LAND AND WATER 
September 12, 1914 
thouo-li pressed in upon their right at ]M will have 
achieved thcii" immediate object. 
For:— 
(a) Tliey will liave compelled the Frencli 
bodies at L. L. either to retreat precipitately 
through the gap of Nancy between Toul and 
E^)inal, or to be caught in reverse and 
annihilated : 
{/j) They will have permitted their own 
army in Lorraine (K K K) to pass through 
the gap of Nancy and to join up in a direct 
forward march with what had hitherto been 
their northern annies cut off from them by the 
projecting fortress of Verdun. 
(c) More important still, they will have 
wiped out the strategical factor of the fortified 
frontier line Verdun — Toul, and Epinal— 
BeHort. For once the Germans are behind 
that line, that line might as well not exist ; 
and the garrisons within the fortresses can be 
picked up at their leisure. 
(d) Fbially, and most important of all, the 
Germans {if tlieij achieve this pushing back or 
breaking of the French line in the neighbour- 
hood of V.) will pick lip communications 
(2), (2), (2) far preferable to the onlg ones 
they now have along (1), (1). The former 
(2), (2), (2), are what they have always wished 
to have, but have been debarred from by the 
baiTier of the fortified frontier. They are lines 
leading directly and shortly to their great 
depots on the upper llliine and in Lorraine, 
well served with rolling stock, numerous, and 
parallel. Quite another matter from the long, 
crowded and insufficient lines (1), (1), through 
the intensely hostile ten-itory of Belgium. 
Here along (2), (2), is a mass of railways — no 
less than six main lines, coming straight 
across the Ehine — to feed the invading army ; 
and the threat to their existing lines at 
(1), (1), even if the Frencli pressure around 
the Gremian right at M continues and develops 
to the North, will have become negligible, 
because the German line will have new and far 
better sei-vice of supply from Ahace-Lon-aine. 
This should make it clear that everything 
depends in the next few days upon Avhether the 
Germans can (1) break through, or even (2) seriously 
push back the eastern part of the Allied line, that is 
the French troops stretched from liaK-Avay between 
Paris and Verdun to Verdun itself. 
In the first case, supposing the Germans break 
through in the neighbourhood of Vitr}', all that is 
caught to the east of the point, including the French 
troops in Lorraine at (L), (L), (L), woidd be doomed. 
In the second case, supposing they do not break 
the French line but merely cause it to retire, though no 
decision would have been arrived at (always supposing 
that the troops in Lorraine had time to retreat rapidly 
through the gap and join their felloAVS beyond) and 
though the German forces would still find an intact 
and unbroken anny in front of them, yet the invaders 
would have managed to establish themselves in a 
stronger position than before. The difficult and few 
Belgian lines of communication (1), (1), would have 
lost theii' importance. No turning movement against 
their north would then threaten their supplies, for 
their supplies would then come directly from the east, 
and they would have established new, much more 
numerous, much stronger, and much shorter lines of 
supply coming straight from dii-ectly over the Ehine 
behind them. 
One may illustrate the three possible results 
which the situation ajipears to present in the three 
following diagrams. 
In the fii'st, where it is supposed that the 
B^RIS 
H^- 
vitby'le 
francois 
SKETCH SHOWINO KBSCLT 
n THB ALLIED LIKE IS 
NEITUKB PRESSED 
NOR PIERCED. 
BACK 
Belfort 
Gennan forces in the north between Verdun and 
Paris have failed to pierce the Allied Hue, they will 
have no choice but to retire along their existing lines 
of communication (1) — (1), in the direction marked 
by the arrows. They will be in danger of being cut 
off from their fellows, K K, in Lorraine ; they will 
be in danger of seeing their only communications 
through Belgium and the north (1) (1) cut by the 
advance of the superior Allied forces along A B. 
In the second supposition, haAiug broken the 
BKICTCH SHOWING EBStrLT 
IF ALLIED LINE IS PIERCED. 
EELFORT 
Allied line at V, they would have cut off the French 
army in LoiTaine, L L L, and could confidently 
expect its destniction. At the same time, they would 
feel no more anxiety about then' old abandoned com- 
munications along (1) — (1), for they would dej)cnd,. 
when the French army in Lorraine had gone, upon 
the new and better communications along (2) — (2). 
Frotn that moment onwards the German forces icould be, 
for the first time, in a definite position of superiority- 
over the Allies in the Western field of the icar. 
Tlie thu'd possibility is that of the Allied line^ 
PARIS ^ \ 
TOUL 
kK 
SKETCH SHOWING RESULT 
IF THE ALLIED LINE IS 
PUSHED BACK, 
^^' 
u^^: 
v^^"- 
.\i^ 
^EPiNAL 
EELFORT 
pushed back into such a position as W W W, joined 
by the troops from Lon-aine and not broken, nor 
8* 
