LAND AND WATER 
September 5, li}14 
3. THE UNEXPECTED RAPIDITY OF ADVANCE. 
MONS 
The rate of tlic Gcnuan advanoc, to vvliicli allusion has been made elscAvhurc, is tlie tliird lesson we 
haAC to leani from the openinf^ pliascs of the Avar. 
It Avas CA'ideiit from the tirst mention of the general Gorman plan (and it has been openly talked 
of by no one more than the Germans for more tlian ten years past) that this plan demanded not only 
surprise, nor only superior numbers, nor eAen only the added success that AA-as promised against 
fortifications, but also a i)0Aver of exceediugly rajjid advance ; for a bloAv is not a knock-out bloAv unless 
it is a SAvift bloAV. 
NoAV, in this, as in the other mattei's I am here examining, the German theory has justified itself 
in the main, but, here again, not as completely as full and immediate success demanded ; fui-ther, the 
success is subject to a most important qualification Avith Avhich I shall deal in a moment. 
Wlion the French fell back from the line of the Sambre after the fall of Namui-, the pressure 
exercised upon the retreat by the German forces Avas never relaxed during the Avhole of three full da\s 
and r:ights. It Avas a mai'vellous jjicce of organisation and of effective military Avill. 
The ncAv line taken up by the Allies made an angle with the old line, and at the same time Avas 
more extended to the West than the old line. "J'lie conA^ersion Avas roughly from tlie line A — B on 
the accompanying sketch, held till Simday night, the 23rd of August (12 days ago), through the dotted 
line E — F reached on Tuesday night (ten da3\s 
ago) to the line C — D held on Wednesday 
night and Thursday morning a week ago ; and 
because there was this angle between the old 
f)-ont and the ncAV, and because the new front 
extended more to the West than the old front 
had done, the heaviest of the marching fell, 
as we have seen, to the western part of the 
line ; that is, upon the English contingent ; 
Avhich is represented in my sketch by the thick 
part of the lines. 
But the remarkable thing about even that 
Avestcrn extremity is that the Gennans were 
able] to keep up their pressure throughout the 
Avhole of so rapid a retreat. It AAas the true 
pressure of an army ; it was not merely cavalry 
keeping in touch, nor advance bodies feeling 
the Avay for the main columns. When the 
fighting Avas fiercest upon Wednesday, the Allied 
line had stUl in front of it — after 26 to 30 miles 
of retreat — as heaAy a body of attack as 
it had had upon the Sunday before upon 
in some places 12 to 15 miles a day for those 
MAMUR* 
o 
u 
to 15 20 23 
' ' ■ ' 
So 
_i 
SCALE OF MILE5 
SKETCH SHOWIXO NATCEK AND EXTENT OF THE KAPID AT.LILD 
HETIREMENT AND GEKMAN AOiVAXCE, AUO. 23EB-l'(iXH. 
mnrrrr THE ALLIED LINE. 
■ ■iiiiM IHB ENGLISH CONTIXCLNT. 
POSITION ON EVENING 0>' 
THJ! IXTERMEDIATB 
THE 29th. 
the Sambre. The German advance had aA'eragcd 
tAvo and a half days. 
I repeat, the character of this advance, carried out by such an cnoniious body of men without a 
liitch, is unique. It Avould be fast going for a AveU-organised army approaching a distant goal undis- 
tm-bcd. For an army actually fighting as it advanced, and fighting against so equal a resistance, and 
moving in such unprecedented numbers, it is amazmg. 
But after saying so much, we must again qualify our admission of the German achievement by 
certain considerations which greatly modify its value to its authors. 
It is noAV apparent that these very rapid strategical moves upon the part of the Germans are of a 
piece Avith the corresponding tactical policy of a rush, dense and rapid, which, if it fails, involves a 
considerable period of recuperation to foUoAv. The three days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesda}^ 
from ten days to a week ago, saAv this very rapid rush from the line A — B to the line C — D. Tlie 
four days folloAving saAv hardly any advance at all ; and, so far as can be gathered from the veiy con- 
fused, fragmentary, and hitherto quite incomplete telegrams received this AA'eek, the three folloAving 
diiys (Sundaj'-, Monday, and Tuesday last)— making six days in all— also saAV very little advance. 
In other words, this rapidity, Avliich it Avould be folly not to admire and pedantic not to be 
astonished at, is a i-apidity essentially local and essentially restricted to efforts isolated in tunc. It is 
n<jt lilve the rapidity Avhich marked the great advance of the Grand Army upon Uhn, or any other of 
the rapid general ad\ances of history. It is not even a rapidity con-esponding to the marches which 
shut up the French Ai-my in Sedan 44 years ago. It is a rapidity essentially not continuous. This is 
notto say that it fails to achieve its purpose— far from that : so far this strategical rash and halt has 
achieved its immediate purpose— but it has not achieved its end. The Germans have plenty of time 
before them, measured by the rate of their first ad\ ance. TTie time is more restricted if it be measured 
by the rate of their advance plus the first halt Avhich succeeded it. It is more restricted still if Ave 
consider another factor, to which I Avill noAv turn. 
That factor is what I may caU " the expense of rapidity." 
^ There are two principles upon which any great effort may be based in any form of human activity. 
You may strain to inci-ease the productivity of your capital and spend only the income of it, or yoa 
may spend tlie capihil itself. You may be aiming at creating an extra force which shall be ahvays in 
e\isk':i.?e and alwajs dependable, or you may be aiming at an effect which is necessarily rctitricted to a 
shoit time because the achievement of it wears away your very means of achievement. 
10* 
