LAND AND WATER 
September 12, 1914 
The foi-m in wliicli this problem presents itself 
has been so clearly put in the general Press, that the 
repetition of it here may seem tedious to the reader. 
I will, nevertheless, repeat its main elements, because, 
simple as they are, they must be fully grasped if the 
future of this campaign is to be understood. 
At the end of last week it seemed as though an 
investment of, or at least an attack upon, the ITorthern 
and Eastern sections of the fortifications of Paris was 
intended by the German commanders. They had 
successfully advanced with amazing rapidity from the 
Belgian frontier to the gates of the French cai)ital. 
Tlicrc was not anyone following and commenting 
ujion the military history of the campaign who did 
not hope (if his heart was with the Allies) that this 
task would be undertaken by the invaders — or who 
did not di'ead it if his symj^athies were with the 
Germans. 
It is almost self-evident that to undertake a task 
of such magnitude as the attack upon the Northern 
and Eastern forts alone in a perimeter of over 100 
miles, and that in the presence of an unbeaten army, 
would be to imperil the Avhole future of the German 
forces of invasion. But it was suggested in these 
comments — 
(1) Tliat the overwhelming advance upon Paris 
would never have been made unless Paris had been its 
true objective. 
(2) That the moral importance of entering Paris, 
both positive in its effect upon the German nation 
and negative in its effect upon the Allies, Avould 
hardly permit the Gennan commanders to give up the 
prey, even temporaril3^ 
As a matter of fact, the right wing — that is the 
extreme western extremity — of the Gennan invading 
line was, upon Saturday and Sunday last, deliberately 
halted. The forces opposed to it at the moment (in 
the neighbourhood of Creil) were certainly not suffi- 
cient to have compelled this halt, or to have imposed it 
upon a reluctant enemy. The change of plan, though 
certainly made at the last moment, was deliberately 
chosen and as deliberately acted upon by those who 
were responsible for the German movements as a 
whole. And the change of plan was this. Of the 
forces which had marched, one overlapping the other, 
until the German army of invasion was stretched over 
the whole of northern France from the neighbourhood 
of Paris at Ci'eil in the west to Verdun in the east, 
the extreme western ones turned suddenly at right 
angles to their previous course and began marching 
south and east in the directions indicated in the sketch 
below by the arrows. 
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Paris was left neglected upon the right ; and 
while the remainder of the Gennan line was advancing 
southward (each body directly towards the front of 
the position it occupied) these western units alone 
(conventionally known here as the First German 
Army) turned partly away from, but in the main per- 
pendicular to, the original direction which they had 
hitherto strictly and rapidly followed from Mons and 
Charleroi towards the French capital. 
Why did they do this ? What had happened ? 
The answer to such questions can only be found 
in one of two alternatives. 
Either {a) the whole German advance upon Paris 
Avas not intended as a fundamental part of the campaign, 
but was in the nature of a feint ; or, {b) the German 
advance had on its western extreme come ujj against 
a surprise ; had met forces unexpectedly strong, had 
come up against an unsuspected reserve maintained 
by the French deliberately during all the retreat, 
and maintained at the cost of weakening the defensive 
line which retired so precipitately (but remained 
unbroken) during that retreat. 
There is indeed a third possibility, which has only 
to be named to be rejected. As it has been suggested 
in some quarters I will not leave it unnoticed. 
This tlm-d conjectui-e is that the cessation of the 
Gennan advance upon Paris was due to an exhaustion 
of that advance m numbers and in energy. There are 
many reasons why this conjecture may be safely 
rejected. 
It is evident that the advance was planned in 
great detail, and with a full organisation of its daily 
effort and its reserves of strength. 
It is equally evident that the check, had it been 
due to this cause, would have taken the fonn of an 
increasing exhaustion long before Paris was reached, 
and of that exhaustion there has been no sign. 
Fm-ther, the extreme German right wing, which 
was thus suddenly turned perpendicular to its original 
direction, has been so turning in these last few days, 
with full energy ; it is still defending itself vigorously 
against what are obviously superior numbers. It has, 
as I write, taken a strong counter offensive upon the 
Ourcq. While the deliberate choice of a new and, at 
first sight, puzzling direction towards the east and 
south (while Paris lay to the west) is still further 
evidence of a change of plan very different in character 
from mere bewilderment, or from any confusion due 
to some miscalculation by the German commanders of 
their remaming energy. M 
Nothing can explain this unexpected wheel but 
the necessity of a new plan, and that necessity arising 
from the discovery, behind and in the neighbourhood 
of Paris, of a large French reserve force of wdiose 
existence, oi% at any rate, of whose numbers, the 
enemy were hitherto ignorant. 
\Vliat is that new plan which has thus been 
suddenly adopted by the Germans, Avhen they dis- 
covered this unexpected weight of men on their right, 
and what are its chances of success ? 
While the German advance on Paris was taking 
place, the various bodies of the German Line between 
the Meuse and Paris were occupied in attempting to 
outflank the Allied line which was retreating before 
them. In any one day of the advance, after the line 
of the Sambre was abandoned, the position was always 
somewhat after the fashion of this diagram. The Allied 
line being held by bodies A B C D of the enemy, 
opposed to its own bodies F G H K, fresh bodies, 
draA\Ti from the superior numbers of the Germans, 
kept coming round, as at E, to envelop the Allied line 
if possible. This attempt to envelop was only 
avoided day after day by the continued rapid, but 
luckily orderly, retreat of the Allies upon positions to 
e» 
