LAND AND W A T E E 
September 12, 1914 
from the town of Ki-asnik, had forced those ojiponents 
back without enveloping or breaking them. 
Actions of this sort repeated in the eastern 
theatre of the war were exactly what the General Staff 
at Berlin had planned and desu-ed. Their repetition 
would ultimately prove to the llussians the 
impossibility of invading Hapsburg or Ilohenzollern 
territory in force. 
But as it so happened, the whole effect of this 
success Avas first negatived and then completely ruined 
by what took place immediately to the east. 
This main advanced Austrian body which was 
marching upon Lublin and which we call Austrian 
Army No. I. had to the east of it, that is upon its 
right flank, another force which we will call Austrian 
Anny No. II. This Austrian Army No. II. was 
drawn up upon a line the left of which reposed upon 
Ivamionka and the right of which extended, roughly, 
south and eastward from that town down to Halicz. 
This Austrian Army No. II. was presumably at 
first no larger than Austrian Army No. I. which was 
making the main advance upon Lublin ; for the second 
Amiy was only thus extended tipon the flank of the 
first to protect tlie first army from being turned and to 
cover fi-om attack the communications, and those depots 
lying in the fortified town of Lemberg, for Army 
No. II., and for Army No. I. in the fortified town of 
Przemysl. 
NoAV this flanking force, Army No. II., evidently 
came upagainst somethingmuchbiggerthanitexpected. 
It had to be rapidly reinforced to meet the Russian 
bodies which it discovered upon its front, and the action 
to which it was compelled became, against the will of 
the Austrian commanders, much more imj)ortant 
than that other action in which Army No. I. had 
been engaged near Krasnik. 
Tliese reinforcements were so rapid, and so 
numerous that when the shock came more than six 
Austrian Army Corps were in line in this second 
Austrian Anny between Kamionka and Halicz. 
They were the 3rd, the 7th, the 11th, the 12th, the 
13th, and the 14th, with five Divisions of Cavalry 
and some unknown contingent of the Last Reserves, 
tlie Landsturm. 
It is especially to be noted that this great con- 
centration of men amounted to something like a third 
of all those Austria-Hungary can put into the field. 
If we add to it Ai-my No. I. upon its left much 
more than half, perhajjs two-thirds, of the total 
Austrian forces were present upon this Galician 
front. The Russian Anny marching to meet 
this Anny No. II. of the Austrians lay at first 
with its left upon the railroad at Dubno, its 
right bejond Luzk. It crossed the frontier on 
August 20th, the day when the Germans were 
marching through Brussels; it pushed back the 
Austrian outposts very slowly ; indeed, its advance 
appears to have been heavily contested. It was 
not until Tuesday, September 1st, ten daj-s ago, that 
the full mass of the Austrian Ai-my No. II. felt the 
shock. 
The Russian attack lasted apparently over forty- 
eight hours, and upon the third day (just at tlie 
moment when the German advance in France had 
come to the neighbourhood of Paris) the Austrian 
forces of Army No. II. broke and partially dissolved. 
It was not a victory like Sedan in Avhich an army 
is surrounded and wholly destroyed. But it was a 
victory of the j^artial type in which the cohesion of 
the enemy's force as a whole, and therefore its military 
value, is so largely impaired as to destroy all its power 
for the immediate future and most of its power 
throughout the Campaign. Very nearly one-third of 
the men here drawn up to meet the Russians fell into 
the hands of the enemy, as did 200 of theii- guns, and 
the decisive natiu'e of the result is still better proved 
by the abandonment of Lemberg. 
The situation by September 5th, last Satiu'day, 
was that of the accompanying sketch, with one 
SEMANOIR 
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BKCOND POSITION Or THB AnSTEIAN AEMUtS ATTltB THS BATTLB 
OF LEUBXBO. 
Austrian army (I.) successful in the North and 
trying to break a Russian force before it in the 
neighbourhood of Lublin-Cholm, while the other 
army (II.) had broken before a larger Russian force 
in front of Lemberg and had abandoned that town 
to the enemy. 
ImmetGately after this Russian success in front 
of Lemberg it became clear that this defeat of Austrian 
Army No. II., complete as it was, or rather becaiise 
it was so complete, was no more than the beginning 
of the business. 
It is obvious from the sketch that for the 
Russians sO to destroy Austrian Army No. II. was 
equivalent to their putting themselves immediately 
upon the flank of Austrian Army No. I. ; and the great 
Russian force which had put out of action one-third 
of the military power of Austria in front of Lemberg 
was now in a position to attack the second third of 
that military power — the fraction which I have called 
the Austrian Army No. I. — in flank. It could 
threaten its communications with Przemysl, its base. 
Here a very curious situation seems to have 
ai'isen. Au.strian Anny No. I., threatened in flank 
by the enemy after the defeat of Austrian Army 
No. II., should have retreated as fast as it coidd to 
save itself from being turned. The first reports 
received were to the effect that it had so retreated. 
But later reports told a different story, and what seems 
to have happened after is that Austrian Army No. I. 
instead of falling back made a desperate attempt to 
get round the rear of the successfid Russian force 
upon its right in the direction A — B. In that 
attempt it is said so far to have failed. It is even 
said to have lost 5,000 prisoners, and to have had the 
10th Army Corps cut up in the attempt. It is 
obvious that a daring stroke of this sort is paid for in 
proportion to its daring. 
Austrian Army No. I. therefore was compelled to 
retreat, and, at the time of writing this (Wednesday 
evening), the Russians already claimed a partial 
victory over its right wing. The retreat of the 
first Austrian Anny cannot have taken place on 
Przemysl, for that line was threatened by the Russian 
advance from Lemberg. The retreat miist be well 
to the west, towards Cracow, and the Russian 
message is to the effect that this Austrian Army 
No. I. thus in retreat was caught in flank and 
severely pressed. How thorough that defeat has 
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