September 5. 1914 
LAND AXD WATER 
I 
ways : £be oarorcs her position both against Russia and agaiiiet 
England— the two States, that is, with whose hostility w« have 
to reckon. Turkey, .also, is the only Power which can threaten 
England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the Bhort sea route 
and the laud communications to India. We ouglit to spare uo 
ea/jrifices to eecm-e this counti-y as au ally for the eventuality of a 
war with England or Russia. Turkey'e interests arc ours. It is 
also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her 
oomniaudiiig position on t!ie Bosp.horus and at the Dardanelles, 
tliat this important key should not be transfiirtd to the keeping 
of foreigners, and belong to Ruteia or England. 
• •*••• 
We have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese 
friendship. . . . The apparently peaceful state of things must 
not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but Jione the less formid- 
able, crisis — perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of 
the German nation. 
Wo have fought in the la-st great wars for our national union 
and our position among the Powers of Europe; wo now must 
decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a ]Vorld 
Kmj'irr, and procure for Geiinan spirit niul Gemian ideas that 
lit recognition which hac been hitherto withheld from them. 
Save afl regards Japan, the further the Prophet has 
(]«parte<i from his own coiiutry the less true have been his 
prognostications. The distant fields on to wliich he cast his 
vielon were gi-ecn, hut not as verdant as General Bernhardi, 
v.ho appears to have taken as true the leaflets used in our 
domestic political strife where any and all sides pi'edicted the 
vce to come from our English-speaking cousins across the sea, 
from our brotlicrs in Canada, Austi-ailia, Xew Zealand, South 
Africa; from India, Egj'pt, and all other parts and depen- 
dencies of our Empii-e, if this, that, or the other political 
nrstrum were not swallowed or rejected. He believes, or 
wishes his readers to believe, that the United States of America 
are anxiously waiting the pyschological moment to blot our 
Empire out for ever- -our great colonies and dependencies were 
Jooking for the moment when they could shake themselves free 
from England's detestable gi"asp, India to drive the last of our 
r.Tce into the ocean and thus be free, Tuikey to take Egypt 
back into its empty crop and there digest her people at leisure. 
And when all these moments came about the day of Germany 
would arrive to shatter the British Empire to pieces and on 
the dust build up her own. Pity he was too soon for Mr. 
'■ Odell " of the Constitutional Club. The Kaiser's spy system 
had not then comc> up to date. - 
DOUBT ! THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM. 
\\ ith all Bornhardi's enthusiasm and prophetic ardour 
bis military instinct warned him that there were difficulties 
ahead. Tliese he sets out with a frankness equalling his 
•pprcciatiou of the goal to which Germany means to march : 
Spain Alone of the renvaining European Powers has any inde- 
pendent importance. She has developed a certain- a»tagoii"isni to 
rronce by her Mi^rccco policy, and may, therefore, become even- 
tually a factor in German policy. The pe'tty States, on the contrary, 
form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, 
prove to pos-scss a by no means negligible importance : the small 
Balkan States for Austria and Tuikey; Denmark, Holland, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany. 
Switzerland and Belgium count »s neutral 'The former was 
declared neutral at the Congres* of Vienna on November 20th, 
1815, under the collective guarantee of the signatory Powers; 
Belgium, in the Treaties of London of November l&th, 1831, and of 
April 19th, 1839, on the part of the five Great Powers, the Xether- 
landA. and Belgium itself. 
If we look at these conditions aa a whole, it appears that on 
the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple 
.\lliancc and that of the States united against it by alliance and 
agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the 
leaj;ue. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose 
wfight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in 
favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indis- 
putably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval 
superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical condi- 
tions, she may cause the greatert damage to Germany by cutting 
off hrr maxitime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army 
available for a continental war. When all considerations aje taken 
into account, our opponents have a, political superiority not to be 
underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by 
large colonial levies and a strong English landing force, this 
superiority would lie asserted on land a!so. If Italy i-eally with- 
draws from thejfriplo Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will 
be united against Gennany and Austria, 
Under these conditions the position of Germany is extra- 
ordinarily ditiicuJt. 
• • ■ • • « • 
An iiit«n£ive Aolonial policy is for us especially an absolute 
necessity, 
A highly interesting examination follows of the political 
complications of the European Powers. Bernhardi docs not 
permit himself to harbour delusions. Although he had pre- 
viously set forth the position of Belgium as neutral, he now 
more minutely di.«cusscs her position, foreshadowing her 
cntxiring into a combination opposed to the Germanic alliance, 
and the Germanic view of the right to violate her neutrality. 
