Soi)teml)er 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
wera seeking to complete the deetructaon, the nest st-age of the 
drama is one and the same thing. 
It is fairly clear that the Gci-man cruiser Mainz was sunk 
by our light cimiser squadron; It is far more abundantly 
clear that our battle cruiser squadron performed the same 
office for the Koln and Ariadne. All three of these German 
light cruisers have now ceased to exist. 
In addition, the Germans admit to the loss of th? destroynr 
V 187. They do nob mention the actual loss of any other 
destioyel:. Personally, I think that only one was actually 
sunk, and that our " two sunk " is due to two conflicting 
accoi:nts of the sinking of the V 187. 
It is the ea.siesb possible mistake to make in war. There 
is not the remotest reason to believe that the Germans, having 
ofiicially admitted more serious lo.sscs, would risk concealing 
tha loss of a further inferior vessel. 
I put the rcsu't of the battle as follows : — 
BRITISH. 
GERMAN. 
Susx. yil. 
Ariadne (li-ht cruiser). 
Koln (light cruiser). 
Maim (light cruisar). 
y 187 (destroyei). 
Bu'LY Damaged. 
Arethusa (light cruiser). 
SO. 
L'lurel {destroyer). 
r Liberty (destroyed. 
PaU\C£0. 
, iVil 
10 to 20 destroyers (probably 10 
\ 
only). 
All of which spells a British victory clearly enough, but it 
does not spell anything to which tho epithet of " great " should 
i be applied, because its material ©fiect ou the naval war cannot 
ba other than subsidiary. 
In the matter of details : our light cruisers are of appro.xi- 
niately the same speed as the German ones, but our battle 
cruisers are considerably faster. To this probably is due the 
fact that the other two German cruisers were accounted for. 
aihey could, of course, neither fight nor run away fi-om thu 
lAon and her sisters. Incidentally, the fact that our light 
i cruiser squadi'on waa undamaged further suggests that the 
Gennans were running from tlicm. 
According to the first ofllcial report— the second one is silent 
' — at some time during the proceedings the battle crui.<;ers were 
" attacked by submarines and floating mines." There is a 
v.ngueness in this phrase. It may mean either that the big 
j.!iips nearly ran on to a mine field, or that tho surpiiicd 
German cruisers dropped mjues in the hopes that the enemy 
vnuld run on to them — a very old device. If it were this 
"latter, then probably the Germans will have to do a great 
deal of mine sweeping ere they can safely venture out again. 
It is difficult to believe that the submarine attack and 
the "floating mine attack" on our battle cruiser squadron 
took place at the same time or place, except in so far as tho 
submarines may have — by showing themselves — manoeuvred to 
drive or lure the British Fleet on to a mine field. 
The apparent impotence of the German submarines, which 
did no harm, is not a matter on which to lay much stress. The 
fact that they were on the spot at the psychological moment 
indicates that the Gennan submarines are efficient. That their 
efforts were unsuccessful comes in the chapter of accident. 
We have now to consider the psychological side of the 
matter. Had the German cruisers tamely surrendered to our 
battle cruisers, it would merely have been bowing to the 
inevitable. From things as they happened we can therefore 
tii-aw the inference that tho morale of the German Navy on 
August 28th was still quite good, despite the deteriorating 
influences of being more or less shut in. 
The vessels which went out must have gone out knowing 
that theirs waa a dangerous mission. It ia easy to surmise 
their particular objective, and they must have known that 
that would be suspected by the British Fleet. But probably 
.it the moment when they were surprised thoy were congratu- 
l.abing themselves on being safely back in their own watere, 
having met neither good fortune nor bad. 
Now comes in an interesting problem. The presence of 
British battle cruisers with the light squadron indicates that 
the possibility that the German jjattle cruisers would como 
tut to support tlie German light squadron was allowed for, 
find likely enough it was thought or hoped that tho Gennau 
High Sea Fleet would follow. 
No big German ship intervened. They may all have 
been too far away to do so. But that attributes lack of 
prescience to the enemy — ever a dangerous thing to do when 
one is endeavouring to estimate hostile intentions. 
Rather, in my opinion, tlio German heavy ships kept out 
of tho way as part of a deliberate plan. A trap was to b3 
suspected. Kotliing was to be gn.ined by coming out. whereas 
asorlio wn.^ bound to mcnn fresh losses. Hcncs, a-i I read it, 
the immobility of the High Sea Fleet. If this reading ba 
corroet. it gop's to indicate tho correctness of mv assumption 
in the first of these articles— that the High Sea Fleet intends 
playing a waiting game, and will only come out before " dsr 
Tag" under pressure of home circumstances. Such ho,tit> 
ciixr.mstances ha,d obviously not arisen by August 28th. 
