LAND A K D W A T E U 
September 5, 1914 
From the next section agaia to the west, or left, Pootion IV, which was that hold by the British 
contingent supported bj Frcncli troops, the line bent back again to the south. There had been 
announced, for forty-eight hours past, strong German pressure towards the ring of forts round La Fere, 
and unless I misread the exceedingly interesting account given in a London morning paper on 
Wednesday, and relating presumedly to Saturday and Sunday, the line was then bent back beyond 
St. Quentin, which is the toAvn there described as having been abandoned. There were, even at that 
date, English soldiers as far back as Koyon, though it does not follow that the fighting had got as far 
soutli as that, for Koyon may have been no more than the headquarters of the resistance at this 
indented portion of the line. 
In the fifth section, still more to the west and the left, we had the defensive line of the Allies 
facing along the line of the Somme from Ham to Perrone and up as far as, and perhaps, a little behind, 
the tovni of Bapaume ; the cannonade on this extreme left being heard from YiUers on the other side 
of the Somme. 
Putting all these together, wc are now in a position to establish the defensive line which the 
Allies were holding against the Prussian advance at the end of last week. How far they had 
succeeded in holding, whether they had not even taken the counter-offensive, no kind of inforraatir-.n 
had reached London. 
That line, tlien — the sinuous line held by the Allies during last week-end — the accompanying 
sketch describes. Its first section still held the Upper Meuse. Its second was bent back behind 
Soigny, and perhaps already to the Aisne. Its third, on the contrary, was pressed out towards Hii'soa 
AMIENS •<(f'' • ^ , 
VILLERS 
SCALE OF MILES 
TO 
SKETCH SnOWIXO EOUGlrLT THK FKOBABLS Di;ii:y31V3 LIXI OF LAST TCESDAT (oX THX LAST TELEOKA5I3 EKCEIVED BT 
wed>:esdAt NionT), 
and Guise. Its fourtli was deeply indented towards La Fere and ISToyon. Its fifth went right up 
again and held the enemy from near Bapaume, through Peronne to Ham. 
It will be immediately apparent from such a conclusion that two main offensive efforts were 
being made by the Germans to break the Allied line, and that the attempt to outflank it only Avas for 
the moment abandoned. These two efforts correspond to the two indentations in the line, one in front 
of Ecthel, the other in front of Noyon. If both and each of these sections could hold against the 
pressure directed against them, the line would remain intact, thongh it should still further retire. If 
either were forced, the line would be pierced and the first phase of the war decided in favour of the 
enemy. That Avas the jjeril six daj's ago. 
The indentation pointing towards Noyon corresponds to the valley of the Oise, and is the shortest 
road of approach to Paris. It was upon this notch presumably that the Aveiglit of the assault fell. 
Certain corollaries attach to these conclusions. Thus it is evident that from this week-end the 
main communications between Paris and London, which run through Boulogne and Amiens, Avere so 
gravely threatened that travel along them had to be abandoned, Avhile the supply of the English 
contingent had also in future to come from further west along the coast. 
It is again evident that the threat on the Oise valley, the deep indentation of the line 
before Noyon, meant tv/o things. It meant, first, that the extensive left of the Allied line Avas in 
danger of being cut off, and therefore the numerical inferiority of the Allies — alreadj- jjronounced— 
Avould be gravely emphasised, and that the Allies Avould have suffered their first defeat in the field. 
It meant, secondly, that, CA-en if the Allies' left should succeed in retiring and escaping such a 
disaster, the advance of tlie German extreme right upon Paris AA'ould be the next step. Such an advance 
would not mean that the French Army in the field had accepted an adverse decision. It w^ould 
still be in being and still be able to continue the struggle indefinitely. It Avould not run the risk 
of shutting up any considerable portion of its total forces behind the forts of Paris. It Avould 
reserve itself for continued free action upon the flank, and (if possible) upon the communications 
of the enemy as ho advanced upon the capital. To advance u])on the capital would be, for the 
enemy, nothing but a stroke of moral effect. "Wliat moral effect means in war, how it may lead 
men to wasteful energy, Avhcn and in ' ' 
Avhat degree it 
may be of value, I discussed last Aveek. 
4* 
