further news is received, there is no evidence of a decisive 
result here ujwu tlie Franco-Belgian frontier, but only of a retirement on the part of the Allies, A\ith 
a corresponding advance on the part of the Germans. 
Meanwhile, what is most probable is an attempt of the Gennans to turn the Allied line round 
Cambrai. Whether that operation can be successfully carried out or not will depend almost entirely 
upon the unknown factor — the numbers the French haAC gathered within striking distance south and 
cast of Le Cateau. 
• 9* 
