September 13, 1914 
LAND AND WATEK 
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THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOQ 
THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 
I PRO POSE in my notes of this week to begin 
with an examination of the Eastern field of the 
war. Because here tilings have been brought 
to at least a local decision. 
From the very beginning of this vast series of 
European campaigns it has rightly been taken for 
granted that a factor of time was involved peculiar to 
this universal war. 
In aU wars the factor of time is a positive 
detciTninant. That is, it is a factor the neglect of 
which makes nonsense of all the rest, and the under- 
standing of which is essential to the understanding of 
all the rest. But in this war, more than in any other 
which I can call to mind, the factor of time is 
emphasised with extreme simplicity and absolute 
effect. 
To repeat what has been said upon all sides (and 
more than once in these pages), the forces of the two 
Germanic Powers, threatened from the West and from 
the East, find themselves superior to the AVestern, at 
the mo.st equal to the Eastern, enemy. By an acci- 
dent, happy for the Germanic powers, the Eastern 
enemy cannot enter the field until long after the 
Western enemy. Therefore it is the whole business 
of the Germanic forces so tlireatened to destroy the 
menace from the West before the menace from the 
East comes into play. 
The Western enemy of the GeiTnanic Powers is 
the French Army, which, with its six per cent, con- 
tingent of English and its unexpected and fortunate 
addition in strength received through the resistance 
of the Belgian Militia and Trained Regulars, stands 
to the Germanic Powers in the proportion of rathei* 
more than 1 to rather less than 3. The Eastern 
enemy is the Russian Army, which is superior in 
mere number to the Armies of the two Gei-manic 
Powers combined. 
Let me show first in more detail than has 
hitherto been attempted in these pages why the 
pressure exercised by the Russian Army will be felt 
later than is generally imagined. 
That Russia would mobilise more slowly than 
France has been amply appreciated. There was here 
an element of delay amounting to a fortnight or three 
weeks. 
!• 
