Sejjtember 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
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AlCKOWS SKOWIXa COMPAEATITB lENaTH OF ADTAXCi : 
(a) foe EtrsSIAN3 IX EAST PRUSSIA UPON BEKLIX. 
(b) foe RUBSLVXS BEFOr.E POSES UPON BERLIN". 
(C) FOR OEE3IANS ON TUEIB PBESSXT POSITION UPON 
PARIS. 
frontier and to some extent in the belt immediately west of it, (3) tlie presence of considerable opposing 
forces. 
As to (1) : I tliink the most striking vr&j of showing to the eye of the reader what tliis depen- 
dence iipon " the Eussian steam roller " means, is to put before him the following diagi'am. It is 
absurdly simple, but I think it is effective. Here are three arrows. The first (a) represents the 
advance which a Eussian Army must make from its 
extreme starting point to Berlin : even if it were as 
rapid in its advance (which is impossible) and as 
successful (which it has not hitherto been) as the 
Gei-man forces in the west. Tlie second arrow (i) 
represents the distance which the Eussian armies 
would still have to cover after they had masked or 
taken the frontier fortresses, thoroughly invaded the 
heart of Prassian territory, and had passed the town 
of Posen — an advance which could not be made xmtil 
the Austrian menace upon theii- flank had been 
destroyed. The third broader arrow (c) represents 
upon the same scale the distance at the present 
moment separating the Prussian Army (with its 
Austrian auxiliaries) from Pai'is. I think the contrast 
is sufficiently striking. 
But it is already evident that the Eussian 
advance wUl be neither unchecked nor particularly 
rapid. Two things have happened this week, the one certainly fortunate to Eussia, the other certainly 
unfortunate, which give one the right to speak in this fashion. 
The unfortunate thing is a heavj^ defeat suffered by the forces which have been invading East 
Prussia. This defeat appears to have taken place in front of Osterode. We have the German official 
account (and German official accounts have hitherfo been singularly accurate) which speaks of 30,000 
prisoners and of a total defeat. We have the Eussian admission of a check, and we have the further 
admission of great numbers ha\iug been brought up against two ai'my corps which were caught in 
isolation. We ought not to attach undue importance even to an action of this kind, which would have 
been decisive in any of the smaller wars of the past ; but it is a very important thing. It will be 
retrieved ; and it will be retrieved by numbers, as also by the intense determination of the Eussian 
people. But, for the moment, it makes progress towards the line of the Vistula, Danzig, Graudenz, 
Thorn, impossible, and the Eussian sweep through Eastern Prussia towards the lower Vistula has 
been held up. 
Tlie second piece of news, fortunate rather than unfortunate to Eussia, though not yet conclusive, 
equally proves with Avhat deliberation the western advance must be undertaken. It is upon a larger 
scale than the check received to the north of Eussian Poland in East Prussia, and the field in which it 
Las taken place is Gahcia — that is, the northern belt of the Austrian dominions between the Carpathians 
and the Eussian border, and the southern part of that western projecting lump of Prussia which 
corresponds to Eussian Poland. Here an Austrian advance had been proceeding during the week, not 
without successes that might be called victories, towards Lublin, and attended by a peculiar success at 
Kielce. Tliis advance appeai-s to have been checked by the Eussians and to be heavily tlireatened at 
this moment by a counter-offensive directed against the town of Lemberg to the south. We have now 
authoritative news that this counter-offensive was entirely successful. Thus the main Austrian 
attack upon Eussia has failed, and its momentum has been checked and broken. Therefore, after due 
delay for re-organisation and for coming up westward, the Eussian masses wiU be free to cross the 
extreme western boundary of Eussian Poland, and begin their march upon the line of the Oder. 
But not till some time hence. 
But the process, even though unchecked for the future, must necessarily be a slow one. Until the 
line of the Oder is reached, there is no threat to Berlin, let alone any heavy pressure which could make 
Prussia retire her men from the Western theatre of war. And in general, I repeat what I have said 
before in these notes : I think there T\'ill not be, under the most favourable circumstances, any anxiety 
in the Western field for what is going on in the East until after the middle of October. If the 
circumstances are not favourable, but are unfavourable, then there will be no such pressure for months. 
For, after October, the few roads wiU be difficult and the approach of winter wiU handicap all advance. 
If anyone has placed reliance on the extraordinary telegrams which announce the retirement of men 
from the Western field of war to help in the Eastern, he may be content to forego that consolation. 
The Prussians (and Austrians) to the west of the Ehine will use every man they can in that Western 
theatre of war for many weeks to come. The train-loads seen going eastward through Belgium are 
either train -loads of wounded evacuated towards the base, or men being moved from one part of the 
Western field to another. Men drafted to the East they most certainly are not. 
I will conclude by some appreciation of what, I think, has been in everybody's mind duiiug the 
past week — the success of certain German theories, the coming true of many German prophecies, and 
the acliievement of tasks which Germany had openly proposed to herself. But I will suggest not only 
the success of Germany in these matters, but also the modifications of that success, which I now append. 
We are, at this stage of the war, at last able to appreciate more or less in their right 
proportion certain facts which were conjectural and doubtful during the first weeks ; and before 
we proceed to our weekly summary and reading of what has happened to date in the two fields of 
operations, the Western and the Eastern, it would be well to enumerate those facts and to grasp 
them for the purposes of our further judgment. 