COMPLICATIONS TO BR CONSIDERED. 
We niuKt endeavour to obtain in lliis syttem our mer!te<I 
petition at the h^nd of a fedrrnlion c,f Certrsil Europr.-.n St.^^•y, 
ai:d thus rcduco the i.iMginary Euifvpean equili'oriiini, in one Wiy 
or tJie other, to its true value, ajid correspondingly to increase our 
own power. 
A f;u>ther question, suggested by the present political position, 
is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the 
beginning of the last century nnder quite other conditions — in fact, 
under a different conception of what constitutes a State — can, or 
ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was pro- 
claimed neutral, lio one contemplated that she would lay clainr to 
a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well Be asked 
whether the acquisition of such tenitor-y is not if/so facto a breach 
of neutrality, for a State from which — ^theoretically at least — all 
danger of war has been removed has no right to enter into political 
competition with the other States. This argument is the more 
justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a 
war of Germany against France and England, the two last-men- 
tioned States would try to unite tlieir forces in Belgium. Lastly, 
the neutrality of the Congo State' must be termed more thiiii 
problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a 
non-neutral country. The conception of permanent ueutranty is 
entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which cair 
only attain its highest moral aims in coniiK:tition with other States. 
Its complete development presupposes such competition. 
Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the 
internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights 
of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously inter- 
preted, and powerful States have never refrained from a liigh- 
haudtd interference in the internal afi'airs of smaller ones. 
THE RUSSIAN STEAM-ROLLER. 
If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast 
Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, 
from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better 
prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly 
with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the W'est powerful 
allies, who are impatiently waiting to jcin <li an attack on 
Germany. The geographical conditions and means of conununi- 
cation there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of 
power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which liatred of 
Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a 
war, and a victoi-y over Germany and Austria would not only 
open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the 
political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. 
Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats 
in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected 
on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. 
Should Russia, then, after weighing the.se chances, launch out 
into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably 
assume a quite different chai'acter from that, for example, of a, 
Fr.anco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the 
first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat 
her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly 
ever, thocefore, become a struggle for political existeneej anil 
cause th.nt straining of every nerve which such a stmggle entails. 
» • » » • • 
We cannot count on seeing a great commander .at our head; 
a sPioiiil Frtdeiiik Ihu Oicat will hardly .appear. 
We cannot blink the faot that we have to deal with immense 
milit.ai'y difficulties, if we are to attain our own political' ends 
or repel successfully the attack of our opponents. 
GERMANY'S DOORS-OPEN AND SHUT. 
In the first pface, the geographical configuration and position 
of our counti-y are very mifavourable. Our open easteni frontier 
offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre 
of the Government and administration, lies in dangerons proximity 
to it. Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned 
on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, 
no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion, and 
neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier 
of the Rhine can easily bo turned through Switzerland. There, 
of course, the character of the country offers considerable diffi- 
culties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not 
be easy to brealc down their resistance. Their army is no despicable 
factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains 
>hey would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. 
The natural approaches from the North Sea to th<- Baltic, 
the Sound, and the Great Belt, are commanded by foi'eign guns, 
and can easily fall a prey to our enemies. 
_ The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms 
m itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through 
Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner 
that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the 
south and south-cast alone are we secured by Austria from direct 
invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may 
have to face attacks on three sides. This circumstance compels ii's 
to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but 
it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to 
act on a correct and consistent plan. 
ISOLATION. 
If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal 
the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from 
.anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, 
France, .and Russia have a common interest in brealting down our 
power. This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. It 
is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germ.any's 
power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as" is 
natural in our pofition, we must win it by the sword against vastly 
superior foes. 
Such a war— for us more than for any other nation— mnst 
be a war for our political and national existence. This must be 
so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost 
aiuiihilating us by land and by sea. 
We must therefdie prepare not only for a short war, but for 
a^ protracted campaigii. We miift be .armed in order to complete 
tne overthrow of our enemies, should the vii lory is:* ours; ami, if 
worited. to continue to defend ourselves in the very heart of our 
countiy until suceeiis at last is won. 
ir.» 