It Admiral Beatty sought to draw the Main Fleet, hu 
opcr.Ttion, brilliantly conceived and executed though it was, 
was to that extent a failure, or rather will be so regarded hi/ 
the Germans. 
Hence the inappropriateness of that term "Great Naval 
Victory " in which our ]?ress has so freely indulged. To adopt 
a chessboard simile, we have had a success; but that success 
13 merely the capture of a pavrn. It brings us matorial'v 
nearer to checkmate, but a series of several such captures will 
be needed before checkmate is arrived at. 
Since the Guehen affair — especially since it has transpired 
that this battle cruiser and the Bredau ran away together 
from the small British cruiser Gloucester, little more powerful 
than the Breslav — there has been a tendency on the part of 
the public to despise the German Fleet. We have all of us 
perhaps forgotten that the truth about the affaire Goehen has 
jjroLably been sedulously concealed so far from the German 
Navy. At any rate, the affair of Heligoland seems to indi- 
cate that we shall have to wait awhile before reaping the 
moral benefit of the Goehen incident. 
Or it may be that, having realised the deceit of the 
policy under which they were educated to despise the British 
Navy, German sailors (possibly ever less credulous than their 
leaders imagined) have risen to the occasion, and are seeking 
to prove themselves. However things may stand, even from 
the bare official reports (I place no reliance whatever on 
published personal narratives), it is abundantly clear that off 
Heligoland the German Navy did acquit itself well against 
overwhelming odds, and that we shall do best to esteem our 
enemies accordingly. 
For the rest, the most pleasing feature of the action off 
Heligoland is that our Admirals obviously take nothing for 
granted, any more than Nelson and hia compeers did in the 
great wars of a hundred years ago. " One Englishman is 
worth three Frenchmen" w.ia taught to raw recruits; but our 
Admiralty wisely saw to it that their forces were ever two to 
one ;it tho crucial point! 
In concluding this sui-vey of the Heligoland affair, it ii 
necessary to draw attention to the curious story (voucherl for 
by the official Press Bureau) that when the German cruisers 
sank, and their survivors were being rescued, German officers 
were observed shooting their own men. 
Unofficial stories to the effect that German prisoners 
assert that they had been given to imderstand that if captured 
they would be put to death by the British with great barbarity 
may bo dismissed as a fiction, probably iuventied this side of 
the North Sea. Even if told it on the other side, it is very 
unlikely that the most unsophisticated German sailor would 
really have believed it; it ia certain that no German officer 
did or does. So the " to save them from a worse fate " story 
can go by the board at once. 
The shooting incident would never have appeared in an 
official report unless it were absolutely authenticated. It did 
take place, and the explanation, as I read it, is this: "Dei- 
Tag " (which we used to believe was merely a British scare- 
monger's fancy) was a very real thing indeed to the officers of 
the German Navy. 
We have probably even now no conception aa to what it 
meant to those who treated our Fleet so handsomely at Kiel 
only a few short weeks ago. 
In the past I liave known German naval officers fairly 
well. At any rate, well enough to know that they would never 
lose their heads in any circumstances sufficiently badly to 
shoot their own fellow sufferers without some very good and 
valid reason. 
That reason is not to be supplied over the circumstanco 
tliat small cruisera were sunk by the battle cruiser squadron. 
The obvious ia necessarily the obvious. 
We must, therefore, seek further back for the cause of 
this cxtraordinaiy incident. It is probably to be found in tho 
vague happenings of Act Two. I take it that in one or more 
of the German cruisers under fire from our destroyers and 
light cru'sers panic occurred. Or, if there were no actual 
par..-c, there was shooting so wild that it amounted to the 
samo thing. Game to the last, the German officers spent their 
last moments in avenging themselves upon those who they 
cre.iited with being responsible for the failure of "Der T.t^'' 
as tliey had realised it. 
In a general way, this action is probably regarded a.? 
insensate and insane. It may be so, but I view it in quite 
nnother light. To my mind it indicates that, whatever the 
German bluejacket may be, his officers are of the highest 
possible metal. We will do well to revJrence and respect thcui 
as enemies worthy of our steel. 
Officially, Germany has admitted a defeat in tho affair of 
Heligoland. But v,-e shall be wise to realise that at sea wo ara 
fighting against men who arc inspired by a spirit which it is 
i:' 
