September 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
K tlio Uioiuiug of August 2Sth there occurred 
certain operations which were hailed hy the daily 
Press as a "great naval victoiy " which is, ofi 
course, au incorrect t-erm to employ for what 
after all was merely a " minor operation " of war. 
The mere fact that the German official report 
conceals nothing indicates that the vanquished so i-egard it; 
and in naval warfare it is always tht opinion of the vanquinhcd 
uhich matters most. Had the Gcrnian Admiralty issued an 
incorrect report, our advantage would have been greater. Bub 
of this later on. Let us fji-st review what happened in detail, 
and then proceed to draw conclusions. 
Heligoland is a small island some 46 miles from Cuxhavcn, 
which guards the entrance to the Kiel Canal, and in or near 
which the German High Seas Fleet was probably lying at the 
same time. It is also about equidistant from the naval arsenal 
at Wilhelmshaven. Lying as it docs at the apex of a triangle 
The first act of the drama was a species of prologue. We 
learn from the official report that British submarines have for 
the last three weeks been in the habit of cruising in what ia 
known aa " outside the enemy's front door." It is the first 
time in history that submarines have been used as scouts; 
hitherto they have always been regarded as sharpshooters and 
agents of destruction generally, their unique pobsibilitics in 
the way of inshore observation having apparently escaped 
attention. Those who knew of the intention to use submarines 
in the scout capacity have ever been, careful to ignore the 
subject. 
The Germans — so far as we can surmise — were ignorant 
of the submarine scouts. They doubtless kept a very sharp 
look-out for submarine attack; but not being attacked con- 
sidered the coast as clear- — a legitimate assumption on the part 
of any Fleet which regards the submarine from the conveu- 
tioual standpoint. 
For reasons which — since nothing about the niEtter has 
jSt = Approximate scene of 
t/i£ engagement 
i -^f/mmm^^mmm:- - ^^mmmmm 
between these two impoi-tant points, Heligoland is a vital out- 
post in the German scheme of coast defence. Enormous sums 
have been expended on fortifying it, and in the conitructiou 
of a harbour proof against toi-pedo attack. 
The utmost secrecy has always been observed about Heligo- 
land, but it was obviously always intended to be the advanced 
base of the Gonnan light squadrons and Rub;narines, behind 
VNliich the battle fleet could move with impunity between Kiel 
and Wilhelmshaven, via Brunsbruttcl and Cuxhaven. 
The exact constitution of the attacking British force has 
not been stated, nor for various rca.son.s is it likely to be stated 
for some time to come. We arc simply told of " strong forces " 
of destroyers (under Commodore Tyi-whitt) supported by light 
cniisers (uudc;r Commodore Goodenough) and battle cniisers 
(|under Rear-Adniirals Boatty, Moore, and Christian), acting 
in conjunction with submarines (Commodoio Kcy.s). From 
tlie Navy List thci names of most of the priudpal ships em- 
ployed can bo conjectured ; but such conjectures may not ;kccs- 
«arily he correct, ."iiv mor.-, than that the official acx- -^ut 
aeceisari.y gives all tho story. 
appeared in the public Prcas at tho time of writing — need not 
be more specilically referred to, there were grounds to believe 
that a German torpedo squadron would be creeping out some- 
time on or about August 27tJi. 
It came; light cruiscis and a number of destroyers, prob- 
ably two divisions of twelve each, as the Gennans generally 
woi-ii in groups of that number, with a cruiser at the head of 
eatli. The third German cruiser, Ariadne, was old and 
slo-.v. She was not in commission before the mobilisation 
of the fleet, and it is improbable that she was leading a 
destroyer division. It is more likely that she was an ordinaiy 
look-out ship. 
Accounts, other than the official report, are necessarily 
vague and conflicting. In m.itters of this sort personal iir.pits- 
sioiis i;o for veiy little, save from the psychological standpoint. 
The ordinary participant sees little or nothing of tho game 
save in his own immodiat© vicinity, and he i? generally too 
much occuj)icd to see very much even theri>. His feeling^i art\ 
tiieicforo, inore valuable evidence than his viHicu or £i:j;;)cscd 
vision. 
13* 
