August 29, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
ueClTiMAXE m:nelayinc 
i« 
THE MINE QUESTION. 
IT is not possible, nor -would it bo desirable, to record 
naval incidents on day-by-day lines. The first 
official report is necessarily brief, and when a mors 
extended one appears it usually puts tilings in a mora 
or less totally different light. 
The sinking of the Amplilon is a case in point. 
The fuller official report should go far to reassure public opinion 
on the subject of mines, which, since the Fctro-pavlovsk was 
blown up instantaneously at Port Arthur in the Kusso- 
Japanese War, have been regarded by the public as " appal- 
lingly, etc., etc., etc., deadly." 
In one sense what the public thinks does not matter. In 
another sense it matters a very great deal, for public appre- 
hensions are certain to be communicated to relatives in the 
Fleet, wherein everyone day 
and night knows that a mine 
may be struck. The best logic 
for that is Farragut's " Damn 
the torpedoes." 
This, attitude, however, 
will become difficult to pre- 
serve if men are constantly 
receiving letters from their 
nearest and dearest about 
" those diabolic mines ! " Ps}'- 
chology is everything in naval 
warfare, and " nerves " are 
easily communicated if the 
process goes on long enough. 
Far too much about " the 
mine danger " has appeared in 
print. 
As a matter of fact the 
mine is merely potentially 
dangierous. The l^etropav- 
lovs/c was not sunk in a 
moment by a mine, but be- 
cause that particular mine 
exploded her main magazines. 
That did the mischief. Simi- 
larly, the Amphion would 
probably have still been afloat had she hit the mine anywhere 
except where she did hit it. Even so, she remained afloat for 
a, considerable time, and the loss of life dii-ectly due to the 
mine seems to have been small. 
The Russo-Japanese War was prolific in mines, both sides 
having ships hit. I chanced to have many personal friends 
in both fleets, and after the war " experiences " were, naturally 
enough, very get-at-able. 
Of the Japanese ships which hit mines the Hatiute took 
some two hours to sink, and no lives were lost. The Russians 
aver that she sank in three minutes, like the I'etropavlovsJc 
did, but that in no way corresponds with the narratives of her 
crew. 
The Tashlma kept afloat for many hours, and foundered 
dowly while being towed home rather too fast a day later. 
The Asahi was hit by two mines, which both glanced off, 
and exploded without doing any more barm than wetting 
everybody. 
The Shihhhiina hit one mine which did not explode. 
Tlie MUcasa hit nothing. 
That is the true story of the most dramatic mine incident 
in the world's history — the entire Japanese battle fleet steam- 
ing unconsciously into a mine field. 
On the Russian side the refropavlovslc was, of course, as 
stated, blown to pieces immediately by the explosion of her 
magazines; but the cruiser Baijan, when she hit a mine, merely 
had one compartment filled, and steamed into harbour at .a 
reduced speed. 
Those aro in each case bits of information, from those 
•who had been in the ships mentioned ; and — since blockade 
nines have not been made materially more deadly in the 
interim — these details should serve to remove the impression 
that a mine is necessarily any worso than a torpedo or big 
-shell. Tiie only really terrible thing about its menace is that 
it (like the submarine) is unseen attack. 
For the rest, it may be added that mines may play a most 
useful part in the British blockade, since it is far easier for us 
*o secure results by mining a definite area which miist ba 
-i.e.. 
passed than for the Germans to accomplish things on thai 
'■ dropping by chance " principle. 
There is one matter which I have omitted in the fore- 
going, and that is the part played by the mine-sweepers- 
fiinall vessels fitted for removing mines laid by the enemy. 
The tremendous importance of this last is that, wlaether 
or no the British fleet lays mines, the German fleet dares not 
move out without sweeping its way. Sweeping is not the 
kind of thing which can be done at battle-cruiser speed. It 
is to be done easily enough, but' it takes time. And time is 
everything, for it allows due notice to be given of every move 
of the enemy; in other words, it renders an evasive surprise 
(humanly speaking) impossible. 
Meanwhile, several neutral mei-chant ships have been 
sunk by mines, and an Admiralty notification issued to tha 
effect that the Germans have 
HOSTILf 
NAVAL BASE 
SENSELESS MlNELAYtNC 
mined trade routes well out 
in the North Sea. This is a 
violation of International 
Law. Also a senseless pro- 
ceeding, as it is devoid of any 
militai-y utility. In the 
North Sea neutral ships are 
the chief victims; in the 
Adriatic the Austrians have 
lost a torpedo boat and a fine 
liner by their own mines ! 
The only real ttie of mines 
is: 
(1) To "contain" a 
hgstile Fleet. 
(2) To prevent hostile 
movements along an antici- 
pated route. 
As regards the first, the 
British Fleet was at sea and in 
jwsition long before Germany 
could attempt the opera- 
tion. As for the second — ■ 
as mentioned last week — the 
Amph'wn was sunk because 
she chanced to run into a 
legitimate German anticipation of the movements of our 
Expeditionary Force. 
The mines dropped on trade routes out at soa come in 
neither category. They simply indicate that those in control 
of German mine-layers are animated by the " Goehen spirit." 
which, being translated into plain English, .is " only hit 
where there is no risk of being hit back," 
TRADE AND NAVAL WARFARE. 
An event of the utmost importance is now in process of 
taking place without most of those immediately concei-ncd 
realising that the Fleet has anything to do with' the matter. 
I refer to the organised attempt which has recently been 
initiated — the attempt to capture and hold all the German 
trade markets. It is a remarkable illustration of the ti'uth 
of the old proverb, " Trade follows the flag." 
All the same, however, there is a certain situation to bo 
faced. We have swept and— unless the unexpected occurs — 
we shall go on sweeping German commerce from the seas. 
This means the automatic capture of all German markets — a. 
prospect of unexampled prosperity for the British Empire at 
the expense of Germany. 
Germany cannot protect her trade. We can protect ours. 
Tlie deduction to neutral merchants is obvious. 
Herein, however, lies the danger. Germany has nothing 
more to lose, but she has everything to gain. If she can get 
even a portion of her trade under the American flag, the 
proverbial coach and horses through an Act of Parliament 
will save her from utter trade disintegration. 
In such case we can only press our advantage at the expense 
of America. Germany may have her own dreams about 
destroying America once she can succeed in destroying her 
European rivals. But no American is likely to dream that 
particular dream. And so there is always the risk that iu 
American diplomacy present advantage may bulk larger than 
future possibilities, especially since the recent Japanese action. 
Whatever Japan's intentions may be, they aro bound to be 
13* 
