LAND AND WATEE 
September 12, 1914 
That Tiussia -n-oukl, once mobilised and once 
advancing, be unable to bring that jjressure to bear 
during the first A\ceks of the war was less generally 
ajjpreciated. 
AVhen the critic measures the minimnm distance 
between some point of the Eussian frontier and the 
Prussian capital of Berlin he is struck by the short- 
ness of the line between the one and the other. 
That point upon the Eussian frontier nearest to 
Berlin is to be foimd at Pyzdrj, where the river Warta 
leaves the territory- of Eussian Poland to enter the 
territory of Prussian Poland, and from this point to 
Berlin itself is almost exactly 282 kilometres, or 
between 173 and ISO miles. 
If, therefore, the problem were merely one of a 
Eussian advance from that point upon the Eussian 
frontier to the capital of Prussia the factor of time 
• woidd not be of the striking importance it is. The 
advance required in order to strike at the Prussian 
capital would not be half as much again as the advance 
required to strike from the German frontier in the 
West at the French ca2)ital. 
But the jn'oblem cannot be stated upon these 
lines, and to envisage it so is quite to misunderstand 
the elements of the Eastern Campaign. 
There are two things which prevent so simjjle a 
plan as a direct advance on Berlin from the extreme 
of Eussian Poland. 
(1) It so hai>pens that the two Germanic Powers 
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"^' C A L I C I A \ 
PLAN- SHOWIXa HOW THE CONFIGURATION OF THE WESTEBX 
EUSSIAN FRONTIEB EENDEKS NECESSARY TUB TOTAL SUBJUGATIOX 
OF AUSTRIA AND EAST PRUSSIA, IN ORDER TO SECURE THK 
I'LANKS OF THE ABJIT, BEFORE THE DHIECT MARCH ON BERLIN 
IS BEGUN, 
lie (by the configuration of the Eussian frontier on 
the west) upon the flank of any such advance 
towards Berlin. Were the Eussian Armies merely 
to go straight before them in an advance upon 
the Prussian capital they Avoidd leave behind them 
unbeaten upon theii* right in A, as upon the left in B, 
to the North and to the South, great bodies A Prussian 
and B Austrian, which, by marching, the one South, 
the other North, along such lines as (1) and (2) into 
Eussian Poland, would fall upon the communications 
of sucli a Eussian advance and destroy it. Therefore 
those who draw up the genei-al Eussian plan must first 
allow for the holding of German territory as far as the 
line C — D on the North — Avhich is the line of the 
Lower Vistula — and for the holding of Austrian 
territory up to the line E — F, that is the whole of 
Galicia, before an advance upon Berlin can be under- 
taken. It is not until the advancing Eussian columns 
are, roughly, abreast along the whole line North and 
South from Danzig to Cracow that a direct East and 
West march upon the heart of GeiTnauy could begin. 
(2) It so happens that the Northern of these two 
flanking fields (to wit, the provinces of East and West 
Prus.*ia uj) to the line of the Vistula, between Thorn 
and Danzig) is composed for the most part of country 
])ariicularly defensible, a mass of marsh and lake ill- 
provided with communications. Furthei-, the ultimate 
boundary of all this, the line of the Vistula itself, is 
artificially defended by strong works, especially at 
Danzig and at Thoni, its two extremities. In other 
words, just where the Eussians had to meet their most 
formidable human opposition, that of the Prussian 
military organisation, they also had to meet the most 
formidable natural conditions. 
On the other hand there is a form of advance 
which Eussia can undertake against Germany and 
which will bring pressure to bear upon Gemiany long 
before any direct march upon Berlin has begun. If 
Eussia occupies Galicia thoroughly and in this region 
thoroughly defeats the mass of the Austrian forces : 
if she then proceeds Westward and by North down 
the Valley of the Oder, she will be striking immediately 
at the Easternmost of the great industrial regions of 
the German Empire, and will thus be bringing 
immediate i)ressiu-e to bear upon the whole German 
social system. 
That first great industrial region is Silesia : All 
that U])per Valley of the Oder of which Breslau is 
the capital. 
Now it is probable from the nature of the recent 
Eussian successes (with which I shall next deal) that 
Silesia -will be struck before the line of the Lower 
Oder is reached ; and when the Silesian Plain, with its 
dense population, its flourishing industries, and the 
open road it affords into Saxony (another wealthy 
industrial region) is reached by the Eussian armies, 
anxiety will for the first time be seriously felt by the 
Gei-man Commanders in France. 
But how long will it be before even Silesia, let 
alone the line of the Lower Oder or Berlin itself, can 
be thus threatened ? 
In order to answer that question we have to con- 
sider the measure of the Eussian success in Galicia and 
the distances involved by an advance after this success. 
The Eussian success in Galicia has, at the moment M 
of writing, ever}' appearance of being decisive, and it ' 
would seem as though the progress of the Eussian 
invasion would now be continued almost unchecked 
until Silesia itself was reached and the pressm-e upon 
Germany begun. 
For the first time since the opening of the cam- M 
paigns in Western and Eastern Europe one is able to 
give here a consecutive account of a decisive action. 
Indeed, this is the first decisive action that has taken 
place at all since the opening of the Campaign. AVe 
haA-e, further, more detailed accounts of what took 
place than we have hitherto had of anything that 
has happened in the Western theatre of war. 
To begin at the beginning. 
While a rapid and, as it has turned out, prema- 
ture Eussian advance was taking place through East 
Prussia, to the north of that great projection upon 
the map ANhicli is made by Eussian Poland, the 
Austrians to the south of that same projection had 
invaded Eussian Poland with equal rapidity and 
success. 
Before we go further it is important to remember 
here what the jjolitical object of the two Gei-maaic 
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